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 Abstract	  
The field of management has built a wealth of literature on turnaround management as 
well as the effect unethical actions have upon organizations. However, there has been less 
study on the application of these topics to turnarounds specifically in small, regional, 
public institutions of higher education. It is important that an institution of higher 
education that has been affected by an ethical failure execute a turnaround to restore trust 
and faith in the organization, internally and externally. 
A small, regional, public institution of higher education in the upper Midwest 
recently encountered a series of organizational difficulties that negatively influenced its 
reputation. An organizational course change was necessary. The research titled “The 
Management of a Turnaround after an Ethical Breech in a Public Institution of Higher 
Education” applies the differing, yet related, theories of turnaround management and the 
restoration of trust to a small, public institution of higher education. The research 
investigated whether or not the university employees (faculty, staff, and administrators) 
believed that the organization and its leadership had demonstrated a process/path 
illustrative of a turnaround. Ultimately, the research investigated the theory that 
institutions of higher education can be restored through an ethical turnaround (Hofer, 
1980; Patnaik & Sahoo, 2010; Puffer & McCarthy, 2008). 
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Chapter 1: Introduction	  	  
Background and Overview	  
 Publius Syrus, a former slave from the 1st century BC, penned the poignant 
statement asking “what is left when honor is lost?” (as cited in Lyman, 1856, p. 31). 
Providing that “he who has forfeited his honor can lose nothing more” (as cited in 
Lyman, 1856, p. 31), Syrus commented upon the fact that honor, integrity, and ethics are 
all vital elements of character. Once honor and integrity have been tarnished, it is 
extraordinarily difficult to rebuild trust, faith, or belief in an individual or an 
organization. As human beings inevitably make mistakes that negatively influence the 
organizations in which they operate, it is imperative that the management profession 
study how to correct these faults and blunders in organizations. To rescue an institution 
from its member’s failings, managers and leaders must effectively “steer” or “turn” an 
organization in a different direction. 
Practitioners in management can partner with the Academy to understand the 
most successful techniques and strategies to turn an organization around with ethics and 
integrity while restoring the broken trust and faith of its stakeholders. Academics have 
the opportunity to assess the progress of organizations to change their future and restore 
themselves after their failings while practitioners can put the research into action. Though 
the relationship between management and academics is often challenging and fraught 
with trust issues, this research provides the opportunity for practitioners and academics to 
work together to study an intentional turnaround in an organization that was shattered by 
an ethical breach with a dramatically diminished customer base, a loss of trust and faith 
by the wider community, and in danger of losing its permission to operate and issue 
degrees as an educational institution. 	  
Statement of Research Problem	  
Organizations and individuals have the potential to create an environment with 
“the presence of chaos, change, poor management, and bullying in an organization” 
(Boddy, 2011, p. 376) that is difficult for its employees and stakeholders. Whether the 
leader has committed an ethical infraction or simply made a poor decision, perhaps even 
a series of poor decisions, the organization may lose its credibility with its stakeholders, 
even its legitimacy as an upright entity possessed of integrity, and the public faith (Puffer 
& McCarthy, 2008). Organizations that violate social, moral, or legal codes; commit 
fraud of any sort; engage in asset misappropriation, pollution, or environmental damage; 
discriminate against individuals; breach contracts, or leave obligations unfulfilled must 
correct their actions as quickly and honestly as possible to restore the faith and trust of 
the employees, customers, and other stakeholders (Puffer & McCarthy, 2008). Without 
correction, organizations run the risk of losing customers, employees, and financial 
support. Because organizational strife and chaos from individuals or the environment can 
significantly impact productivity, engagement, and workplace success, the entity’s 
efficiency, output, and service to customers will ultimately suffer (Boddy, 2011; 
“Remember Employee Engagement,” 2009). Employees that are constantly pressured by 
chaos and a tumultuous work environment with constant change, upheaval, and discord 
cannot perform at sufficient levels, negatively impacting output (Boddy, 2011; 
“Remember Employee Engagement,” 2009). 
Hofer’s (1980) focus on turnaround management supports the perspective that 
managers and leaders can correct an organization’s direction from its past mistakes 
through a change in the organization’s patterns of behavior and a transformation of 
perspectives. Entities such as Adelphia Communications, Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco, 
Siemens International, Waste Management Systems, WorldCom, and others have all 
committed a number of serious ethical infractions resulting in billions upon billions of 
dollars lost, livelihoods destroyed, and markets corrupted. However, only those 
organizations that changed their behavior and ethical focus were able to save their 
operations. Hofer (1980) stated, “no matter what the state of the economy, no company is 
immune from internal hard times” (p. 19) whether stagnation of operations, declining 
performance, financial difficulties, economic change, or ethical infractions. For any 
organization, a turnaround is necessary to redirect the entity in a more positive, upright, 
and focused direction. 
The field of management, specifically in strategy, has built a wealth of literature 
on turnaround management, as well as the effect unethical actions have upon 
organizations. Corporations and for-profit entities have already utilized many of these 
turnaround tactics to effect change, and anecdotal examples of turnaround management 
strategies have been documented in governmental organizations (Beeri, 2012). In 
addition, the label of turnaround has been used to describe improvement in student 
performance in public school systems as part of a comprehensive plan to reform 
education (Department of Education, 2012). However, there has been little to no study of 
the application of these topics to turnarounds after an ethical breach specifically in small, 
regional, public institutions of higher education. It is important that an institution of 
higher education affected by an ethical failure execute a turnaround to restore trust and 
faith in the organization, both internally and externally. 
A small, regional, public institution of higher education in the upper Midwest 
recently encountered a series of organizational difficulties that negatively influenced its 
reputation. An audit of its special, short-term international programs determined that the 
majority of special programs failed traditional degree standards (The Associated Press, 
2012; Donovan, 2012a; Donovan, 2012b). Specifically, the students that participated in 
the university’s short-term international programs often lacked legitimate, verified 
transcripts, language proficiency scores, general education requirements, and university 
degree requirements (Redden, 2012). Auditors determined that of the 594 degrees 
awarded, 10 were actually earned according to university standards (Redden, 2012). The 
2011-2012 academic year included the termination of the former president for enrollment 
inflation (and subsequent lawsuit of the former president for wrongful termination), a 
compliance and policy audit (improper degrees, human resources, and internal controls), 
and a financial audit that revealed additional ethical and procedural problems in the 
university (Finneman, 2012). 
The university and some of its employees took a series of actions and made 
decisions that negatively influenced the organization’s reputation and the value of its 
degrees. The entity and its members were accused of enrollment inflation/fraud, improper 
awarding of degrees without documentation, misuse of public funds, and inappropriate 
scholarship allocations. Because of these actions, the university’s reputation was 
negatively impacted, employee turnover increased, student enrollment decreased, 
donations and revenue diminished, and the former dean took his own life. An 
organizational course change was necessary. 
Redden (2012) provided that this case was “a cautionary tale” (para. 8). The 
director of the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admission Officers’ 
International Education Services, Dale Gough, agreed that this example was “not a 
singular case” (Redden, 2012, para. 8). As institutions of higher education pursue 
revenues from international students, illegitimate records, falsified documents, and 
overseas agents that do not adhere to strict university standards become more prevalent 
(Redden, 2012). Though this example was one case at a single institution of ignoring 
proper standards of operation in favor of revenues, anecdotal evidence of fraud and 
problems in university programs are more widespread (Kelley & Chang, 2007; Lieb, 
1998; Redden, 2012; Wright & Jefferson, 1998). The research titled “The Management of 
a Turnaround after an Ethical Breach in a Public Institution of Higher Education” applies 
the theory of turnaround management to a small, public institution of higher education. In 
addition, the research investigates the theory that institutions of higher education can be 
restored through an ethical turnaround (Hofer, 1980; Patnaik & Sahoo, 2010; Puffer & 
McCarthy, 2008). As fraud, problems, or simply failures in higher education leadership 
and operations are not confined to this single example, all institutions of higher education 
should take notice of this research to make organizational course corrections after a 
breakdown. While the specifics of the case that created the need for an organizational 
turnaround are unique to this university, the concepts of a turnaround are not. 
Research Question and Hypotheses	  
Did current university faculty, staff, and administrative members perceive that the 
organizational entity and its leadership have demonstrated a process/path illustrative of a 
turnaround as measured by responses to Beeri’s (2009) Turnaround Management 
Strategies in Local Authorities  
● H1. A positive correlation existed between a perception of turnaround 
in reorganization activities and all faculty, staff, and administrative 
employees. 
● H2. A positive correlation existed between a perception of stronger 
financial controls and faculty, staff, and administrative employees. 
● H3. A positive correlation existed between a perception of extending 
new marketing efforts to new consumers and faculty, staff, and 
administrative employees. 
● H4. A positive correlation existed between a perception of improving 
the local authority’s internal and external image and all faculty, staff, 
and administrative employees. 
● H5. There was a moderate correlation between a perception of 
rebuilding stakeholder trust in the local authority and those employees 
considered mostly staff or mostly faculty. 
● H6. There was a moderate correlation between a perception of 
reshaping and improving the organizational culture and climate and 
faculty and staff employees. 
● H7. There was a positive correlation between a perception of 
rebuilding stakeholders trust in the local authority and the level of 
participation in extracurricular activities on campus. 
● H8. There was a positive correlation between a perception of 
rebuilding stakeholders trust in the local authority and the number of 
hours per week employees spend on campus executing their specific 
job duties. 
● H9. There was a positive correlation between a perception of 
redefining the core mission and all faculty, staff, and administrative 
employees. 
● H10. There was a positive correlation between defining a common 
vision of the local authority and the levels of management. 	  
Definition of Terms and Constructs	  
 The essence of a turnaround was defined by Pandit (2000) as merely “the 
recovery of a firm’s economic performance following an existence-threatening decline” 
(p. 32). This is true regardless of whether the organizational decline occurred over a short 
or long period of time, or if the decline occurred very quickly because of an event or 
series of events that placed an entity in jeopardy (Pandit, 2000). A turnaround can also be 
thought of as a reversal in the direction or course of an activity or action, transforming or 
altering the entity, its allegiances, policies, roles, or trends (Hofer, 1980). Paul (2005) 
viewed a turnaround as “the reversal of performance from decline and failure to recovery 
and success” (p. 123). A turnaround is a recovery, often couched in financial terms such 
as net income, return on investment, return on assets, or other accounting ratios, 
performance improvement, or sustained positive performance (Pandit, 2000; Schendel & 
Patton, 1975, 1976, 1978; Schendel, Patton, & Riggs, 1974, 1976). 
As these standards are mostly financial metrics, Beeri (2009), following the work 
of Boyne (2004; 2006), commented upon the need to measure turnaround through 
retrenchment, repositioning, and reorganization as entities outside of the for-profit sector 
may not be able to quantify turnaround or change merely in accounting terms. Beeri 
(2009) defined retrenchment as “reduction in the scope or size of the organization aimed 
at releasing resources from unproductive sections that can be reinvested in more 
productive ones” (p. 131) in terms of efficiency and stability. The category of 
repositioning as addressed by Beeri (2009) specifically focuses upon effectiveness, 
growth, innovation, and redefining the mission, vision, and goals of the entity to current 
or new customers. In addition, “any internal organizational change, including changes 
within leadership personnel” (Beeri, 2009, p. 132) is considered reorganization, and 
works in conjunction with strategies to retrench or reposition to turn the organization in a 
new direction. 
 Public institution of higher education was defined and delimited in this case to a 
small, regional, public institution of higher education that provides degrees in various 
fields and is funded via public monies. The educational institution was classified as an 
entity that was created and operated with the intent of fulfilling an educational purpose or 
need in society that is exempt from federal income tax to benefit its stakeholders or 
society as a whole (Tolbert, Moore, & Wood, 2010). Because the population of the study 
was a single small, regional, public institution of higher education, stakeholders are 
usually defined as employees (faculty, staff, administrators, and management), students, 
and the public. The public included the community external to the institution of higher 
education in which the institution resides and included the business community, town, 
and surrounding area that work with the institution. However, this research was limited to 
those employed by the university as a current faculty (annual contract, tenure-track, or 
tenured), staff, manager, or administrative member. 	  
Assumptions, Delimitations, and Limitations	  
As this research was undertaken in a single small, regional, public university, the 
researcher made the initial assumption that the respondents would understand the 
questions asked, as well as provide honest and accurate responses. While this research 
was strictly anonymous, the researcher also assumes that respondents believed that it was 
anonymous and would answer questions truthfully, valuing the intent and its purpose. 
The first delimitation of this research was the intentional narrowing of the scope 
of the population to those currently employed at the single university. As these issues 
were unique to the organization at a specific time, the setting and time of the study were 
narrowly focused in both categories. While the researcher worked to gather as much data 
as possible through publicized documentation and survey results, the final outcome of the 
organization’s turnaround will likely take a number of years beyond the study to 
complete. Therefore, this study was a snapshot of a moment in time at the institution. 
 The limitations of this study included general weaknesses in the survey 
methodology. Though the researcher has taken care to use established instruments that 
are found to be reliable and valid, findings may not be generalizable outside of the chosen 
population. As the surveys were substantial in nature, requiring approximately 15-30 
minutes to complete, there is a risk of survey fatigue. To mitigate this risk and encourage 
the most important questions on the instruments were answered, the demographic 
questions were placed after the major instrument. Low response rates and incomplete 
responses are also inherent weaknesses of the survey methodology. The researcher 
attempted to mitigate this limitation by garnering public support from the organization’s 
Office of Academic Affairs to encourage participation (see “Procedure” below). 
 Another limitation of this research is the fact that participants were those 
individuals currently employed at the university, likely skewing the research data. As a 
number of individuals left the university between the time of the ethical breach and the 
time of this research, the responses were skewed as to the opinions and perceptions of 
those currently employed. Because of the nature of the major research question, asking 
whether current faculty, staff, and members of administration (who may or may not be 
considered “managers”) perceived that the entity and leadership had demonstrated a 
process/path illustrative of a turnaround, this research did not investigate the perspectives 
of those individuals that left the organization. Therefore, this issue certainly limits the 
responses to individuals that may be location-bound, could not find an alternative 
position elsewhere, or those that might be especially dedicated to improving the 
organization. In addition, members of the university that have arrived since the breach 
may not view the turnaround in the same light as those employees that have been at the 
institution for a longer period, however, due to the potential ethical risks involved, 
employment length at the university was not investigated. 
 The potential ethical risk of discomfort to the respondents also existed. To 
mitigate, the researcher received approvals from both the George Fox University and 
organizational Institutional Research Boards. In addition, because the issues at the entity 
were so personal and poignant to the respondents, there was the potential for both 
discomfort and inconvenience to the respondents. The survey instrument was designed to 
look at the improvements at the university, but could have brought up unpleasant 
memories of the university’s downturn as well as created feelings of organizational 
pressure, biasing the responses. Because the past issues may have resulted in feelings of 
uncertainty about the future, it was necessary to protect respondents’ identities and 
confidentiality. The respondents were also given an ‘out’ if they do not want to complete 
the survey, protecting the respondents. In addition, certain questions such as “when did 
you start working for the university,” “are you tenured,” and various other potentially 
identifiable demographic questions were not asked as they were prohibited by the 
organization’s Institutional Research Board (A. Stark, personal communication). 
 In addition, there existed an inherent risk of researcher bias as the researcher is 
employed at the organization under study (see Role of the Researcher below). Because of 
the imperative need to mitigate and guard against researcher bias, the researcher chose to 
engage in a quantitative study with established instruments. The identities and positions 
of all respondents were obscured to all users, including the primary researcher, and the 
data was provided in a statistical/numerical form. There were no personal connections or 
assessments with the respondents. In addition, all results were assessed and vetted by the 
Chair of the researcher’s dissertation committee, the committee, and an external reviewer. 
Given that the study focused on a single population, bounded by unique 
experiences, generalization may not be appropriate. Instead, it is up to the reader of the 
research to determine how much or which elements of this study are generalizable to 
other situations. The specific market and issues were unique to the organization at that 
point in time, though the potential exists for other universities and colleges in the future 
to find themselves in similar situations. While the existing research substantiates and 
supports the theories of ethical turnarounds and organizational course change, the 
concepts may not be applicable to all institutions of higher education. Therefore, the 
results may not be replicable in other cases or to the populations of other educational 
institutions. 	  
Significance of the Study	  
The intention of this study is to add to the body of knowledge regarding 
turnaround management as applied to public institutions of higher education after an 
organizational difficulty or ethical breach. While Hofer (1980) and a number of others 
focused upon turnaround management and its various strategies and tactics in the 
corporate setting, Beeri’s (2009) research focused on the same strategies in local 
governments. Because there had been comparatively little research on these concepts in 
higher education, this study serves the academy to broaden the application of the areas of 
research to small, regional, public institutions of higher education. However, with a more 
specific application, this research assessed whether this particular small, regional, public 
institution had effectively started a process or path of turnaround based on the 
perspectives of its faculty, staff, and administration, providing helpful data to the 
organization’s management and leadership (practitioners) to execute necessary course 
corrections to improve the university’s progress. 
By adding to the body of knowledge through exploring and understanding ethical 
turnarounds in higher education, the main literature that remains fixed in the corporate 
world can be applied to the different area of higher education. The research may help 
educational leaders by demonstrating one example of how ethical turnarounds can be 
applied in colleges and universities. By informing other colleges and universities about 
options to turn an organization around, other institutions can be helped by demonstrating 
how to change and revitalize their potential. Because of the issues surrounding the 
population under study, the research has the potential to positively influence policies of 
other institutions of higher education before they engage in the same behaviors or how to 
execute a turnaround after an ethical breach. The study provided ongoing information and 
data over time to develop an understanding of how institutions of higher education can 
execute an ethical turnabout. 	  
Researcher’s Perspective	  
The role of the researcher was a challenging element of this research, creating 
strategic, ethical, and personal issues. It is important to note that the researcher in this 
study was not only involved in the research, but was employed by the organization during 
the research. As an Assistant Professor of Accounting at the organization, the researcher 
began her employment with the organization in the fall of 2009, two academic years prior 
to the 2011-2012 academic year when many of the issues came to light. The researcher 
was reasonably acquainted with the issues that inspired the organizational change; 
however, the challenge was to mitigate researcher bias (see “Instrument Reliability and 
Validity” and “Limitations and Delimitations” below). 
   
 	  
Chapter 2: Literature Review	  	  
Turnaround Management	  
 Managers and leaders have the capacity to create an environment with “the 
presence of chaos, change, poor management, and bullying in an organization” (Boddy, 
2011, p. 376) that is detrimental to its employees and stakeholders.  History, society, and 
the business world have all learned the hard lesson that “there are unethical and even 
toxic [individuals] who exploit the loopholes in management systems and seek to fulfill 
their personal desires at the expense of their organizations and its employees” (Toor & 
Ofori, 2009, p. 533). These unethical and destructive individuals have been guilty of 
fraud, theft, questionable earnings management choices and manipulations, creating 
deceptive financial statements and publications, and eroding trust from those very 
organizations they serve. The unethical actions from improper leaders damage all parties 
related to the organization, especially employees and stakeholders. 
Whether this detriment is in the form of poor financial returns, unethical 
behaviors, lackluster performance, or general organizational malaise, a substantial 
alteration in culture and operations is usually necessary. Whether the leader has 
committed an ethical infraction or simply made a poor decision, the organization has lost 
its credibility with its stakeholders and employees, its legitimacy as an upright entity with 
integrity, and the public faith (Puffer & McCarthy, 2008). Organizations that are 
discovered violating social, moral, or legal codes; committing accounting or financial 
fraud; engaging in asset misappropriation, pollution, or environmental damage; 
discriminating against individuals; or breaching contracts and leaving obligations 
unfulfilled, must correct their actions as quickly and honestly as possible to restore the 
faith of the employees, customers, and other stakeholders (Puffer & McCarthy, 2008). 
Hofer (1980) stated, “no matter what the state of the economy, no company is immune 
from internal hard times” (p. 19) whether from stagnation of operations, declining 
performance, financial difficulties, economic change, or ethical infractions. Therefore, a 
turnaround is often necessary to redirect the entity in a more positive, upright, and 
sustainable direction. 
Historical development of turnaround management.	  
 Every industry and organization faces trials and difficulties while operating in a 
complex environment, inevitably shifting and adapting. Organizations, governments, 
businesses, and institutions have all made drastic changes in their intended direction for 
various reasons. This behavior of making drastic changes to save an entity was not 
codified or studied in management theory until the relatively recent past. Considered an 
element of strategic management, the concepts of managing an organizational turnaround 
have actually been a part of organizational and individual thinking far longer, both in 
business and government. 
An ancient example of turnaround management occurred when Pharaoh hired 
Joseph to manage Egypt, effectively changing leadership (Genesis 41-43, English 
Standard Version). This appointment turned Egypt’s focus from the short to the long-
term to strategically managing food resources for an extended famine (Genesis 41-43, 
ESV). A more contemporary individual’s turnaround that had an immense impact was 
that of Thomas Jefferson. President Jefferson was a staunch Anti-Federalist that initially 
supported very limited federal government and stronger states’ rights (Jefferson, 1751). 
However, Jefferson completed a major philosophical turnaround that violated his own 
beliefs to complete the Louisiana Purchase, altering the future of the young United States 
of America (Jefferson, 1802). In recent years, the Roman Catholic Church has been 
undergoing its own organizational turnaround. After decades of hiding sexual abuse and 
crimes committed against children by members of the clergy, the Church executed a 
turnaround with the Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People that 
publicly promised to investigate any allegations against priests or deacons (USCCB, 
2002/2011). If the accused is found guilty through an institutional investigation, the 
offending priest is removed from active ministry and instructed to comply with relevant 
civil and state law (USCCB, 2002/2011). 
 While governments, leaders, and organizations have all utilized the general 
concepts of turnarounds in the recent and distant past, the fields of business and 
management have incorporated turnaround management as an important element of 
strategic management in its repertoire (Hofer, 1980). A number of examples of 
turnarounds exist in management theory such as General Motors (GM) bringing in Alfred 
Sloan to turnaround GM, Lee Iacocca leaving Ford to help change Chrysler, and DuPont 
expanding and reformatting its business strategy and mission to become one of the most 
important businesses in American industry (Castrogiovanni, Baliga, & Kidwell, 1992; 
Schendel & Patton, 1976). No matter the rationale behind the turnaround, Hofer (1980) 
provided that if the organization is to be saved when performance has declined, there is 
“almost always a major effort to ‘turn the company around’” (p. 20). 
 The concepts of changing direction to improve profits and efficiency have always 
been elements of individual and organizational thinking, but there were a number of 
circumstances that spurred its development to become a formalized element of strategic 
management. Turnaround management was born out of a business climate of corporate 
stagnation and declining performance beginning in the 1970s (Schendel & Patton, 1976). 
The 1970s were a complicated and difficult time for American industry. The economy 
was plagued by stagflation, massive competition from international manufacturing 
imports, an Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo, stock 
market disruption, permanent departure from the gold standard, high interest rates, and 
general economic malaise (Magdoff & Sweezy, 1977). The American economic giant 
that had powered the world since the end of World War II faced significant competition 
that was beginning to outpace America with improved quality and quantity (Magdoff & 
Sweezy, 1977). An unfavorable balance of trade coupled with the devaluing of the United 
States dollar and heavy growth of large-scale banking with large debt loads created an 
economic climate that could not continue to rely on previous business success (Magdoff 
& Sweezy, 1977; Wren & Bedeian, 2009). Deming (1985) summed up the problems of 
American industry as a “lack of constancy of purpose” (p. 7) to plan, a focus on short-
term profits instead of long-term success, improper evaluation of individual employees, 
managers moving from job to job, a focus on concrete figures without regard to 
unknowns, high medical costs, and high costs of litigation and liability. 
The culmination of these factors and the struggles and decline of the American 
economy after the post-World War II boom left American businesses and industry, 
especially manufacturing, besieged and stagnated. The time was ripe for turnaround 
management. Profits were down, American industry was inefficient and overburdened, 
and consumers were no longer content to purchase simply what American manufacturers 
provided. To save American industry, “diversification and divestment, acquisition, 
management reorganization, financial reorganization, vertical integration, and other 
strategies, and combinations of these” (Schendel, Patton, & Riggs, 1974, p. 4) became 
tools of organizational turnarounds. Over time, the academy linked these tools of 
organizational turnarounds to various industries across the corporate world, government, 
and higher education. 
A number of individuals have studied and embraced turnaround management; 
however, Dan E. Schendel (leading Richard Patton and James Riggs) and Charles Hoffer 
were the major codifiers of turnaround management. Schendel et al. (1974) began their 
initial focus on turnaround management within a narrowly defined set of parameters - 
finance. Schendel et al.’s (1974) first foray into turnaround management examined “a 
sample of firms who [had] reversed serious declining performance trends and [identified] 
characteristics of the strategies used to turn performance around” (p. 4). The first 
question the researchers aimed to address was why some organizations were able to pull 
themselves out of decline and while others spiraled further into destruction (Schendel & 
Patton, 1974). The initial studies focused upon financial measures, income, and profits, 
ascertaining turnaround through successful financial performance, sound investment, and 
logical expansion to generate sales (Schendel & Patton, 1974). Schendel and Patton 
(1976) completed a second study investigating both the qualitative and quantitative 
aspects of turnarounds, but still focused exclusively on the financial indicators of a 
turnaround. The most important conclusion from the research was that a “stagnating or 
declining company seems to first need a deepened threat or shock to spur it to action” 
(Schendel & Patton, 1976, p. 240). Asserting that substantial change is required to 
achieve a turnaround in an organization, the previous lackluster performance that was 
allowed before the crisis must be eradicated (Schendel & Patton, 1976). In addition, any 
inefficiency in productivity, working capital, or operations must be corrected 
immediately (Schendel & Patton, 1976). 
Schendel and Patton (1978) next looked beyond profitability as a single 
performance goal in strategic turnarounds. Cooper and Schendel (1971) viewed strategy 
as the general goals and intentions of a business in how it chooses its markets, its policies 
for operation, and spends and utilizes its resources. Schendel and Patton (1978) utilized 
these concepts of strategy to expand their model to a mathematical construct that would 
recognize the “multiple, independent performance goals” (p. 1613) of profitability, 
market share, and efficiency. The model asserts that beyond increasing sales and 
adequately performing in the company’s chosen market, a key element of turnarounds is 
production efficiency and holding down costs (Schendel & Patton, 1978). The 
researchers worked to create an elegant model of improved performance that 
encapsulated more dimensions of strategic turnarounds. In addition, Schendel, Patton, 
and Riggs (1976) determined through their study of 54 companies that the general 
strategic causes of decline were higher wages, lack of supply for raw materials, higher 
competition, difficulties with management, and smaller profit margins. The strategic 
solutions to these problems included diversification, divestment, changing upper 
management, and vertical integration of operations (Schendel et al., 1976). Schendel et 
al. (1976) also found that the operating causes of organization decline were economic 
recessions, strikes, labor issues, excess production capacity, and decreased price. The 
operating responses to these problems were to improve efficiency, focus on a specific 
area of business, and/or execute plant expenditures (Schendel et al., 1976). The 
summation of Schendel and his team’s contributions to turnaround management was that 
an organization’s stagnation and/or decline was a strategic decision problem that could be 
solved through a turnaround (Schendel & Patton, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1978; Schendel et 
al., 1974). 
The next researcher to concentrate on organizational turnarounds and turnaround 
management was Charles Hofer. Building on Schendel et al.’s (1976) work on patterns of 
decline and turnaround, Hofer (1980) furthered turnaround management by creating a 
framework of turnaround strategies with a more operational focus. First, Hofer (1980) 
made the important distinction of questioning the “why” of a turnaround before the 
“how.” He demanded that a business answer three important questions before designing 
and instituting a turnaround: 
● Is the business worth saving, or is it better to liquidate it now? 
● If the business is worth saving, what is its current operating health? 
● What is the business’ current strategic health? (Hofer, 2008, p. 24) 
If the board of directors and management determine that the organization is worth 
saving, it is important to decide that the change is fiscally possible before expending the 
substantial effort and funds necessary to change direction (Hofer, 1980). Once the 
organization’s management determines that it is fiscally responsible and operationally 
logical to turn the organization around, Hofer (1980) demanded a current assessment of 
the entity’s financial condition, market and technological positions, production 
capabilities, strategic health, and product/market matrix before selecting a turnaround 
strategy. Financial condition is reasonably simple to determine with traditional financial 
and accounting measures and ratios. Market position is assessed through investigating 
current product and market segments, cost accounting break-even points, as well as 
determining the maximum sales possible for the organization’s capacity (Hofer, 1980). 
The organization should also study its technological position, taking into account the 
quality of the entity’s goods or services as well as its capacity for innovation (Hofer, 
1980). For companies that produce goods or services, the entity must evaluate whether it 
possesses sufficient capability to increase production for more sales or to improve the 
efficiency of its current capacity (Hofer, 1980). In regards to a company’s strategic 
health, Hofer (1980) suggested that entities intending to turn themselves in a new 
direction carefully assess their strategic possibilities from all directions and perspectives. 
Hofer (1980) did not neglect the need to assess where in the product/market matrix the 
organization and its products should reside – penetration, development (product or 
market), or diversification. Once an organization and its management has investigated all 
of the elements of its capabilities and finds that there is hope for a turnaround, it is time 
to execute the change. 
Continuing with Schendel’s (1976) division of operating and strategic turnaround 
strategies, Hofer (1980) codified whether entities should focus on strategic or operational 
turnarounds based on their current strategic and operating health. The stronger the 
strategic health, the more likely the firm is to use an operating strategy (Hofer, 1980). For 
entities with stronger operating health, an operating strategy is also appropriate (Hofer, 
1980). However, the imperative first step of a turnaround for any entity is the dismissal of 
current upper management that caused the problem or allowed the infraction to occur 
through act or omission (Hofer, 1980). Whatever the type of turnaround, the beliefs and 
conduct of current leadership must be entirely removed to make room for positive change 
(Hofer, 1980). Institutional philosophy socializes employees and stakeholders to the 
entity’s ethics, codes, and norms (Sims, 2000). Therefore, it is only by removing all 
remaining vestiges of the prior leadership that the underperforming and/or unethical 
culture can be eradicated (Sims, 2000). Sims (2000) commented that because there is a 
natural human desire to maintain the status quo, change is often extremely difficult for 
institutions and entities. Individuals subconsciously work to conserve and protect the 
current institutional ethos (Sims, 2000). Because change is difficult to undertake, a 
culture of inefficient and/or unethical comportment tends to feed on itself and support 
additional unfortunate conduct (Sims, 2000). Leadership must alter the mindset and 
psychological associations of the organizational culture for any real, permanent change 
(Schneider, Brief, & Guzzo, 1996). To correct and improve the organization, its culture, 
and its performance, the beliefs and conduct of current leadership must be removed for 
positive transformation (Hofer, 1980). 
After upper management is replaced and members of the entity assess the firm 
from every side and angle, it is time to change the organization’s direction. Hofer (1980) 
codified four general operational strategies – revenue-increasing, cost-cutting, asset 
reduction, and combination strategies. Revenue producing strategies such as increasing 
sales, producing and marketing new products, cutting prices, and improved marketing 
campaigns all have the potential to improve short and long-term revenues (Hofer, 1980). 
Cost-cutting strategies through decreasing the cost of production or administration are 
also a solution, but often require more permanent measures to be effective (Hofer, 1980). 
A more extreme strategy is to reduce an organization’s assets. By selling off or reducing 
assets that are inefficient or unnecessary, the organization can obtain a short-term 
infusion of cash (Hofer, 1980). However, this strategy creates a risk that the entity sells 
the very assets that will be needed in the future after the turnaround (Hofer, 1980). Any 
one or a combination of these strategies can be used to revitalize an organization after 
prior top management is removed, but the appropriate strategy for the entity is dependent 
on its goals for its short and long-term solutions (Hofer, 1980). Hofer’s (1980) major 
overall contribution to the field of turnaround management was to convert Schendel et 
al.’s (1974; 1976; 1978) research into operationally useful tactics for organizations. 
A number of researchers took Schendel et al.’s (1974, 1976, 1978) and Hofer’s 
(1980) work and continued their efforts to search for constructive solutions to correct 
organizational decline. Dozens of individuals took hold of turnaround management and 
built a genre of management through studies, models, and strategies. The general stages 
of a turnaround became changing upper management, completing an in-depth, exhaustive 
analysis of the organization’s situation, implementing a plan, restructuring the entity and 
its culture, then returning to normal operations to assess the success or failure of the 
change (Turnaround Management Association, 2012). Because forty years of research 
created turnaround management, only the major highlights are presented below. 
Carrington and Aurelio (1976) contributed a case study that encouraged planning 
and communication with all stakeholders in an organization during a turnaround while 
allowing flexibility to change. Castrogiovanni, Baliga, and Kidwell (1992) reminded 
organizations interested in completing a turnaround to concentrate on how upper 
management is changed, focusing on hiring CEOs from successful industry competitors. 
In “Turnaround: Retrenchment and Recovery,” Robbins and Pearce (1992) discussed the 
tactics of retrenchment and recovery in turnarounds. Robbins and Pearce (1992) also 
added a focus upon internal and external factors, situation severity, stability, recovery, 
cost reduction, asset reduction, and entrepreneurial expansion to the turnaround models. 
Barker and Mone (1994) published their work in opposition of Robbins and Pearce 
(1992). Barker and Mone’s (1994) study of the same firms found that retrenchment was 
not necessarily the best solution, but the right strategy depended on the specifics of the 
organization. 
Chowdhury and Lang (1993) also maintained a turnaround management focus on 
narrow operating turnarounds in “Crisis, Decline, and Turnaround: A Test of Competing 
Hypotheses for Short-Term Performance Improvement in Small Firms.” Dolan (1993) 
added a company’s bankruptcy score, diagnostic studies, and monitoring plans to the 
toolkit of turnaround management in a four-stage rescue plan approach for a turnaround. 
Arogyaswamy, Barker, and Yasai-Ardekani (1995) added a two-stage contingency model 
to turnaround management with recovery strategies aimed to slow or halt any 
organizational decline. Chowdhury and Lang (1996) collaborated again to research 
turnarounds in smaller organizations and efficiency strategies. Barker and Duhaime 
(1997) continued to research strategic change while Barker and Mone (1998) added 
strategic reorientation to management theory. Harker and Harker’s (1998) research 
looked to strategic selling and marketing during a turnaround. 
Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) continued the research on turnaround management, 
providing a focus on operational, managerial, asset, and financial restructuring. Lohrke, 
Bedeian, and Palmer (2004) then built upon previous research to offer a three-phrase 
turnaround process. Lohrke et al. (2004) stipulated that the turnaround process was first a 
decline (stage one) that initiated a response (stage two), then elicited a transition or 
outcome (stage three). The research by Sheppard and Chowdhury (2005) took a different 
turn by studying Eaton Corporation, failing in its turnaround in a fiercely competitive 
market. Smith and Graves (2005) separated turnarounds into distinct phases – the decline 
and the recovery. Entities that are working to change their direction must carefully take 
into account the severity of the organization’s financial, asset, and capacity problems to 
stop the decline and stabilize, as well as the retrenchment potential to improve cash flows 
and efficiencies (Smith & Graves, 2005). 
The interrelated contributions to the field of turnaround management were 
constructed at times in tandem and in competition by these researchers. Combining a 
number of possible strategies, assessment tools, and directions for an organization, 
turnaround management is a complex and varied field that investigates organizational 
change via operations, strategy, finance, accounting, marketing, and production, 
depending on the needs of the entity. Researchers and practitioners have utilized the 
above findings as well as other research in strategy to change public and private entities, 
governments, large and small businesses, for-profits and not-for-profits (Boyne, 2006; 
Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Ruiz-Navarro, 1998; Walshe, Harvey, Hyde, & Pandit, 
2004). The importance of turnaround management cannot be understated to help 
organizations correct themselves, their reputations, and/or their strategy in order to solve 
their organizational problems and turn their focus on a more positive future while 
focusing on efficiency, effectiveness, and growth.  
 Turnaround management arose when organizations were failing, struggling, and 
declining in performance and value because of economic factors, internal inefficiencies, 
and poor performance. Risk factors for troubled organizations include: 
● Ineffective management style, 
● Troubled finances (excessive debt, inadequate cash flows, poor efficiency ratios), 
● Over-diversification of products or services, 
● Poor relationships with creditors, 
● Lack of proper controls, 
● Inability to compete effectively in the market, 
● Unpredictable growth, 
● Reliance on too few customers,  
● Lack of a business plan (Turnaround Management Association, 2012). 
However, these issues are not unique to a specific time period or isolated incident, 
but are ongoing, continuous problems in business. These factors that regularly occur in 
any number of organizations, coupled with the most recent series of economic problems 
from the Great Recession, demonstrate the continuing challenges for organizations from 
the internal and external environment. 
 The Great Recession of 2008-2009 began with the collapse of the sub-prime 
mortgage market that infected the rest of the financial systems throughout the United 
States (Chong-Yah & Hui-Ying, 2011). The mortgage failures tightened the bond and 
credit markets, turning highly liquid investment markets sluggish and unwieldy. Lehman 
Brothers and American International Group collapsed (among others), weakening other 
banks and financial institutions and spreading to every financial market across the globe 
(Chong-Yah & Hui-Ying, 2011). At this point, the stock market began to plummet 
(Chong-Yah & Hui-Ying, 2011). Investors lost confidence and investments declined, 
threatening businesses (Chong-Yah & Hui-Ying, 2011). Consumers cut spending, 
decreasing sales of already flagging businesses, and these entities were forced to lay off 
employees (Chong-Yah & Hui-Ying, 2011). Unemployment rose, individuals and 
families stopped spending and lost their homes, and the economic downturn snowballed 
(Chong-Yah & Hui-Ying, 2011). The Great Recession did not turn into another Great 
Depression because of low interest rates, massive budget deficits of governments across 
the world, and focused global monetary policy, but it clearly demonstrates that the global 
economy is deeply interconnected and reliant upon a delicate balance of financial 
relationships (Chong-Yah & Hui-Ying, 2011). Though the financial and economic 
conditions were different in the Great Recession and the 1970s recession, the underlying 
need for businesses to change directions, retrench, diversify, and become more 
entrepreneurial to survive is even more relevant than before. 
 Companies have already used turnaround management after the Great Recession. 
For example, the Ford Motor Company has had a long history of success, changing 
directions, and pulling itself out of financial difficulty. The Great Recession was a very 
arduous time for automobile manufacturers including Ford, with several only able to 
survive through government bailouts for billions of dollars. However, Ford Motor 
Company leadership chose not to utilize taxpayer funds to save itself and instead elected 
to execute a turnaround (Hehir, 2010). Prior to the recession, Ford’s management made 
the mistake of purchasing organizations that operated as relatively autonomous entities 
that were simply joined by brand (Hehir, 2010). Leaders decided to turn around and “do 
more with less” (Hehir, 2010, p. 15), improved its cash flows, divested of unnecessary 
lines of business, and accepted the reality of fierce competition. However, Ford’s long-
term success will not be decided simply by cutting product lines, focusing on quality, and 
reducing the complexity of the organization’s administration (Hehir, 2010). The true test 
of the turnaround will be whether Ford can achieve the right “leadership [and] culture, 
using a strategy that is realistic and practical, held together by [a] whole systems 
approach – [knowing that] there really are no short cuts” (Hehir, 2010, p. 15). Hehir 
(2010) provided that for Ford to be successful in permanent change, the board of 
directors must ensure CEO accountability, competence, commitment, a strong connection 
between management and the board, independence, and well-defined areas of duty. As 
evidenced by Ford Motor Company’s turnaround - their retrenchment, cutting back 
product lines and expenses, divestment of nonperforming segments, and reorganization of 
administration - turnaround management is a vital element of strategic management 
theory with continuous relevance to all organizations in trouble. 
 There are diverting and differing theories within the field of turnaround 
management. However, the most pressing issues surrounding turnaround management are 
not necessarily the theories, but the hard realities of the business and economic climates. 
In fact, “today’s increased competition, cyclical and volatile financial markets, and 
economic trends have created a climate in which no business can take stability for 
granted” (Turnaround Management Association, 2012). The economy demands that 
turnaround managers and organizations be extremely fluid, adaptive, and creative, no 
matter the industries and/or entities in which they operate. The increased federal and state 
regulations make lending, financing, and obtaining credit more convoluted and 
specialized (Turnaround Management Association, 2012). In addition, because 
bankruptcy provisions no longer permit banks and lenders to become directly involved in 
the turnaround, organizational course change becomes more complicated as bank 
participation becomes a form of equity action (Turnaround Management Association, 
2012). These pressing operating environment issues demand more assistance from 
turnaround management. Increasing pressures upon these managers, entities, and 
stakeholders will make turnaround management more valuable and more difficult. 
Turnaround strategies.	  
 An organization “turning around a company ethically, financially, and 
strategically [first] requires a compelling vision to motivate executives and employees” 
(Puffer & McCarthy, 2008, p. 305). The institution must address the various problems 
identified by the numerous stakeholders, including employees, management, customers, 
clients, creditors, regulatory agencies, and stakeholders as a whole. Only with a clear and 
coherent vision focused upon organizational direction and an effort to change the 
perceptions (both internally and externally) of the entity can it correct its failures. Hofer 
(1980) provides three important questions to answer before designing and instituting a 
turnaround strategy in a business: 
● Is the business worth saving, or is it better to liquidate it now? 
● If the business is worth saving, what is its current operating health? 
● What is the business’ current strategic health? (p. 24) 
If the board of directors and management determine that the organization is worth 
saving (and salvageable), it is important to decide that the change is fiscally possible 
before going through with the substantial effort and funds usually demanded to change 
direction (Hofer, 1980). Unfortunately, some organizations are so sullied that no amount 
of money can solve its problems. Enron and WorldCom, for example, both had so much 
financial fraud and corruption that the companies were irredeemable in terms of their 
corporate reputation, stakeholder trust, and financial status, making bankruptcy and 
divestiture the only option to recuperate any remaining worth (Putter & McCarthy, 2008). 
In addition, unethical leadership and behavior may be so insidious and destructive 
that it spreads to other entities and organizational partners. Enron, a multi-billion dollar 
energy trading entity, due to its aggressive, illegal, and unethical business practices, 
destroyed itself. However, Enron’s unethical behaviors were so pervasive that it also 
devastated its colluding auditor, Arthur Andersen, one of the five most powerful public 
accounting firms in the world (Yuhao, 2010). The corruption, fraud, and unethical 
behavior were so widespread that Enron could not be redeemed, and to attempt a course 
correction at the time the accounting scandals broke would have been financially 
impossible. Therefore, once management and leadership have determined that it is 
fiscally possible to revive the organization, Puffer and McCarthy’s (2008) requirement of 
a “compelling vision” (p. 305) demands that the organization change. This course 
adjustment is often achieved through new leadership, hiring a Chief Ethics and 
Compliance Officer (CECO), restructuring the entity, including policies and procedures, 
removing and changing the reward structure, and demoting and/or firing the “old guard,” 
all in an effort to restore trust and faith in the organization. 
	  
 
	  
Removal of former management.	  
 
In all of examples of successful ethical turnarounds provided above, the first 
turnaround strategy was to remove the president or CEO of the organization. The 
imperative first step of an ethical turnaround for any entity is the dismissal of current 
upper management that either perpetrated the infraction or allowed it to occur through act 
or omission (Hofer, 1980). To correct the organization and culture, the beliefs and 
conduct of current leadership must be entirely removed to make room for positive change 
(Hofer, 1980). Because institutional philosophy socializes employees and stakeholders to 
the entity’s ethics, codes, and norms, it is only by rooting out and removing all remaining 
vestiges of the toxic leadership that the poisonous and unethical culture be eradicated 
(Sims, 2000). Sims (2000) commented that because there is a natural human desire to 
maintain the status quo, change is often extremely difficult for institutions and entities as 
individuals subconsciously work to conserve and protect the current institutional ethos. 
Because change is painful and difficult to undertake, a culture of unethical and improper 
comportment tends to feed on itself and support additional unfortunate conduct (Sims, 
2000). Leadership must alter the very mindset and psychological associations of the 
organizational culture for any real, permanent change (Schneider et al., 1996). Therefore, 
it is imperative that those leaders and stakeholders that demand an ethical turnaround 
institute new management and leadership as soon as possible as “successful turnarounds 
require the replacement of current top management” (Hofer, 1980, p. 28). 
Restructuring the entity.	  
 
In addition to an unethical manager, the structure of an entity may lack 
appropriate controls and reporting structures to “blow the whistle” on improper activities. 
As part of an ethical turnaround, management should provide the support to move 
departments, functions, and reporting as necessary to align compliance and responsibility 
while providing the policies and practices to support this change. Cases such as Putnam, 
Tyco, and Waste Management all exemplified the need to change policy and structure 
with regards to reporting unethical or improper actions for a turnaround to be 
successfully accomplished (Kavanagh, 2008). This restructuring may include instituting 
policies were there were none (internal controls, codifying actions and responsibilities, 
etc.), correcting policies that were misapplied, or even eliminating verbal or written 
policies that allowed for incorrect practice. New leadership may need to change the 
functional structure of the institution to effect change because the Chief Ethics and 
Compliance Officer “always needs a direct unfiltered line to the highest governing 
authority” (Kavanagh, 2008, p. 26). Management should also allocate the funds and 
resources to increase compliance audits, monitoring, internal controls, provide a helpline, 
and sufficiently staff the organization (Kavanagh, 2008). 
	  
Removal or change of reward structure.	  
  
 Another change during a transformation or institutional turnaround is the removal 
of the mechanisms that encouraged and rewarded the bad behavior--financial bonuses, 
pay schemes, and fringe benefits/perks of management positions (Ackermann, 2005; 
Meisler, 2004; Sims, 2000). Individuals in positions where compensation, bonuses, and 
personal wealth are closely tied to institutional performance are especially at risk for 
unethical behavior to better their personal situations (Ackermann, 2005; Meisler, 2004; 
Sims, 2000). These personal financial benefits may serve to encourage aggressive or 
unethical behavior at the expense of the entity and its shareholders (Ackermann, 2005; 
Meisler, 2004; Sims, 2000). Removing these inducements, like Putman Investments and 
Tyco, cuts organizational expenditures and decreases the personal financial rewards for 
earnings manipulation; therefore, it is imperative to remove those weaknesses entirely 
during an ethical turnabout (Ackermann, 2005; Meisler, 2004; Sims, 2000). While this 
shift will not eliminate all incentives for unethical action, it certainly reduces much of the 
personal benefit for bad behavior. 
	  
Demoting and firing the “old guard.”	  
  
 During the ethical turnabout, new leaders must be able and willing to demote and 
dismiss employees from the organization if they are known to be unethical (Sims, 2000). 
If current employees are disinclined to embrace the new organizational culture and 
leadership, managers must remove them (Sims, 2000). This restructure is especially 
important for the “old guard” of organizations that have allowed, condoned, or engaged 
in unethical behavior under previous management in the past. The ethical turnaround may 
necessitate the removal or demotion of all senior management, board of directors, internal 
audit staff, even the external auditors if they were complacent in the fraud or unethical 
activities as evidenced by the provided cases. As managers and leaders often hire like-
minded individuals, unethical leaders of the past may have appointed employees that 
were willing to bend or break ethical or organizational standards, but only those 
individuals and stakeholders that are willing to embrace the new ethical culture should 
remain with the entity (Sims, 2000). 
 Boyne (2002) initially studied the various differences between private entities and 
public organizations to determine if various business concepts could be applied to public 
entities. Analyzing 34 different studies, Boyne (2002) concluded that “available evidence 
does not provide clear support for the view that public and private management are 
fundamentally dissimilar in all important respects” (p. 118). Boyne (2002) argued that 
managers of public entities must understand the differences between public and private 
entities, but have the opportunity to draw upon the lessons and tools from members of the 
private sector and apply them to the public sector. Boyne (2006) also determined that the 
academy had not yet developed a model of the turnaround process outside of the private 
sector and developed a generic conceptualization of turnarounds for the public sector as 
well. Concurring with other researchers, the major stages in decline and recovery 
(turnaround) began with the onset of the decline for whatever reason followed by 
corrective action to avoid a major turnaround (Boyne, 2006). If the organization failed to 
change behaviors and direction, a turnaround becomes necessary, demanding various 
strategies depending on the needs of the entity (Boyne, 2006). 
Boyne (2004; 2006) broke the various strategies from other researchers into the 
more generic strategies of retrenchment, repositioning, and reorganization. Boyne (2006) 
provided that retrenchment as a turnaround strategy has the major intention to cull parts 
of entities that are underperforming, unprofitable, or unproductive. Whether it is to divest 
assets and/or business segments, introduce/remove technology, or to remove employees 
that do not align with the optimal strategy, each serves the organization in an effort to 
heighten efficiency (Boyne, 2004; 2006). In contrast, Boyne (2006) stipulated that 
repositioning is an entrepreneurial strategy that involved activities designed to redefine 
the organization’s mission and vision. This redefinition is designed to enhance the 
entity’s presence in a market or allow it to enter into new areas that can encourage a 
turnaround through new advancement, including entering into new markets and engaging 
in different competitive enterprises (Boyne, 2006). Boyne (2006) determined that there 
was a general disposition of success in repositioning while executing a turnaround. In 
addition, Boyne (2006) provided that the reorganization strategy was “a broad description 
of any change in the internal management of an organization” (p. 379). Reorganization 
was usually executed in conjunction with retrenchment and/or repositioning, but often 
included the removal of the organization’s leadership (Boyne, 2004; 2006). Ultimately, 
Boyne (2004; 2006) provided that all three general strategies were feasible in public 
entities, though reorganization is the most commonly used strategy, yet more study in 
public entities would be advantageous to the field. 
Turnarounds in higher education.	  
While there has been extensive literature on corporate turnarounds, comparatively 
less exists in higher education. Because higher education has become a competitive 
market demanding performance and efficiency in operations as well as finances, the 
concepts of turnaround management that were applied to corporations and businesses can 
be transitioned to higher education (Paul, 2005). Higher education institutions often 
demonstrate a longer path of decline then corporations, but can fail nonetheless (Paul, 
2005). Atkinson (2002) provided examples of colleges in the United Kingdom that 
necessitated operational, though not ethical, turnarounds because of various failures in 
operations, financial management, or both. Atkinson (2002) detailed six distinct colleges 
in case studies, applying a strategy of “recognising the crisis; stabilising the crisis by 
taking control of all expenditures; analysing what has gone wrong; making management 
changes; managing stakeholders; identifying strategic options; planning recovery; and 
delivering recovery” (p. 25). These institutions of higher education were suffering from 
financial crisis and experienced an additional financial shock, but were not suffering as a 
result of ethical issues (Atkinson, 2002). Atkinson (2002) also differentiated between 
“recovery” and “turnaround” in that recovery was simply a single stage of an entity-wide 
turnaround that is comprehensive and involves the entity as a whole that addresses both 
strategic and operational issues. Atkinson (2002) derived this application from Slatter and 
Lovett’s (1999) corporate turnaround strategies. Slatter and Lovett (1999) emphasized 
that an organization needed to first stabilize from the crisis, demanding proper cash 
management, improved financial controls, and reducing costs. As the crisis continued, 
Slatter and Lovett (1999) encouraged a change of leadership and increased 
communication with stakeholders to inform and rebuild trust, setting the stage for change 
throughout the entity, critical process improvements, and financial restructuring. 
Organizations may execute a recovery, but may not complete a turnaround if there are not 
sufficient changes to correct the direction of the entity’s strategy or operations. 
The particular challenge of chronicling the turnarounds in higher education was 
clarified by Atkinson (2002) in that there was “no published list of colleges in recovery, 
nor one of colleges which had successfully emerged from recovery” (p. 11) at the time of 
his research. Of Atkinson’s (2002) initial proposed sample, the majority of the 
organizations contacted declined to participate in his study, even with a guarantee of 
anonymity. The stigma of failure in higher education is such that entities experiencing a 
turnaround or recovery intended to avoid the connection to Paul’s (2005) research. Paul 
(2005) provided that organizations and institutions within higher education have 
struggled defining both success and failure, making organizational declines and potential 
turnarounds harder to define and study. 
New York University and Northeastern University were both case studies of 
strategic, operational, and financial turnarounds from declining revenues and struggling 
performance (Paul, 2005). At New York University (NYU), substantial annual deficits 
threatened the organization’s operations, coupled with decreased enrollment and a market 
position known for serving the lower-scoring end of the academic market, demanded a 
change to survive (Paul, 2005). By reforming its mission and repositioning itself in the 
market, NYU executed an operational and financial turnaround that effectively altered the 
organizational strategy to adapt to a changed economic climate. Northeastern University, 
when faced with a major market decline in enrollment as well as decreasing revenues, 
executed an operational and financial turnaround by cutting programs and slashing 
operating expenses (retrenchment) (Paul, 2005). In the cases of NYU and Northeastern 
University, external market forces acted upon the organizations and the financial results 
exacerbated the problems in the entities (Paul, 2005). Once the colleges brought in new 
presidents, they used retrenchment, reorganization, and repositioning strategies to 
improve organizational performance (Paul, 2005). 
Ethical turnarounds.	  
 Turnaround management is not limited to financial, strategic, and operational 
turnarounds, but theorists and organizations have adapted its concepts and applications to 
ethical turnarounds after organizations and/or management have taken unethical actions 
and made unethical decisions. Management and leadership can save an organization from 
its past unethical choices only through a change in the organization’s patterns of behavior 
and a transformation of ethical perspectives. Entities such as Adelphia Communications, 
Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco, Siemens International, Waste Management Systems, 
WorldCom, and Xerox have all committed a number of serious ethical infractions 
resulting in billions of dollars lost, livelihoods destroyed, and markets corrupted. Of these 
examples, only those organizations that changed their behavior and moral focus through 
an ethical turnaround remained in the market. Puffer and McCarthy (2008) continued 
Hofer’s (1980) work, stating that an organization “turning around a company ethically, 
financially, and strategically requires a compelling vision to motivate executives and 
employees” (p. 305). Turnaround management became the solution for ethical as well as 
operational and strategic problems. 
Every institution seeking to change its trajectory must address the various 
problems identified by the numerous stakeholders, including employees, management, 
customers, clients, creditors, regulatory agencies, and stakeholders as a whole. Only with 
a clear and coherent vision and an effort to change the perceptions of the entity can it 
correct its failures, strategically or ethically (Puffer & McCarthy, 2008). Turnaround 
management theory provides that the course adjustment is achieved through new 
leadership, potentially hiring a Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer (CECO), 
restructuring the entity, removing and changing the reward structure, and demoting 
and/or firing the “old guard,” all in an effort to restore trust and faith in the organization 
(Hoffer, 1980; Kavanagh, 2008; Sims, 2000). Another imperative change during a 
transformation or institutional turnaround is to remove the mechanisms that encouraged 
and rewarded bad behavior - financial bonuses, pay schemes, and fringe benefits/perks of 
management positions (Ackermann, 2005; Meisler, 2004; Sims, 2000). In addition, 
during the ethical turnabout, new leadership must be able and willing to demote and/or 
dismiss employees from the organization if they are known to be unethical (Sims, 2000). 
Turnaround management has provided organizations with the tools, techniques, and 
models to change their behaviors with the creative application of these concepts to ethical 
infractions, saving many entities from their own mistakes. 
	  
Successful ethical turnarounds in corporations.	  
 
There have been dozens of corporate scandals throughout the business and not-
for-profit worlds including ACORN, Adelphia Communications, AIG, American 
Airlines, Arthur Andersen, Bayer, Enron, Exxon, Fannie Mae, Global Crossing, Putnam 
Investments, Siemens AG, Tyco International, Union Carbide, Waste Management 
Incorporated, WorldCom, Xerox, and many others. The institutions that were unable to 
execute an ethical turnabout could not survive in their present form, forcing 
restructurings, mergers, buy-outs, sell-offs, massive lawsuits, and bankruptcies to 
survive, or were destroyed outright. However, those institutions that were willing to 
change their ethical directions and adapt were able to endure. These examples are 
important to the study of turnarounds in higher education because while these large, for-
profit corporations are not in the same industries or even markets as higher education, 
their successes and failures blaze a trail for colleges and universities to have a basis in 
strategic, operational, and financial changes to execute their own turnarounds.  
Putnam Investments, a Boston-based multi-billion dollar investment organization 
working to manage mutual funds worth over $270 billion, was undermined by a series of 
trading scandals in the early 2000s (Ackermann, 2005). Employees executed improper 
rebates and unsuitable payments to certain retirement funds and exhibited a lack of ethics 
(Arner & Young, 2004). However, the unethical behavior went deeper with flagrant 
violations of the firm’s fiduciary duties to manage fund assets that resulted in substantial 
losses of clients, revenue, and reputation. A cowboy culture existed that encouraged 
abusive market transactions to “sell, sell, sell” (Arner & Young, 2004). A number of 
extremely valuable clients quickly removed over $70 billion of their assets, pulling over 
25 percent of the organization’s portfolio from Putnam’s control almost overnight (Arner 
& Young, 2004). The mindset of obtaining new clients became more important than 
efficiently and accurately managing customer funds (Arner & Young, 2004). In addition, 
two important fund managers in the organization were found to have bought and sold 
assets improperly, negatively affecting their clients and shareholders. The company was 
also embroiled in a difficult and complicated battle with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission over $138 million in fines and shareholder restitution for wrongs (Arner & 
Young, 2004). The result of the unethical and abusive leadership of former CEO Lasser’s 
18-year management term was a paranoid and destructive culture that damaged clients 
and employees (Arner & Young, 2004). A veritable dictator, Lasser exhibited bullying 
“behavior designed to belittle others via humiliation, sarcasm, rudeness, overworking an 
employee, [and] threats” (Boddy, 2011, p. 367). 
Putnam Investments desperately needed an ethical turnaround to save the nearly 
seven-decade-old firm, choosing to hire Charles Haldeman as CEO (Arner & Young, 
2004). Haldeman was an investment manager known throughout the industry to be 
dedicated to client and stakeholder focus that consistently maintained extremely high 
standards (Arner & Young, 2004). The new CEO executed a number of internal changes, 
including bringing in a new compliance (ethics) officer as well as other high-level 
managers (Ackermann, 2005). Haldeman also introduced significant reforms throughout 
the organization, such as creating a code of ethics, cutting bonuses and incentives to 
reduce excessive risk-taking, decreasing costs and advertising, and removing over 20 
high-ranking individuals from management (Ackermann, 2005; Arner & Young, 2004). 
Not only did Haldeman “clean house,” but he also changed the organizational culture to 
demand higher standards of behavior by analyzing the trading records of every employee 
(Arner & Young, 2004). The new CEO also institutionalized additional policies halting 
improper trading while consolidating compliance efforts and responsibility in one office 
under the compliance officer (Ackermann, 2005; Arner & Young, 2004). Putnam 
Investments saved its future through hiring a leader that transformed the organization 
with an ethical turnabout, rebuilt its reputation, and restored employee and stakeholder 
trust in their operations. 
 German corporation Siemens AG has had a number of ethical scandals in its 
tumultuous past as a provider of electricity technology, energy technology, 
telecommunications, financial solutions, and dozens of other products. However, an 
ethical violation committed by the entity occurred over an extended period from 2000 
through 2006 (Crawford et al., 2007). The transgression involved bribes paid to 
individuals, entities, and governments in at least 15 different countries around the globe, 
totaling approximately $1.3 billion (Crawford et al., 2007; Dougherty, 2008a; Dougherty, 
2008b; Nielsen, 2009; Prodhan, 2008). These payments made to buyers in several 
industries and countries were executed to expedite transactions with government officials 
(Nielson, 2009). The company’s actions were not only unethical, but also illegal 
according to German law (Nielson, 2009). These bribes made to win business for 
Siemens AG were not isolated, hidden payments from the shadows committed by a single 
individual or a minority of managers (Dougherty, 2008b). As Siemens AG was a German 
company, German prosecutors investigated over 300 individuals throughout the 
organization to uncover the depth and breadth of the corruption (Dougherty, 2008b). The 
organization brought lawsuits against the disgraced executives guilty of the corruption 
and authorization of the bribes, demonstrating “the intent of Siemens's new chief 
executive, Peter Loescher, to mount an aggressive cleanup effort” (Dougherty, 2008b). It 
took two years of investigations and court battles, but Siemens AG publicly 
acknowledged its ethical failings (Gallitz, 2009). 
Siemens AG provided an official apology and a promise to correct the misconduct 
and trespasses, rooting out the problems of the company to allow the entity to move 
forward (Gallitz, 2009). Siemens paid 1.2 billion euros in fines because of its actions. 
Siemens first hired a new chief executive well known for his ethical behavior and actions, 
Peter Loescher, to execute the turnaround (Gallitz, 2009). Management hired a series of 
external compliance advisors and an internal compliance officer, working with an outside 
firm to determine the depth of the corruption (Esterl & Crawford, 2007). The 
organization’s management also restructured its operations to create a clear responsibility 
configuration, increased internal control procedures, and took action against parties found 
guilty of misconduct (Gallitz, 2009). In addition, Siemens changed board polices and 
board membership to better align with the organization’s new direction (Gallitz, 2009). 
The institution also engaged Ernst & Young as the company’s independent auditors, one 
of the world’s most reputable accounting firms, emphasizing the organization’s 
“commitment to optimal corporate governance” (Gallitz, 2009, para. 4). In addition, other 
countries, including the United States, brought charges upon former executives for their 
actions in the bribery scandal. 
Tyco International was another corporation in the early 2000s found to have 
committed a massive accounting fraud. Tyco International manufactures sprinkler 
systems, security systems, industrial products, and numerous other goods (Pillmore, 
2003). Former CEO, L. Dennis Kozlowski, robbed millions from the organization and 
condoned a culture of excess and complacency from upper management and the board of 
directors (Pillmore, 2003). Both the former CEO and CFO “allegedly used the company 
as an ATM” (Meisler, 2004, p. 28), stealing several hundred million dollars from the 
enterprise. By authorizing bonuses paid to themselves, misappropriating funds and assets, 
and manipulating stock sales, upper management deliberately stole millions in assets 
(Meisler, 2004). To prevent bankruptcy, the organization’s leadership booked losses of 
$9.2 billion upon the discovery of the accounting fraud and agreed to a massive ethical 
turnaround (Meisler, 2004; Pillmore, 2003). 
The turnabout began with bringing in a strong, no nonsense, ethical leader to 
clean house, starting with the executive team (Meisler, 2004; Pillmore, 2003). Using his 
“passport to ethical leadership” (Puffer & McCarthy, 2008, p. 310) approach, new CEO 
Ed Breen immediately changed the structure and culture of the organization by hiring 
Eric Pillmore as the lead corporate governance officer that oversaw the turnaround 
(Marshall, 2004). Breen and Pillmore removed the 125 individual members of the 
headquarters staff, cut expenses, improved operations, and created a new series of 
governance and control systems in an effort to prevent future frauds and thefts (Meisler, 
2004). The company also adjusted their supervision and severance compensation 
packages to remove incentives and benefits for asset manipulation and tightened 
restrictions upon stock trading by top management (Meisler, 2004). Management 
executed an additional sweeping change by completely replacing the board of directors 
that had allowed such activities to occur (Pillmore, 2003). New leadership labored to 
change the culture from the top as well as work towards restoring investor confidence and 
faith (Pillmore, 2003). Tyco’s ethical turnaround was achieved by changing 
administration, converting the ethical mindset from the top of the organization, instituting 
new governance procedures in personnel, finance, and strategy, and bringing in ethical 
leadership that was willing to fight for integrity. 
From 1991 to 1997, Waste Management, Incorporated engaged in a number of 
aggressive and overambitious accounting practices that dramatically inflated earnings and 
the value of its assets (Bailey, 1998; Greer, 2004; Johnson, 2008; “SEC and WMI,” 1998; 
“Waste Management audit,” 1998). The fraud was uncovered during a $19 billion merger 
with USA Waste Services, Incorporated in 1998 (Bailey, 1998; Greer, 2004; Johnson, 
2008; “SEC and WMI,” 1998; “Waste Management audit,” 1998). The corporation had to 
restate five years of earnings, assets, and financial statements in the amount of $3.5 
billion in charges (Melcher & McWilliams, 1998). Waste Management executed their 
fraud by inflating depreciation schedules to understate expenses and overstate revenues 
by approximately $716 million, overvalued waste sites and facilities of $1.3 billion, 
overstated goodwill of $536 million, and understated liabilities of $654 million (Melcher 
& McWilliams, 1998). 
The corporation executed the turnabout beginning with hiring a new CEO, Maury 
Myers, known for his turnaround skills, after pressuring the previous senior management 
team to resign (Greer, 2004). Myers oversaw the correction of accounting flaws, updated 
and rectified payroll errors for 10,000 employees, and instituted new technology and 
systems to properly account for activities and funds throughout the organization (Greer, 
2004). Myers was able to restore investor and public trust by demonstrating a will and 
intent to change organizational direction and followed through to exact a transformation 
(Greer, 2004). The company completed this turnaround and restored confidence through 
a three-year development plan that demonstrated success through increased share value, 
higher net income, and stronger earnings per share as the plan progressed (“Business 
Brief,” 2002). 
Xerox was also entangled in an accounting scandal from 1997 to 2001 that 
resulted in the overstatement of profits by over a billion dollars (“When something,” 
2002). Whistleblower James Bingham, the assistant treasurer for the corporation, publicly 
revealed the organization’s fraud and unethical behavior (“When something,” 2002). 
Xerox committed a number of deliberate abuses to overstate income and falsify financial 
statements over five years to inflate profits by approximately $1.5 billion (Thapa & 
Brown, 2007). By booking revenue on long-term lease contracts immediately instead of 
properly recognizing revenues in the periods in which it was actually earned, Xerox 
substantially overstated revenues (Kadlec, Fonda, & Parker, 2002). These accounting 
frauds required a restatement of approximately $6.4 billion on five full years of financial 
statements (Kadlec et al., 2002). In addition to flagrantly improper and unethical revenue 
practices, the corporation also admitted to bribery totaling at least $600,000-700,000 to 
government officials in India to increase sales (“When something,” 2002). 
Xerox determined an ethical turnaround was possible and promoted Anne 
Mulcahy as “the accidental CEO” (Miller, 2004, para. 8). Mulcahy promoted the values 
of honesty, resilience, and trust (Patnaik & Sahoo, 2010). Mulcahy chose to work to 
recapture the previous culture and values of the organization begun with the founding 
father CEO Joe Wilson (Patnaik & Sahoo, 2010). By leveraging the positive, beneficial 
character and culture of the organization to stamp out the unethical activities of the few, 
Mulcahy revitalized the corporate philosophy (Patnaik & Sahoo, 2010). The turnaround 
succeeded because Mulcahy was “straightforward, hardworking, disciplined, patiently 
persistent, and extremely loyal to the company. She took the turnaround of Xerox with a 
missionary zeal, by walking the talk and taking the whole company along with her” 
(Patnaik & Sahoo, 2010, p. 25). 
These rather notorious and well-publicized examples of turnarounds in these 
powerful corporations provided not only the knowledge that positive change and 
turnarounds are possible, but also provided explicit examples of tools, tactics, and 
strategies executed during the process of turnaround. What is also of note is that all 
turnarounds utilized new leadership that were committed to bringing the organizations 
back into the light, solving the strategic, financial, ethical, and operational failings that 
caused the crises. In fact, all examples of the successful turnarounds above included a 
strong, ethical leader that demanded the same level of morality of the organization as a 
whole. 
Qualities and role of an ethical leader during a turnaround.	  
 Once the new manager takes on the leadership position, the ethical individual 
must communicate and bring attention to the new organizational focus of upright and 
honest behavior to effect an actual transformation (Sims, 2000). Honesty is a vital 
element of ethical leadership and has been the subject of much research (Avolio, 1999; 
Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999; Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005; Den Hartog, House, 
Hanges, Ruiz-Quintanilla, & Dorfman, 1999; Howell & Avolio, 1992; Kouzes & Posner, 
1993; Posner & Schmidt, 1992). The leader’s honesty and increased negative attention 
upon wrongdoing and positive focus on “doing what is right” serves to uphold values, 
increases openness throughout the organization, and creates an opportunity for open 
communication about past mistakes as well as future direction and correction (Sims, 
2000). First, the new leader must be able and willing to control his or her emotional 
reactions to the crisis that created the need for the ethical turnaround (Sims, 2000). As it 
is likely the new manager’s tenure will begin in the middle of an organizational upheaval, 
the leader must also be able to remain rational and in control during the future calamities 
and crises that inevitably result during the process of the turnaround (Sims, 2000). 
Reactions to problems must be swift, upright, honest, and open, with an adamant refusal 
to hide behind the corporate shield of silence (Epstein, 2003; Puffer & McCarthy, 2008; 
Sims, 2000). Leaders must possess a willingness to both admit past failings and apologize 
for them with the intent of creating and strengthening a culture of trust and honesty 
(Epstein, 2003; Puffer & McCarthy, 2008; Sims, 2000). Management must clearly 
communicate all relevant information, positive and negative, to the various stakeholders - 
employees, creditors, customers, governmental bodies, and others - consistently relaying 
financial data as well as progress in the turnaround (Epstein, 2003). In addition to 
conveying the new organizational direction, leaders must actively model and 
conscientiously demonstrate the expected behavior, bringing a character of ethical 
activity and management that others can admire and emulate (Sims, 2000). 
Because “organizations as we know them are the people in them; if people do not 
change, there is no organizational change…[and] are effective only to the degree that 
these structural changes are associated with changes in the psychology of employees” 
(Schneider et al., 1996, p. 7). Leaders must change the hearts, minds, and thinking of the 
employees to execute a successful turnaround, usually through the strength and qualities 
of the person in charge. It is not enough that the leader, executive, or manager believes 
himself or herself to be ethical, but these individuals must possess a reputation for ethical 
and moral behavior (Treviño, Hartman, & Brown, 2000). 
Existing literature provided that there are individual characteristics that are likely 
to manifest within ethical leaders, among them a substantial level of cognitive moral 
development, a concern for others, responsibility, and reliability (Bass & Steidlmeier, 
1999; Brown et al., 2005; Brown & Treviño, 2006; De Hoogh & Den Hartog, 2008; 
Kalshoven et al., 2011; Turner, Barling, Epitropaki, Butcher, & Milder, 2002). However, 
Kalshoven, Den Hartog, and De Hoogh (2011) chose to focus on the “Big Five” 
personality traits that most strongly correlate with integrity of conscientiousness, 
agreeableness, and emotional stability (p. 350). In addition, Brown et al. (2005) as well as 
Treviño, Brown, and Hartman (2003) identified the traits important for ethical leaders of 
fairness, power sharing, and role clarification. 
Treviño et al. (2000) asserted that the two-pillared ethical leader must be 
perceived as both a moral person as well a moral manager. The individual must act 
ethically and morally as a leader, as not simply the Chief Executive Officer, but as the 
Chief Ethics Officer, demonstrating honesty and integrity in every decision and deed. The 
moral person has the traits of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness, always acting with 
the behaviors of “doing the right thing,” having an honest concern for people, and 
operating with a strong personal morality (Treviño et al., 2000). That same moral person, 
when making decisions, must also hold to his or her values, be objective and fair, take 
into account a concern for society, and follow ethical rules (Treviño et al., 2000). 
Values, ethics, and morals are the guiding force and direction for a management’s 
behavior, therefore top management and executive leadership must portray them at every 
level of the organization (Treviño et al., 2000). The individual must then clearly convey 
that ethical standing, integrity, honesty, and fairness to all employees and interested 
stakeholders to be followed. A strongly ethical leader will publicly display principled, 
upright, and honest behaviors with veracity in all of his or her interpersonal 
communications and interactions with others (Treviño et al., 2000). By modeling and 
encouraging upright conduct, the turnaround leader is able to guide and inspire a virtuous 
culture for followers and employees (Treviño et al., 2000; Woolf, 1979). It is not enough 
that the leader, executive, or manager believes himself or herself to be ethical; these 
individuals must possess a reputation for ethical and moral behavior, clearly conveying to 
all employees and interested stakeholders their integrity, honesty, and fairness (Treviño et 
al., 2000). Because tenets, beliefs, and ethos are the guiding force and directive for an 
organization’s behavior, it is imperative that top management and executive leadership 
demonstrate them at every level of the institution (Treviño et al., 2000). As a moral 
manager, the individual needs to model all of the traits of the honorable person (Treviño 
et al., 2000). Leaders also must provide appropriate rewards for positive conduct and the 
suitable discipline for negative behavior, constantly and continuously publicizing the 
organization’s ethics and values (Treviño et al., 2000). 
Erickson (2006) stated, “successful leadership – and the trust of those led – 
demands a true partnership between leaders and followers to create a team that advances 
our society toward the common good” (p. 63). Fruitful organizational governance ties the 
leader’s goal to the benefit of the entity and stakeholders as a whole, as well as to the 
employees and other stakeholders (Erickson, 2006). The ethical and transformational 
leader chosen to steer the turnaround should also possess a number of personal qualities 
to build a relationship with the organization. In addition, he or she must maintain strong 
leadership through the period of turmoil to sustain organizational focus and effort through 
the process. Charles Christy, the Chief Financial Officer of Coastal South Bancshares, 
Incorporated, provided the Six C’s of leadership necessary for leaders to possess: 
● Competence — [the] demonstrated proficiency in “hard” technical skills and 
“soft” behavioral, influencing, and leadership skills, 
● Composure — [the ability to] remain calm under fire, 
● Conviction — [the] passion and commitment toward [the leader’s] views or the 
views of others, 
● Character — [the] consistent demonstration of integrity, honesty, respect, and 
trust, 
● Care — [demonstrating] concern for the personal and professional well-being of 
others, [and] 
● Courage — [a] willingness to stand up for [one’s] beliefs, admit mistakes, and 
challenge the status quo when necessary in the spirit of “constructive contention.” 
(Thomson, 2010, p. 50) 
However, a “cultural change or an ethical turnaround for a company is a long and 
complicated process that cannot happen overnight, or simply by firing an unethical CEO” 
(Sims, 2000, p. 74). Thus, it is vital that stakeholders be patient with the entity and allow 
for a time of transition instead of expecting a total transformation overnight. To realize 
the transformation fully, leaders need the tools and authority to execute their vision 
whether it is hiring, firing, or restructuring the entity to change its ethical trajectory. 
Instituting a Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer (CECO).	  
 A strong ethical leader devoted to an ethical turnaround will often hire (or 
become) a Chief Ethics (and Compliance) Officer (CECO). Two strong examples of 
hiring a CECO were with Eric Pillmore at Tyco and ethics team leaders at Siemens AG 
that were specifically dedicated to ethics and performance (Kavanagh, 2008). Kavanagh 
(2008) provided an excellent description of the Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer as 
an individual who: 
● Serves as the primary officer; 
● Has responsibility for the overall ethics and compliance program; 
● Has formal and informal recognition as having authority for a critical function in 
the organization; 
● Supports the CEO and board in championing corporate values and standards; 
● Participates in major company decisions;  
● Serves as a member of the executive management team; [and] 
● Maintains a singular focus on ethics and compliance. (p. 26) 
The CECO should be the final authority of ethical behavior and action, 
maintaining sufficient independence from management to be free to raise issues without 
fear of retaliation (Kavanagh, 2008; Snell, 2011). To be successful, the Ethics Officer 
needs the freedom and support from management to create a new culture and make 
recommendations that will be embraced by the institution (Kavanagh, 2008; Snell, 2011). 
Aguilar (2010) mentioned that CECOs may hold other positions and titles such as Chief 
Risk Officer, Chief Operating Officer, Chief Executive Officer, Head of Human 
Resources, Chief Financial Officer, Head of Internal Audit, General Council, and others. 
For the CECO to be effective, the individual needs direct contact and access to the board 
of directors as the overriding authority of the organization (Aguilar, 2010; Kavanagh, 
2008; Snell, 2011). However, the best reporting relationship for the CECO is a direct 
connection to the highest authority in the entity, possibly demanding a restructuring of 
the institution (Kavanagh, 2008; Snell, 2011). 
	  
The Role of Trust in Organizations	  
During a speech in Clinton, Illinois, Abraham Lincoln (1854) was believed to 
have said that “if you once forfeit the confidence of your fellow citizens, you can never 
regain their respect and esteem” (para. 1). As the speech was not transcribed, the 
newspapers ascribed the additional comment to Lincoln that “it is true that you may fool 
all of the people some of the time; you can even fool some of the people all of the time; 
but you can’t fool all the people all of the time” (Lincoln, 1854, para. 1). While Lincoln 
was speaking to the importance of maintaining the trust, faith, and conviction of the 
populous in its leaders, his words of wisdom transcend mere politics into all 
organizations and social interactions. 
There is no single person or entity that has every quality needed to succeed. It is 
the necessity of society to work together, if only to engage in mutually agreeable 
commerce. Because every individual and organization is naturally and rationally 
concerned first and foremost with their own interests and goals, there must be a basic 
understanding between the various parties in order for social interaction, communication, 
and cooperative behavior to occur (Hosmer, 1995; Kramer & Tyler, 1996). Trust is 
necessary for stronger connections and communications in organizations, economies, and 
society as a whole because all interpersonal relationships depend on a certain amount of 
trust between individuals and groups to function (Denton, 2009; Hirsch, 1978; Kramer & 
Tyler, 1996). 
Trust is thought of as the general belief that individuals or parties in an exchange 
or relationship will follow through with what they say and do, behaving as agreed upon 
by all involved (Blau, 1964; Deutsch, 1958; Puranam & Vanneste, 2009). Trust between 
individuals is the basic building block of interpersonal relationships and communication 
and therefore essential for stable associations (Blau, 1964; Puranam & Vanneste, 2009). 
Caldwell, Davis, and Devine (2009) concluded that “trust is ultimately the relinquishing 
of one’s personal choice or power in the expectant hope that another party will honor the 
elements of the social contract between the parties” (p. 104). For collaboration in an 
enterprise, individuals that trust one another are able to work toward mutually defined 
goals with improved outcomes. 
Even more than regular interpersonal relationships, management and leadership 
require substantial trust to administer and guide organizations as an imperative element of 
the work environment (Denton, 2009; Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Wong & Cummings, 
2009). Shapiro, Sheppard, and Cheraskin (1992) provided that there are three types of 
trust in professional relationships – deterrence-based, knowledge-based, and 
identification-based trust. The concept of deterrence-based trust centers on the idea that 
the individuals involved will come through and complete the tasks they agreed to and will 
achieve what they have promised (Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Shapiro et al., 1992). In 
general, employees, management, and leadership achieve what is required of them, but 
mainly because of the threat of punishment or removal (Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Shapiro 
et al., 1992). Knowledge-based trust is trust formulated by one’s knowledge and 
understanding of others – that the individual can trust their interpretation of the others’ 
personalities and behavior to be able to predict how they will act and behave (Kramer & 
Tyler, 1996; Shapiro et al., 1992). In addition, identification-based trust is driven by the 
idea of being able to identify with the other person’s feelings, intentions, desires, and 
perceptions of the world (Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Shapiro et al., 1992). As organizations 
are composed of individuals with complex personalities, intentions, and desires, 
understanding and empathizing with others allows leadership and employees to work 
together better with mutually understood goals. 
Kramer and Tyler (1996) then expanded on Shapiro et al.’s (1992) types of trust, 
adding calculus-based trust, as well as expanding upon knowledge-based and 
identification-based trust. In investigating deterrence-based trust, Kramer and Tyler 
(1996) concluded that “the threat of punishment is likely to be a more significant 
motivator than the promise of reward” (p. 119). Because the fear of negative 
consequences may be stronger than the desire to achieve positive results, Kramer and 
Tyler (1996) added calculus-based trust, believing that trust is an “ongoing, market-
oriented, economic calculation whose value is derived by determining the outcomes 
resulting from creating and sustaining the relationship relative to the costs of maintaining 
or severing it” (p. 120). The idea of calculus-based trust is that the respondents in the 
relationship calculate the value and importance of cultivating the connection, not just the 
pain of punishment if the association fails. As the relationship grows, individuals 
regularly make progress in building the relationship as well as suffer the setbacks of 
failures of trust. With knowledge-based trust, Kramer and Tyler (1996) reinforced 
Shapiro et al.’s (1992) dimensions of predictability, information, and accurate prediction 
of behavior by emphasizing communication and a courtship process to cultivate an 
ongoing understanding of the person and their reactions. With identification-based trust, 
Kramer and Tyler (1996) highlighted the idea of predicting the needs of the other 
individual in the relationship to build trust, as well as predicting their choices and 
feelings while empathizing with others to think, feel, and respond like the other person. 
Trust is not only necessary for employees to demonstrate a readiness and 
inclination to stand up for what is right, but also to voice concerns, make suggestions for 
improvement, and to maintain an open, healthy culture (Wong & Cummings, 2009). 
Trust is considered to be a “crucial ingredient of organizational effectiveness” (Galford & 
Drapeau, 2003, p. 95) because “when employees trust who they work for, they are 
happier and more productive. Trust in turn is built on credibility, respect, and fairness” 
(Denton, 2009, p. 12). With credibility and trust in management, individuals in an 
organization are more able to express their thoughts with less fear of repercussion or 
punitive action, lessening uncertainty through communication. As trust is crucial to 
positive organizational performance, a lack of trust often increases incidences of ethical 
issues and corruption, as well as undercuts all constructive efforts and projects (Cremer, 
Tenbrunsel, & Dijke, 2010). 
Kramer and Tyler (1996) explored the dynamics of trust at three levels – macro, 
meso, and micro, and trust should be investigated at every level within an organization. 
At the macro-level, it is important to address the strength or weakness of trust in the 
entire organization (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). It is at the institutional level where 
researchers can question whether trust has remained at its previous level or declined, as 
well as how it can be rebuilt (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). The very nature and organizational 
structure of the entity influences how management supervises and treats its employees. 
Faunce (1981) discussed the transitions of management in organizations from depending 
on the skills of artisans, to extremely routinized technology in the industrial revolution, to 
management again depending on the expert efforts of its employees. The needs of 
management influenced the level of trust they bestow upon their employees (Faunce, 
1981; Kramer & Tyler, 1996; McGregor, 1957). When management relied upon the 
unique and complex skills of their artisans, the style was more trusting and open, as the 
employees and craftsmen possessed talents that were not readily available. As employees 
can be internally motivated per McGregor’s (1957) Theory Y, management must have 
more trust in its employees. However, the more mechanized society became with human 
beings acting as interchangeable parts, the less trusting management became in the labors 
of their employees because of the belief that employees are lazy and must be forced to 
work (Faunce, 1981; Kramer & Tyler, 1996; McGregor, 1957). Yet, as the pendulum 
swung back towards a knowledge-based economy with specialized skills and less firms 
utilizing people for mechanized production, management again adopted a more trusting 
and open style (Faunce, 1981; Kramer & Tyler, 1996).  
Caldwell and Jeffries (2001) identified seven qualities of managers and entities 
that are pertinent to convey and understand organizational trustworthiness. These include 
competence, quality assurance, interactional courtesy, procedural fairness, responsibility 
to inform, legal compliance, and financial balance (Caldwell & Jeffries, 2001). Without 
organizational proficiency in operations as well as quality control to prove its adherence 
to its competencies, internal and external stakeholders cannot be assured or trust that the 
entity is fulfilling its obligations to its employees, creditors, and stakeholders, calling into 
question its purpose (Caldwell & Jeffries, 2001). Procedural fairness demands that all 
relevant stakeholders, have the opportunity to participate in the organization with all 
matters of impartiality and openness (Caldwell & Jeffries, 2001). By clearly adhering to 
the responsibility to inform, entities provided all the important information and necessary 
communications applicable to appropriate stakeholders, upholding their obligation to 
notify, as well as conveying honesty and trust to everyone related to the organization 
(Caldwell & Jeffries, 2001).   
At the meso-level, the dynamics of trust related to the collaborative networks 
within and across organizations (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). Powell’s (1990) research 
indicated four networks of collaboration, all of which create social relationships and 
involve trust. These networks involved: membership in a professional community of 
some sort, a group bonded together with shared history and experiences, a network 
bonded by mutual dependencies, and a network based on place and kinship (Kramer & 
Tyler, 1996; Powell, 1990). When members of a collaborative network belong to the 
same professional community, it is easy for them to share information, experience, and 
skills, creating stronger outcomes in a professional accounting, medical, legal, or other 
specialized society. The network with a shared history is often within an organization or 
company where mutual experiences such as an especially successful or challenging event 
bonded them together. A network of mutual dependencies may be formed based on a 
project or simple necessity. The network based on kinship may be developed in close 
quarters based on friendship and togetherness. Trust is imperative in these networks as 
they can create mutually agreeable outcomes through relationships, gossip, kinship, and 
collaboration (Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Powell, 1990). Trust is easier to build when 
members of the networks are in the same organization as proximity encourages bonding. 
As trust is grown and cultivated in these networks, groups of individuals or entities can 
create better outcomes than they would have on their own. 
At the most basic, micro-level, the study of trust centers on the psychology of the 
individual (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). At the individual level, trustworthiness in managers 
is contingent on the belief that these individuals and entities are competent, responsible, 
and dependable, and able to fulfill their obligations completely without reservation 
(Ingenhoff & Sommer, 2010). In addition, Caldwell and Clapham (2003) provided 
interpersonal trustworthiness factors that were indispensable for individuals, including 
established ability, benevolence, and integrity, demanding first that managers possess the 
necessary skills, competencies, and expertise to do their jobs with the utmost ability to 
perform. Managers and leaders should have the intention and desire to do the right thing, 
to do well without thinking of personal gain, operate with kindness, as well as act with 
integrity, upright character, honesty, fairness, and credibility (Caldwell & Clapham, 
2003). Another less obvious indicator of trust in managers and leaders is whether the 
individual is consistently available, both physically and emotionally, therefore actively 
engaged in the organization as well as the concerns of its employees (Denton, 2009). 
Employees must also be convinced that the manager or leader has both the capacity and 
willingness to keep confidences and maintain privacy to be trusted and is “present,” in 
that the manager or leader is focused on the success of the enterprise (Denton, 2009). 
Because trust is needed when there is an ambiguous situation or action in the future, 
where the results of the decision depend on the actions of others, and where the negative 
result may be worse than the positive outcome, the destruction of the relationship of trust 
and confidence in leadership is especially damaging (Deutsch, 1960; Kramer & Tyler, 
1996). 
Destruction of trust and impact on organizations.	  
Trust is often a tentative and fragile aspect of human interaction that is relatively 
easy to break or destroy, intentionally or unintentionally. An unintentional violation of 
trust is accidental or inadvertent because one or both parties may not be aware of the 
same facets of a relationship, agreement, or decision. Intentional violations of trust are far 
more insidious as the betrayal is quite simply a breach of trust or honor in the 
expectations of behavior and relationships that can effectively destroy all positive 
outcomes from a previous or future relationship (Caldwell et al., 2009). Trust can be 
destroyed either through a slow decline that is a gradual erosion or a swift and severe 
single incident that “effectively eliminates all trust” (Kramer & Tyler, 1996, p. 125). 
Caldwell et al. (2009) mentioned that workplace betrayal is usually voluntary as either 
one or both parties decides to violate the agreement or relationship. When one or more 
parties violate expectations or covenants that are pivotal to the organization, both parties 
are aware of the arrangement and affiliation, and that the betrayal has the potential to 
harm one or both parties (Caldwell et al., 2009). The destruction of trust results in 
suffering, frustration, and/or sorrow as a previously respected leader or organization 
becomes tarnished (Caldwell et al., 2009). The violation upsets the wronged party as well 
as destabilizes the relationship, negatively impacting both the cognitive and emotional 
balance in the entity (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). 
At the personal level, where the trust relationship was once in balance, the 
violation creates an immediate state of negative affect and feeling, uncertainty, and 
instability between the parties (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). After the violation, each 
individual undergoes the cognitive processes to determine the depth of the betrayal, 
establish who is responsible for the encroachment, and decide the magnitude of the 
negative impact (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). In addition, both parties will also experience 
the emotional impacts of the violation and must manage the hurt and anger while 
reevaluating the feelings each has for the other (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). Kramer and 
Tyler (1996) also provided that the response of the violator is to either accept 
responsibility of guilt or claim innocence. If the violator claims responsibility, he or she 
can ask for forgiveness and attempt to salvage the relationship, become merely 
ambivalent about the relationship, or becomes hostile and abandon the relationship 
(Kramer & Tyler, 1996). Overall, the outcome of the violation may be a destroyed 
relationship, a recalibrated or reconfigured relationship, or a restored relationship. 
Kramer and Tyler (1996), in discussing calculus-based, knowledge-based, and 
identification-based trust, provided additional violation information. With regards to 
calculus-based trust, as the relationship is built and constantly reevaluated, a violation of 
trust may result in simply a ‘two steps forward, one step back’ mentality where a 
violation results in disappointment and frustration, but not an egregious break (Kramer & 
Tyler, 1996). With knowledge-based trust, knowledge and affinity with others develops 
over time in lower-risk situations therefore “trust is perceived as violated only when the 
person’s actions are perceived as freely chosen” (Kramer & Tyler, 1996, p. 127). If the 
action was freely chosen, therefore deliberate, the individual that is betrayed must revise 
first his or her perception of the betrayer and the relationship, because even if it is 
restored, it will never be the same (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). However, Kramer and Tyler 
(1996) provided that in regards to identification-based trust situations, almost any trust 
violation is a relationship-transforming event. As identification-based trust is based on 
empathizing with and understanding the other person’s identity, violations are a breach of 
the social contract of the parties involved, rupturing the relationship (Kramer & Tyler, 
1996). It is only through meticulous and time-consuming effort that the connection is 
made again, but it will never look the same as it did before the infraction (Kramer & 
Tyler, 1996). 
 At an institutional level, the destruction of trust is profoundly unsettling for the 
individuals that have poured their human capital, financial and physical resources, efforts, 
careers, reputations, and service into the organization for its benefit (Gillespie & Dietz, 
2009). After trust is destroyed either through betrayal or accident, employees no longer 
want to devote themselves to the service of an organization or leader that hurt them, and 
are not inclined to trust the leaders as the relationships between them are damaged. 
Employees may chose to leave the entity, taking the knowledge, training, and 
investments in human capital with them, psychologically withdrawing resulting in 
counterproductive workplace behaviors, or even engaging in acts of obstruction or 
revenge for actual or perceived wrongs (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009). The exit of employees 
from the organization results in a significant loss of institutional data and worth in their 
training, advancement, and outlay of human capital. Employees that no longer trust the 
organization or its leadership may engage in production deviance, the intentional failure 
to perform a task or job as assigned, resulting in frustration for all parties due to the 
insubordination to the organization and its values (Jensen, Opland, & Ryan, 2010). 
 A deeper and more destructive counterproductive behavior by employees is 
outright sabotage that deliberately destroys and/or defaces organizational property, 
relationships, and/or value, whether overt or subtle (Jensen et al., 2010). If the 
organization or leadership has betrayed an individual for whatever reason, the employee 
or manager may also decide to abuse the organization, rationalizing it based on the 
perceived failure of the institution or manager to uphold its promises, believing that he or 
she is “owed” for the betrayal (Jensen et al., 2010). An additional form of retaliation for 
the perceived betrayal or destruction of trust is the calculated lack of focus for the 
employee; an active disengagement at work. This committed exclusion is a change in 
how the employee expects to spend his or her time at the job as evidenced by slacking, 
social loafing, avoiding responsibilities, wasting time on tasks, or executing personal 
business on organizational time (Jensen et al., 2010). These counterproductive work 
behaviors may result because trust in the institution or management has been broken, 
resulting in organizational malcontent, as well as financial losses. 
 Every organization that has experienced a loss of trust suffers. A for-profit entity 
may lose stockholders or stakeholders and the market may abandon it. Stock prices may 
fall, customers may leave, and employees may exit. However, the destruction of trust is 
potentially more catastrophic for the not-for-profit organization as a whole than for-
profits. Because not-for-profit organizations rely upon the generosity of their benefactors 
and belief in their mission to survive, they are particularly at risk for damage due to the 
destruction of trust (Tolbert, Moore, & Wood, 2010). Because not-for-profits often 
depend on donations, charity events, and fundraising activities to generate capital, the 
loss of support of their stakeholders is substantial. 
Restoring trust during a turnaround.	  
Trust is necessary for all organizations as trust is a “crucial ingredient of 
organizational effectiveness” (Galford & Drapeau, 2003, p. 95). A lack of trust often 
increases ethical infractions and corruption as well as undercuts all constructive efforts 
and projects (Cremer et al., 2010). At an institutional level, the destruction of trust is 
“profoundly unsettling” (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009, p. 127). As trust is especially important 
during times of crisis, organizational upheaval, or serious challenge, trust must be rebuilt 
to continue making decisions (Siegrist, Earle, & Gutscher, 2007; Siegrist & Zingg, 2013). 
Therefore, the restoration of trust is vital for an organization to move forward. Because 
trust has both an emotional and cognitive basis, the destruction of trust will influence 
individuals’ actions as well as their relationships (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). Regardless of 
the fact that usually only one of the parties has violated the trust of the other, the repair is 
a mutual, bilateral experience (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). 
Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan (2009) concluded that there are conditions and 
situations where trust cannot be repaired. However, in cases where trust restoration is 
possible, organizations will require remarkably different strategies to rebuild trust than 
those used to create trust. Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, and Dirks (2004) determined that 
organizations have two distinct responses to trust violations. Institutions can either 
apologize for the incident or deny its occurrence (Kim et al., 2004). An apology is a 
public acknowledgment of responsibility for the trust violation as well as an expression 
of remorse, guilt, and repentance for the damage (Kim et al., 2004). The other response is 
to explicitly disavow that the trust violation actually occurred, declaring it false (Kim et 
al., 2004). However, the result of the two tactics will have substantially different results 
depending on the type and severity of the infraction. 
Violations of trust from competence and integrity infractions are important to 
immediately correct. Organizations are much more likely to admit competence violations 
as they are considered more controllable through training, hiring, firing, or simple error 
correction (Poppo & Schepker, 2010). However, integrity violations are quite 
problematic, as “a single act of dishonesty will cause trustors to conclude that the trustee 
is inherently dishonest” (Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan, 2009, p. 255). Even a trivial or 
inconsequential act can bring the entire character of the entity or individual into question. 
Though most ethical and integrity violations are usually perpetrated by a single individual 
or small group of individuals colluding in an entity, the potential exists for the entire 
organization to blamed for damage (Poppo & Schepker, 2010). When individuals or 
organizations work to repair trust, they must: 
● Be willing to invest time and energy into the repair process, 
● Perceive that the short- and/or long-term benefits to be derived from the 
relationship are highly valued – that is, the payoff is “worth” the investment of 
additional energy, [and] 
● Perceive that the benefits to be derived are preferred relative to options for having 
those needs satisfied in an alternative manner. (Kramer & Tyler, 1996, p. 129) 
 Once both parties have determined that the relationship is worth saving, either at 
the individual or organizational level, the parties must engage in reciprocal trust repair. 
The first step is to recognize the trust violation has occurred, acknowledging it so both 
parties are operating with the same information (Kramer & Tyler, 1996). As a trust 
violation might have occurred inadvertently, by mutually recognizing that the damage 
was done, the parties can make the choice to move forward. The second step is to 
determine what actions caused the destruction of trust and take blame for the action 
(Kramer & Tyler, 1996). Because the victim is already aware of the breach, the challenge 
is for the perpetrator to own the blame. Once blame is accepted, the third step to “admit 
that the event was ‘destructive’ of trust” (Kramer & Tyler, 1996, p. 132) is necessary. If 
the guilty party admits the action destroyed trust, he or she demonstrates to the victim(s) 
that their experiences and losses matter. This process usually demands full disclosure as 
well as a discussion of the events and the cognitive and emotional results of the betrayal 
(Kramer & Tyler, 1996). The fourth and final step is for the offender to accept full 
responsibility for their actions as well as the consequences of the breach of trust (Kramer 
& Tyler, 1996). Whether intentional or not, if the victim believes to have been wronged, 
then trust has been broken. During this process, the victim also engages in the same 
discussion and works with the perpetrator to find common ground to rebuild trust. The 
victim can then allow the offender to begin to repair the trust by offering some element of 
forgiveness to the apologetic guilty party. 
 Apologizing for a mistake is a clear behavioral correction but is often rather 
difficult to execute. When making an apology for wrongdoing, the individual or entity is 
admitting its failure and making the implicit promise that the violation of trust will not be 
repeated (Poppo & Schepker, 2010). Apologizing is the most important step to 
reconciliation as it demonstrates an understanding of the perspective and plight of the 
victim and a willingness to remedy the damage caused by the offending party (Poppo & 
Schepker, 2010). Lewicki and Bunker (1996) also outlined a process that begins with 
acknowledging the violation, determining the causes of the violation while admitting 
guilt, admitting and agreeing that the act was indeed destructive, and accepting the 
responsibility for the consequences of the violation. 
The second major response to a breach of trust situation is simply to deny that it 
ever occurred and pretend that it never existed (Poppo & Schepker, 2010). This strategy 
provides no intent to correct behavior and raises serious subsequent concerns about ethics 
and trustworthiness (Poppo & Schepker, 2010). By denying the infraction, the perpetrator 
is concealing the original transgression and committing a supplementary trust violation 
(Poppo & Schepker, 2010). This strategy likely causes added harm, reputational damage, 
and financial loss to the organization because it indicates the full intent of the individual 
or organization to further deceive the injured party and possibly the public (Poppo & 
Schepker, 2010). 
To substantiate organizational trustworthiness, entities should exhibit 
competence, quality assurance, interactional courtesy, procedural fairness, responsibility 
to inform, legal compliance, and financial balance for both managers and entities 
(Caldwell & Jeffries, 2001). Institutions must maintain a high level of competence to 
achieve sufficient results that adhere to the mission and maintain clear standards of 
quality to assure that competence is publicly and continually achieved (Caldwell & 
Jeffries, 2001). Stakeholders cannot be assured or trust that the entity is fulfilling its 
obligations to its employees, creditors, or stakeholders without organizational proficiency 
and quality controls (Caldwell & Jeffries, 2001). Procedural fairness demands that all 
relevant stakeholders have the opportunity to participate in the organization with all 
matters of impartiality and openness (Caldwell & Jeffries, 2001). Adhering to the 
responsibility to inform, institutions should provide all relevant information to 
appropriate stakeholders (Caldwell & Jeffries, 2001). Entities can rebuild trust by 
providing their stakeholders with truthful, accurate, and timely information about 
organizational performance and expectations (Denton, 2009). Organizations also must 
express confidence and trustworthiness by operating with financial balance to fulfill their 
missions and commitments without waste while adhering to all rules, regulations, and 
laws governing the organization at the local, state, and federal level (Caldwell & Jeffries, 
2001). 	  
Higher Education	  
Classification of small, regional, public institutions of higher education.	  
 The United States describes college and universities as educational institutions in 
several different ways to provide various classifications for students, parents, and 
stakeholders. The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Learning (2010) created 
the Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education, the leading system to 
organize colleges and universities by various characteristics. The Foundation (2010) 
classified educational institutions by the traditional Carnegie Framework, by instructional 
program (level of degrees provided), enrollment profile, population size, and setting. For 
the purposes of this research, the Carnegie Classification of Size and Setting is relevant 
as large organizations often operate substantially differently than smaller, more intimate 
entities. Per the Foundation (2010), a “small” school is defined as one that has between 
1,000-2,999 full-time equivalent students. The classification breaks “small” into three 
other more targeted categories of primarily nonresidential, primarily residential, and 
highly residential, but that additional classification is not relevant to this study (Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Learning, 2010). 
 The Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) (2013) is the body that 
manages the accreditation agencies across the United States. These accreditation agencies 
are regional bodies that have broken the country into separate geographic blocks to 
manage degree-granting institutions of higher education, public and private (Council for 
Higher Education Accreditation, 2013). The following organizations manage the different 
regions of all degree-granting institutions: 
● Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools Middle States Commission on 
Higher Education (MSCHE) 
● New England Association of Schools and Colleges Commission on Institutions of 
Higher Education (NEASC-CIHE) 
● North Central Association of Colleges and Schools: The Higher Learning 
Commission (NCA-HLC) 
● Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges (SACS) 
● Western Association of Schools and Colleges Accrediting Commission for 
Community and Junior Colleges (WASC-ACCJC) 
● Western Association of Schools and Colleges Accrediting Commission for Senior 
Colleges and Universities (WASC-ACSCU) 
An institution of higher education also defines itself by its method of funding. A 
private college or university is exclusively funded by student remissions, the entity’s 
endowment, and donations. As private institutions do not receive public funding from the 
state government, the direct authority over the private entity is the regional and/or 
professional accrediting agency. On the other hand, a public college or university is 
funded in part by public dollars, therefore by state government appropriations. As a 
result, in-state resident students usually pay cheaper tuition rates. However, because these 
institutions are accountable to the state government and the public, there is often a state 
agency, board, or office to which the entity is held accountable. 
Risk factors for organizational malfeasance.	  
All organizations are at risk for organizational malfeasance, but certain 
institutional factors create a potential culture for fraud, all of which may be present in 
higher education. There are “organizational dysfunctions that point toward fraud or at 
least provide opportunities for it to flourish” (Conway, 2004, p. 129), among them issues 
such as a 
● habit of noncompliance with regulatory or governmental bodies; [an] 
● absence of checks and balances, or an enforcement of checks and balances; [a] 
● culture that forbids bad news or dissension; 
● haphazard or limited investigations of suspected wrongdoing; 
● unrealistic goals, targets, or expectations; [a] 
● lack of respect or concern for internal controls; [a] 
● lack of physical safeguards of assets; 
● understaffing; 
● great pressure from stakeholders, auditors, or boards of directors; 
● compensation overly tied to performance; [or there is] 
● inexperienced and/or ineffective oversight by board. (Conway, 2004, p. 129-
130) 
These organizational dysfunctions do not create abuses or excuses malfeasance, rather 
they are examples of the symptoms of the underlying disease of a problematic culture for 
which management is both responsible and accountable, as well as for any decisions 
regarding or relating to ethics, behavior, and performance (Ferrell & Ferrell, 2011). 
Colleges and universities, whether for-profit or not-for-profit, can easily fall prey to these 
issues, even though their existence is usually considered to be for a higher purpose in 
society. 
 In looking at a number of the organizational dysfunctions that create a culture and 
opportunity for problems in educational institutions, these entities have additional 
required elements for compliance with regulatory and governmental bodies. Because 
most educational institutions are exempt from federal and state income taxes by their 
purpose, not only is their income and spending scrutinized by their supporters, but by the 
governmental bodies that exempt them from taxes (Tolbert et al., 2010). Educational 
institutions may have an organizational culture that may want to avoid bad news or 
dissension as the individuals involved are perceived to be unsupportive of the 
organization’s mission and detract from the public’s support of the entity. Without public 
support, donations and funding are not forthcoming and may create potentially unrealistic 
goals. There is no question that “when an organization is accused of fraudulent practices, 
the claim can strike at the very heart of an organization’s image” (Caldiero, Taylor, & 
Ungureanu, 2009, p. 219). For the college or university that relies on the support, 
goodwill, and generosity of its members and other stakeholders, as well as an image of 
meaningful mission and support to the public, the damage from its behaviors may be 
substantial. 
Problems in higher education.	  
While business lapses and ethical turnarounds are discussed at length in the media 
and are the study of academia, researchers often “lack empirical data on ethical lapses 
occurring in universities” (Kelley & Chang, 2007, p. 407). These lapses range from 
improper records, grade inflation, manipulated enrollment, fraud, and more. For example, 
East Arkansas Community College repeatedly falsified records and defrauded their 
stakeholders and state citizens (Lieb, 1998). The “disturbing pattern of padded class 
enrollments, altered computer records, grade inflation and ghost classes” (Lieb, Wright, 
& Jefferson, 1998, para. 10) substantially inflated enrollment with the intent of obtaining 
additional funding and grants from the state government. Certain students were allowed 
to register for classes for free or for payment of $1 simply to over report enrollment by 
approximately 26% (Lieb et al., 1998). In addition, Arkansas State Representative 
Flanagin and his ex-wife, a former dean, were also involved in the fraud, enrolling their 
children in college courses, the youngest age 13, to pad class enrollments (Lieb, 1998; 
Lieb et al., 1998). As evidence of the organization’s ethical turnabout, the trustees of the 
college voted not to renew the president’s contract after it expired, and the former 
President Dr. George McCormick resigned with $150,000 contract buyout with 
nondisclosure agreement (“News Brief,” 1999; Wright, 1998). In addition, Jauwiece 
McGuire, the ex-wife of Flanagin, was demoted from her position of Dean of Humanities 
and Fine Arts due to her role in fraud (Lieb, 1998; Lieb et al., 1998; “News Brief,” 1999; 
Wright, 1998). 
 
Problems at the small, regional, public university in the upper Midwest.	  
 
 The small, regional, public institution of higher education under study recently 
encountered a series of organizational difficulties that negatively influenced its 
reputation. An audit of its special, short-term international programs determined that the 
majority of special programs failed traditional degree standards (The Associated Press, 
2012; Donovan, 2012a; Donovan, 2012b). The “slipshod international program without 
controls and oversights” (Donovan, 2012a, para. 3) allowed 743 students from overseas, 
the majority from China, to receive degrees from an improper international program 
(Donovan, 2012b). More than 500 of these students were awarded degrees that lacked the 
documentation to prove they had actually earned the degrees and the organization became 
known as a degree mill for Chinese students. 
The 2011-2012 academic year included the termination and subsequent lawsuit of 
the former president for enrollment inflation, a compliance and policy audit (improper 
degrees, human resources, and internal controls), and a financial audit that revealed a 
number of problems across the university (Finneman, 2012). The organization and its 
members were accused of enrollment inflation/fraud, improper awarding of degrees 
without documentation, misuse of public funds, and inappropriate scholarship allocations. 
The fallout from these actions culminated in a damaged reputation, substantial employee 
turnover, a decrease in student enrollment, a loss of donors and revenue, and the choice 
of the former dean to take his own life. 	  
Conclusions: Need for the Study	  
The challenges and difficulties at the specific university in question were weighty. 
The organization has been used at academic conferences as a negative example of what 
other educational institutions should not do (C. Belcher, personal communication, July 1, 
2013). The small, regional, public institution and its management determined that the 
organization needed a course correction and began to change its behavior. The entity’s 
accreditation was at risk, the student body plummeted, and the academic and local 
communities vilified the university and its management. As the example of the small, 
regional public university provides, once the damage to an organization is done, the 
consequences may be catastrophic to all stakeholders – employees, students, donors, and 
the rest of the community.  
As demonstrated in the literature review, the vast majority of research and 
established theory regarding turnaround management and trust is firmly situated in the 
business and corporate realm. Because ethical issues and the need for turnarounds are not 
limited to the corporate world but bleeds into governments, educational institutions, and 
not-for-profit organizations, the Academy and its body of knowledge has an application 
gap. With a number of examples in the corporate world, the academic community can 
follow its lead, but with the delicate balance of additional, potential stakeholders of the 
public, government, donors, and others, the stakes for a successful turnaround are perhaps 
even higher. As there has been little to no use of these topics to the area of higher 
education, the research titled “The Management of a Turnaround after an Ethical Breach 
in a Public Institution of Higher Education” applies the differing yet related theories of 
turnaround management and the restoration of trust to a small, public institution of higher 
education. Making an in-depth foray into a specific entity within higher education, this 
research investigates the theory that institutions of higher education can be restored 
through an ethical turnaround (Hofer, 1980; Patnaik & Sahoo, 2010; Puffer & McCarthy, 
2008). By applying these areas of research to this university, the Academy, as well as the 
profession, can use the hard-learned lessons to solve other crises in colleges and 
universities to turnaround and recover before it is too late.  
  
 	  
Chapter 3: Method	  
Research Design and Questions	  
In general, qualitative research seeks to explore and understand an issue or 
concept while quantitative research is designed to test a theory, hypothesis, or statement, 
and mixed methods utilizes both qualitative and quantitative elements (Creswell, 2009). 
Ultimately, the research should drive the methodology and the most appropriate method 
is truly dependent upon the intent of the research. The intention of this research was to 
answer the following question: 
Did current university faculty, staff, and administrative members perceive that the 
organizational entity and its leadership have demonstrated a process/path illustrative of a 
turnaround as measured by responses to Beeri’s (2009) Turnaround Management 
Strategies in Local Authorities? 
● H1. A positive correlation existed between a perception of turnaround 
in reorganization activities and all faculty, staff, and administrative 
employees. 
● H2. A positive correlation existed between a perception of stronger 
financial controls and faculty, staff, and administrative employees. 
● H3. A positive correlation existed between a perception of extending 
new marketing efforts to new consumers and faculty, staff, and 
administrative employees. 
● H4. A positive correlation existed between a perception of improving 
the local authority’s internal and external image and all faculty, staff, 
and administrative employees. 
● H5. There was a moderate correlation between a perception of 
rebuilding stakeholder trust in the local authority and those employees 
considered mostly staff or mostly faculty. 
● H6. There was a moderate correlation between a perception of 
reshaping and improving the organizational culture and climate and 
faculty and staff employees. 
● H7. There was a positive correlation between a perception of 
rebuilding stakeholders trust in the local authority and the level of 
participation in extracurricular activities on campus. 
● H8. There was a positive correlation between a perception of 
rebuilding stakeholders trust in the local authority and the number of 
hours per week employees spend on campus executing their specific 
job duties. 
● H9. There was a positive correlation between a perception of 
redefining the core mission and all faculty, staff, and administrative 
employees. 
● H10. There was a positive correlation between defining a common 
vision of the local authority and the levels of management. 
In addition, the instrument also included a number of demographic questions (see 
Appendix C: Survey Instruments). The instrument was delivered electronically via 
SurveyMonkey.com from the researcher’s personal e-mail and respondents were 
informed as to the expected length of time required to complete it: approximately 15-30 
minutes. The interval Likert-type survey responses were analyzed using various statistics. 
The responses were tested using the Chi-square inferential statistic to assess whether the 
frequency of the distribution of responses fit a specific pattern of whether a majority of 
respondents perceived if retrenchment, repositioning, and reorganization activities 
occurred. In addition, the Pearson Correlation Coefficient was utilized to determine 
whether or not specific correlations existed. The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was 
used to compare groups of respondents as divided by demographic data available. 	  
Respondents and Site	  
The research site of the small, regional, public institution was chosen due to its 
period of substantial organizational change and potential for turnaround after its internal 
difficulties, as well as the researcher’s access to the population, records, and data related 
to the site. As there have been comparatively few, if any, highly publicized examples of 
ethical turnarounds in higher education, this research provided an analysis of how 
respondents perceive the organizational turnaround. In addition, because this site 
involved a number of complex issues that have been publicized in the local, state, and 
national media, there were a number of sources of information for supporting 
documentation. 
Because this study focused on a specific organization, adequate permission was 
sought from the university under study via request through the Institutional Review 
Board. As this research was primary research for a dissertation, the proper permissions 
were also obtained from the George Fox University Institutional Review Board. In 
addition, the Vice President of Academic Affairs at the university under study reviewed 
the research and found it to have merit. The identities and positions of all respondents 
were obscured to all parties, including the primary researcher, via SurveyMonkey.com to 
maintain confidentiality and anonymity. Responses collected via SurveyMonkey.com 
were kept completely confidential and anonymous, even to the researcher. Not only did 
the researcher not know the respondent’s IP address, but there was no way to identify 
respondents individually, as every potentially identifiable demographic question provided 
the opportunity to answer “I prefer not to answer.” The data accessed from 
SurveyMonkey.com included only the numerical responses available. In addition, only 
the researcher was able to access the numerical survey information and the responses 
were not individually identifiable. The data and drafts were stored in an offsite, secure 
location. Because the issues at the organization were so personal and poignant to the 
respondents, there was a need to protect confidentiality to encourage accurate responses, 
but even utilizing a confidential survey, there were potential problems with full 
disclosure. The researcher also worked to make sure the research was not disruptive to 
normal workplace activities by requesting and obtaining permission from the 
organization’s leadership. 
As of the time the research was collected (September 2014), the university 
employed roughly 250 individuals in administrative, faculty (part and full-time – annual 
contract, tenured, tenure-track, and adjunct), and staff positions. Per Israel (2009), a 
population of approximately 250 demands 154 responses for a 5% confidence level. 
These calculations were derived from Cochran’s (1963) sampling equations. As the 
sample population in this research included all currently employed individuals at the 
university in faculty, staff, and administrative positions, all individuals that were 
employed at the time when the surveys were announced were potential sources of data. 
Because of the nature of the major research question, asking whether current faculty, 
staff, and members of administration (who may or may not be considered “managers”) 
perceived that the entity and leadership had demonstrated a process/path illustrative of a 
turnaround, this research did not investigate the perspectives of those individuals that had 
exited the organization. Therefore, this issue certainly limited the responses to individuals 
that may be location-bound, could not find an alternative position elsewhere, or those that 
might be especially dedicated to improving the organization, skewing the data. While 
there has been substantial turnover at the university since the 2011-2012 academic year 
and forward, as the study aimed to ascertain turnaround as understood by current 
employees, the opinions of the faculty, staff, and administrative members that were 
presently at the university were investigated. While respondents may not have been 
employed at the university during the 2011-2012 academic year or before, this study was 
a snapshot in time to determine if the entity was on a path towards a turnaround 
according to current employees. As achieving the proper response rate was challenging, 
see “Procedures” below, modeled after Dillman, Smyth, and Christian’s (2009) tailored 
design method. 	  
Measures	  
The measure (instrument) utilized for this research was the Turnaround 
Management Strategies in Local Authorities (Beeri, 2009). The instrument was vetted by 
prior research and proper permissions were obtained from the original author (see 
Appendix C). The measure utilized a Likert-like scale and its validity was tested by the 
individual researcher that created it (See “Instrument Reliability and Validity” below). 
In addition, demographic questions such as gender, age, tenure at the university, 
department, position, and other relevant questions were asked in the survey, but were not 
required to be completed in order to use the data. Therefore, if the respondents answered 
the survey in its entirety but entered “I prefer not to answer” to the various demographic 
questions, their responses were not excluded from the data. By providing the choice of “I 
prefer not to answer” to every demographic question, it was possible to protect 
respondents’ responses, confidentiality, and identities, even from the researcher, through 
SurveyMonkey.com. While this was as a weakness in that full demographic information 
might not be available for every respondent, this loss was acceptable to protect the 
respondents from risk and potential harm. Because the research was executed through an 
anonymous survey instrument via SurveyMonkey.com, the researcher received only 
numerical results with no identifying personal information, and affirmed that fact to the 
respondents in the request for participation letter and follow-up emails. 	  
Procedure	  
Because this research was undertaken at the researcher’s place of employment, 
the researcher approached the university’s management to request permission to conduct 
the study and the University’s Institutional Review Board. Once the proper permissions 
were obtained, the SurveyMonkey.com web link that combined the demographic 
questions and instrument was distributed to faculty, staff, and administrative members via 
the researcher’s personal email address. The invitation to participate in the survey was 
distributed to faculty, staff, and administration via an email explaining the rationale of the 
research, procedures, and process (see Appendix B: Statement of Informed Consent and 
Communications). In addition, the invitation included the web address to access the 
survey. The emailed letter detailed the purpose of the survey and its importance, as well 
as provided a statement of thanks and contact information for the researcher for 
debriefing (see Appendix B: Statement of Informed Consent and Communications). In 
addition, the letter also provided an invitation to receive an appreciation gift (Dillman, 
Smyth, & Christian, 2009). The appreciation gift was the option for all participants to 
receive a $15 gift card to either the university bookstore or Amazon.com. Once the initial 
invitational letters were sent to the university faculty, staff, and administration via the 
researcher’s personal email address, follow-up e-mails were sent weekly for four weeks 
to encourage additional responses (see Appendix B: Statement of Informed Consent and 
Communications and Communications). Due to the state open records laws in which the 
site is located, the researcher emailed the survey link, letter, and follow-up 
communications from a personal email address using email addresses for participants 
obtained from the university’s website. 	  
Data Collection and Analysis	  
Once the responses were collected via SurveyMonkey.com, various statistical 
methods were used to assess the results to determine potential relationships within the 
data – regression and correlation, among others. Based on the wealth of information that 
was collected utilizing the instrument and demographic data, the mean was taken to find 
the measure of central tendency of the various instruments. The responses were analyzed 
using a number of different statistics in several phases to ascertain the various 
relationships and facets of the survey results, including determining the central tendency 
of the Likert-type scales, analyzing associations using Pearson’s Coefficient, 
relationships through regression and correlation, as well as exploring differences using T-
tests and ANOVAs. Utilizing the Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient, the research 
determined any relevant associations, and ANOVA and multiple regression searched for 
relevant relationships between trust, turnarounds, and ethical leadership. The level of data 
provided on the survey instrument through SurveyMonkey.com also influenced what type 
of statistics were significant and the researcher determined the specifics once the 
available results were compiled. 	  
Instrument Reliability and Validity	  
The instrument was combined with demographic questions in the same link to 
allow for a more seamless process of completion for respondents in a single instance. The 
surveys were executed through SurveyMonkey.com, a reliable service commonly used to 
execute quantitative research. Because the data was secured via login/password available 
only to the researcher, the responses were protected to assure confidentiality. Because the 
instrument was previously created by other researchers and remained unmodified, the 
researcher was able to rely upon the validity and reliability, as established by other 
academics, without pilot testing (Creswell, 2009). Zikmund (1994) provided that the 
reliability of instruments is classified as “the measuring instrument’s ability to provide 
consistent results in repeated uses” (p. 293). Creswell (2009) defined an instrument’s 
validity as being able to “draw meaningful and useful inferences from scores on the 
instruments” (p. 149). Traditionally, Cronbach’s Alpha measures consistency and 
reliability and the academy provides that values greater than 0.70 are considered 
sufficient (Nunnally & Berstein, 1994; Salkind, 2003). 
The Turnaround Management Strategies in Local Authorities survey used a five-
point Likert-scale to ask if organizations executed various strategies in retrenchment, 
repositioning, and reorganization, and to what extent management utilized these 
strategies as perceived by respondents (employees) (Beeri, 2009). Beeri (2009) used 
Exploratory Factor Analysis to assess the new scale, establishing factorability through the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) test. The KMO yielded 0.810, greater than the 
recommended 0.60, with sufficient statistical significance (p < 0.001) (Beeri, 2009). 
Beeri (2009) also assessed the instrument using the Spearman-Brown Correlation, 
yielding 0.88 with reasonable correlations from 0.45 to 0.87. In addition, the instrument 
yielded a Cronbach’s Alpha score of 0.89 overall with specific elements ranging from 
0.54 and 0.87, “reveal[ing] moderate to high consistency among respondents’ scores so 
the scale is plausible and coherent” (Beeri, 2009, p. 134). These tests support Beeri’s 
(2009) results of reliability and validity. 
  
 Turnaround Management Strategies in Local Authorities Scale (Beeri, 2009)	  
 
Correlation matrix for TMSLA factors (Cronbach’s alpha in parentheses). 
Factor No. Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Reorganization at the 
institutional level 4.08  0.71  
(0.870
)        
2. Retrenchment of 
services 2.58  0.89  0.015  (0.740)       
3. Repositioning as 
reaching out 3.35  0.79  0.541  0.018  (0.820)      
4. Reorganization as 
extent of centralization 2.90  0.63  0.099  0.196  0.385  (0.620)     
5. Repositioning as 
innovative services 3.64  0.73  0.544  0.231  0.673  0.356  (0.860)    
6. Retrenchment of 
expenditures 2.70  0.61  0.047  0.353  0.057  0.047  0.283  (0.560)   
7. Repositioning as 
renewing relationship 3.22  0.58  0.626  0.210  0.685  0.257  0.599  0.157  (0.540)  
8. Reorganization at the 
personnel level 4.00  0.89  0.239  0.192  0.155  0.294  0.204  0.180  0.189  (0.690) 
N = 83–85.                     
p < 0.01. One item was reversed for the Cronbach’s alpha procedure. p < 0.05. 
 	  
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations	  
As this research was undertaken in a single small, regional, public university, the 
researcher made the initial assumption that the respondents would understand the 
questions asked, as well as provide honest and accurate responses. While this research 
was strictly anonymous, the researcher also assumes that respondents believed that it was 
anonymous and would answer questions truthfully, valuing the intent and its purpose. 
The first delimitation of this research was the intentional narrowing of the scope 
of the population to those currently employed at the single university. As these issues 
were unique to the organization at a specific time, the setting and time of the study were 
narrowly focused in both categories. While the researcher worked to gather as much data 
as possible through publicized documentation and survey results, the final outcome of the 
organization’s turnaround will likely take a number of years beyond the study to 
complete. Therefore, this study was a snapshot of a moment in time at the institution. 
 The limitations of this study included general weaknesses in the survey 
methodology. Though the researcher has taken care to use established instruments that 
are found to be reliable and valid, findings may not be generalizable outside of the chosen 
population. As the surveys were substantial in nature, requiring approximately 15-30 
minutes to complete, there is a risk of survey fatigue. To mitigate this risk and encourage 
the most important questions on the instruments were answered, the demographic 
questions were placed after the major instrument. Low response rates and incomplete 
responses are also inherent weaknesses of the survey methodology. The researcher 
attempted to mitigate this limitation by garnering public support from the organization’s 
Office of Academic Affairs to encourage participation (see “Procedure” below). 
 Another limitation of this research is the fact that participants were those 
individuals currently employed at the university, likely skewing the research data. As a 
number of individuals left the university between the time of the ethical breach and the 
time of this research, the responses were skewed as to the opinions and perceptions of 
those currently employed. Because of the nature of the major research question, asking 
whether current faculty, staff, and members of administration (who may or may not be 
considered “managers”) perceived that the entity and leadership had demonstrated a 
process/path illustrative of a turnaround, this research did not investigate the perspectives 
of those individuals that left the organization. Therefore, this issue certainly limited the 
responses to individuals that may be location-bound, could not find an alternative 
position elsewhere, or those that might be especially dedicated to improving the 
organization. In addition, members of the university that arrived since the breach may not 
view the turnaround in the same light as those employees that have been at the institution 
for a longer period, however, due to the potential ethical risks involved, employment 
length at the university was not investigated. 
 The potential ethical risk of discomfort to the respondents also existed. To 
mitigate, the researcher received approvals from both the George Fox University and 
organizational Institutional Research Boards. In addition, because the issues at the entity 
were so personal and poignant to the respondents, there was the potential for both 
discomfort and inconvenience to the respondents. The survey instrument was designed to 
look at the improvements at the university, but could have brought up unpleasant 
memories of the university’s downturn as well as created feelings of organizational 
pressure, biasing the responses. Because the past issues may have resulted in feelings of 
uncertainty about the future, it was necessary to protect respondents’ identities and 
confidentiality. The respondents were also given an ‘out’ if they do not want to complete 
the survey, protecting the respondents. In addition, certain questions such as “when did 
you start working for the university,” “are you tenured,” and various other potentially 
identifiable demographic questions were not asked as they were prohibited by the 
organization’s Institutional Research Board (A. Stark, personal communication). 
 In addition, there existed an inherent risk of researcher bias as the researcher is 
employed at the organization under study (see Role of the Researcher below). Because of 
the imperative need to mitigate and guard against researcher bias, the researcher chose to 
engage in a quantitative study with established instruments. The identities and positions 
of all respondents were obscured to all users, including the primary researcher, and the 
data were provided in a statistical/numerical form. There were no personal connections or 
assessments with the respondents. In addition, all results were assessed and vetted by the 
Chair of the researcher’s dissertation committee, the committee, and an external reviewer. 
Given that the study focused on a single population, bounded by unique 
experiences, generalization may not be appropriate. Instead, it is up to the reader of the 
research to determine how much or which elements of this study are generalizable to 
other situations. The specific market and issues were unique to the organization at that 
point in time, though the potential exists for other universities and colleges in the future 
to find themselves in similar situations. While the existing research substantiates and 
supports the theories of ethical turnarounds and organizational course change, the 
concepts may not be applicable to all institutions of higher education. Therefore, the 
results may not be replicable in other cases or to the populations of other educational 
institutions. 	  
Role of the Researcher	  
The role of the researcher was a challenging element of this research, creating 
strategic, ethical, and personal issues. It is important to note that the researcher in study 
was not only involved in the research, but was employed by the organization during the 
research. As an Assistant Professor of Accounting at the organization under study, the 
researcher began her employment with the organization in the fall of 2009, two academic 
years prior to the 2011-2012 academic year when many of the issues came to light. The 
researcher was reasonably acquainted with the issues that inspired the organizational 
change; however, the challenge was to mitigate researcher bias (see “Limitations and 
Delimitations” above). This mitigation was completed by utilizing the researcher’s 
committee, Chair, and external individuals as reviewers. 
  
 	  
Chapter 4: Results	  	  
Overview of the Study	  
 The purpose of this research was a quantitative study to investigate if current 
university faculty, staff, and administrative members perceived that the organizational 
entity and its leadership have demonstrated a process/path illustrative of a turnaround as 
measured by responses to the Turnaround Management Strategies in Local Authorities 
(Beeri, 2009). This study was executed through an online survey submitted via university 
email from September 1-19, 2014. In addition, this survey was executed to determine if 
various other relationships existed. 
Chapter 4 describes the data and results of the online survey as well as the later 
collection and analyses of the variables proposed in Chapter 3 to answer the research 
question and hypotheses. Chapter 4 begins with a discussion regarding missing data, a 
descriptive examination of the statistics, and continues with an analysis of each of the 
hypotheses proposed. Because reviewing both the hypotheses and the research question 
aids in understanding the statistical results, the results are grouped as specific inquiries 
around the hypotheses with graphics and visual support. This analysis and supporting 
information substantiated the discussion provided in the following chapter.  
The survey was opened on September 1, 2014. From September 1 to September 
19, the researcher sent a series of emails to the faculty, staff, and administrative members 
of the university under study (see Appendix A: Respondent Solicitation for this 
information). During this time frame, reminder emails were sent to participants weekly 
until the required number of responses were achieved. Of the 249 employees listed on the 
phone directory on the university’s website, 163 responded to the survey within the time 
frame. However, not all respondents answered every question of the survey, and 
“skipped” questions ranged from 1-18 respondents per question. Removing “I prefer not 
to answer” and “Not Applicable” from the data provided ‘n’ values ranging from 98-151. 
The reasons the data was incomplete and/or missing may be because of survey fatigue as 
more questions were skipped towards the end. In addition, based upon the frequency of 
responses (‘5’ is “to a very large extent,” and ‘4’ is “somewhat”), 93.1% of respondents 
(135 of 145 valid responses) agreed that the university the events were a major violation 
of trust. As a result, individuals may have chosen not to respond due to a lack of trust in 
the survey, concern for confidentiality, or lack of anonymity if the researcher was able to 
determine individual responses. 
Table 1	  
How Major was the Violation of Trust 
 
How major was the violation of trust? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 4 2.4 2.8 2.8 
2 3 1.8 2.1 4.8 
3 3 1.8 2.1 6.9 
4 28 17.1 19.3 26.2 
5 107 65.2 73.8 100.0 
Total 145 88.4 100.0  
Missing 0 18 11.0   
System 1 .6   
Total 19 11.6   
Total 164 100.0   
 
Description of Statistical Tests Used	  
 Two major statistical tests were used to analyze the data and test the hypotheses. 
The following is a brief description of the tests. 
Descriptive statistics and frequencies.	  
 Descriptive statistics are important in data analysis to understand the foundation 
of all other statistics. This analysis includes finding the measure of central tendency, 
therefore the mean, or average of the data set (Newton & Rudestam, 1999). The 
following analysis is also heavily reliant upon determining the frequency of responses, 
therefore determining how many participants provided a specific response to a question 
(Newton & Rudestam, 1999). In addition, descriptive statistics are also dependent on 
standard deviation, which is calculated by squaring the variance of the population to 
determine the normal spread of the data (Newton & Rudestam, 1999). 	  
Findings	  
 There are several formats that represent the quantitative results of the survey 
study. 
Participant/Sample information.	  
 Of the 249 employees at the small, public, regional university, 163 faculty, staff, 
and administrative employees responded to the survey. These replies resulting in a very 
high response rate, far above the more common 10-15%. This response rate of just over 
65% is likely due to a combination of factors, including strong backing from university 
employees, upper administrative support, and the thank you gift of the $15 gift certificate 
for willing participants. This extraordinary response rate indicates a particular interest 
and support in the research from the population overall. The demographic information of 
those 163 participants is as follows. 
Gender. The majority of respondents to the survey were women. As the 
population is roughly 57% woman (142 of 249 total employees) and 43% men (107 of 
249 employees), this is not unexpected. Overall, 32 individuals did not answer this 
demographic question (14 – I prefer not to answer and 18 – skipped), 19.6% of the 
participants (32 of 163 total responses). 
Table 2	  
Percentage of Respondents by Gender 
 
What is your gender? 
Answer Options Response Percent Response Count 
Male 36.6% 53 
Female 53.8% 78 
I prefer not to answer 9.7% 14 
answered question 145 
skipped question 18 
 
Age. Of the 163 participants, 32 individuals either preferred not to answer or 
skipped the question, roughly 19.6% of respondents. No data was known prior to the 
research regarding the ages of the population, only that there was a wide span from the 
youngest members of the organization to the oldest.	  
  
 Table 3	  
Percentage of Respondents by Age 
 
What is your age? 
Answer Options Response Percent Response Count 
Younger than 20 0.0% 0 
21-30 10.8% 16 
31-40 18.9% 28 
41-50 20.3% 30 
51-60 27.0% 40 
older than 60 11.5% 17 
I prefer not to answer 11.5% 17 
answered question 148 
skipped question 15 
	  
Education. The university’s phone directory posted on its website (reference 
redacted here to protect the anonymity of the site) reflected that approximately 17.7% of 
the university were referred to as “doctor” in their public listing, indicating that those 
individuals with terminal degrees responded to the survey at a higher rate than other 
education groups as 37 individuals responded that classified themselves as having a 
terminal degree, yet 44 were listed as “doctor” in the public directory. Other educational 
information regarding the entire population was unknown, but as the population in 
question was a university, it can be inferred that the population was reasonably well 
educated. In addition, a total of 28 respondents of the 163 chose not to provide 
information about the level of their education as 13 respondents preferred not to answer 
and 15 skipped the question entirely.	  
  
 Table 4	  
Percentage of Respondents by Level of Education 
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
Answer Options Response Percent Response Count 
Some high school 0.7% 1 
High school graduate or equivalent 1.4% 2 
Some college 9.5% 14 
Bachelor’s degree 22.3% 33 
Master’s degree 32.4% 48 
Terminal/Doctoral degree 25.0% 37 
I prefer not to answer 8.8% 13 
answered question 148 
skipped question 15 
 
Position at the university. As some members of the university under study 
fulfilled multiple rolls within the organization, participants were instructed to identify 
their position as closely as possible with their main function at the university. Those 
individuals that identified themselves as completely or mostly administrative were those 
individuals that consider themselves to be members of university administration as upper-
level individuals that are responsible for managing the university, at least in part. 
Participants that identified as half administrative and half faculty are usually department 
chairs that carry a half time teaching load and half time management load. Completely or 
mostly faculty respondents are those individuals that are mostly teaching, while staff 
members are those that are largely supporting the function of the university in every other 
capacity besides teaching. While there are some faculty members that have release time 
on their contracts and staff members that also teach one or two classes as an adjunct, 
respondents self-selected the option as to how they spend most of their time at the 
university completing their duties. Another important factor to note is that participants 
were not asked if they were tenured or not. This question was discussed with members of 
the Institutional Research Board in the university under study before the IRB permissions 
were sought. Due to the requirement to protect the university employees with all possible 
confidentiality and anonymity, the Institutional Review Board chair rejected allowing the 
research to include questions on tenure. 
Table 5 
Percentage of Respondents by Position at the University 
 
Which of the following best describes your position? 
Answer Options Response Percent Response Count 
Completely/Mostly Administrative 16.1% 24 
Half Administrative/Half Faculty 8.7% 13 
Completely/Mostly Faculty 36.2% 54 
Completely/Mostly Staff 30.9% 46 
I prefer not to answer 8.1% 12 
answered question 149 
skipped question 14 
 
Department at the university. The university under study is separated into various 
functional units. As some employees worked in multiple departments or under several 
roles, the employee was asked to identify with the department/area in which he or she 
works with the most. Academically, the university is split into two colleges – the College 
of Arts and Sciences (CAS) (65 employees) and the College of Education, Business, and 
Applied Sciences (CEBAS) (64 employees). The areas of music, language, literature, 
natural sciences, mathematics, computer science, fine arts, performing arts, and the social 
sciences are all housed within CAS. The 40 of 65 employees from the College of Arts 
and Sciences provides a 61.5% response rate. Business, education, agriculture, health, 
and nursing are within CABAS. Thirty-three of 64 employees in the College of 
Education, Business, and Applied Sciences responded, providing a 51.5% response rate. 
(A. Stark, personal knowledge) 
 Finance and Administration, as managed by the Vice President of Finance and 
Administration, handles business affairs, human resources, information technology, and 
facility operations and had 49 employees at the time the survey was completed 
(custodians, power plant, groundskeepers, etc.). As only 10 of the 49 employees in the 
Finance and Administration division responded, this area had the lowest response rate of 
20.4%. The division of Student Development governs campus programming, residential 
life, security, student health services, and career development (7 employees). Student 
Development had a response rate of 57.1% with 4 of 7 employees completing the survey. 
Enrollment Services and Communications is in charge of student enrollment, via 
admissions, financial aid, communications, and international programs with 16 
employees. The 7 of 16 employees from the Enrollment Services and Communications 
division provided a response rate of 43.75%. The administrative departments under the 
Vice President of Academic Affairs include the library, student academic success 
programs, institutional research, distance education, academic records, and the honors 
leadership program (28 employees). Eleven of 28 employees in Academic Affairs 
responded to the survey, providing a response rate of 39.3%. Athletics report directly to 
the president of the university and includes all coaches and trainers of all sports as well as 
the sports marking director (7 employees). Four of 7 employees in Athletics responded to 
the survey, providing a 57.1% response rate. Other positions that report directly to the 
president included the director and staff of the university’s center for entrepreneurship 
and innovation as well the university’s digital library program (13 employees). Of the 13 
employees that report to the president or are under the president, 12 responded, providing 
the highest response rate of 92.3%. In addition, of the roughly 163 participants, 27.6% of 
respondents did not provide information on this question as calculated by adding those 
individuals that preferred not to answer (31 individuals) or skipped the question (14 
individuals), perhaps out of concern for anonymity. Based on this information, it is 
possible that a departmental bias existed, especially as a very high response rate was from 
individuals under the president, but far less from the area of Finance and Administration. 
In addition, CAS had a substantially higher response rate than CEBAS, even though the 
number of employees was quite similar. (A. Stark, personal knowledge) 
Table 6	  
Percentage of Respondents by University Departments 
 
Which of the following best describes your department? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
College of Arts and Sciences (Dean or under Dean of CAS) 26.8% 40 
College of Education, Business, and Applied Sciences (Dean 
or under Dean of CEBAS) 22.1% 33 
Finance and Administration (VP or under Vice President of 
Finance & Admin) 6.7% 10 
Student Development (VP or under Vice President of 
Student Development) 2.7% 4 
Enrollment Services and Communications (ED or under 
Executive Director of Enrollment Services and 
Communications) 
4.7% 7 
Position within Academic Affairs (VPAA or under VPAA) 7.4% 11 
Athletics (Director or under Director of Intercollegiate 
Athletics) 2.7% 4 
Other position (President or other positions that report 
directly to the President) 8.1% 12 
I prefer not to answer 20.8% 31 
answered question 149 
skipped question 14 
 
Managerial role at the university. Participants were asked about their roles in 
university management to understand how the different layers of responsibility 
influenced their perspectives and perceptions of the process of organizational turnaround. 
Of the 163 responses, a total of 37 individuals chose not to provide information regarding 
their managerial roles at the university (23 – I prefer not to answer and 14 – skipped), 
therefore 22.7% of total responses.	  
Table 7	  
Percentage of Respondents by Managerial Role 
 
Which of the following best describes your managerial role at the university? 
Answer Options Response Percent Response Count 
Upper or middle management (Ex. 
Dean/Director or above) 6.7% 10 
Junior management (Ex. Assist 
Director/Department Chair, etc.) 14.1% 21 
Do not manage other employees (not 
including work study students) 63.8% 95 
I prefer not to answer 15.4% 23 
answered question 149 
skipped question 14 
	  
On campus events attended at the university. This question was asked to 
determine how active participants were on campus in extracurricular events such as 
sporting events, plays, theater, concerts, symposiums, and all other events on campus that 
support the campus community. Overall, 24 of the 163 respondents decided not to 
respond to this question, roughly 14.7% of the overall sample (10 – I prefer not to 
answer, 14 – skipped).	  
 
Table 8	  
Percentage of Respondents by Level of Participation in Extracurricular Activities 
 
How do you describe your level of participation in extracurricular activities on 
campus? On average, I attend an average of ______ on campus events ex. sporting 
events, celebrating the arts, symposiums, etc. per MONTH: 
Answer Options Response Percent Response Count 
More than 5 per month 14.1% 21 
Average of 5 per month 4.0% 6 
Average of 4 per month 5.4% 8 
Average of 3 per month 12.8% 19 
Average of 2 per month 24.8% 37 
Average of 1 per month 18.1% 27 
Average of less than 1 per month 14.1% 21 
I prefer not to answer 6.7% 10 
answered question 149 
skipped question 14 
	  
Hours/Week doing job at the university on campus. The population at the 
university under study has undergone major changes since the initial public breach of 
ethics (A. Stark, personal knowledge). There has been substantial turnover and 
employees are working quite hard covering multiple duties and sometimes even positions 
(A. Stark, personal knowledge). Anecdotally, the population has been working very hard. 
The respondents’ responses agree with the researcher’s personal experience as 56.4% of 
participants indicated that they worked more than 40 hours per week on campus. As 11% 
of respondents chose not to answer (3 – I prefer not to answer, 15 – skipped), this 
question had the highest response rate of the demographic questions.	  
  
 Table 9	  
Percentage of Respondents by Number of Hours Worked on Campus 
 
How do you describe the number of hours per week you spend ON CAMPUS 
executing your specific job duties? An average of: 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
More than 50 hours per week during the traditional 
school year. 18.2% 27 
46-50 hours per week during the traditional school year. 14.2% 21 
41-45 hours per week during the traditional school year. 29.7% 44 
36-40 hours per week during the traditional school year. 13.5% 20 
31-35 hours per week during the traditional school year. 4.7% 7 
26-30 hours per week during the traditional school year. 7.4% 11 
21-25 hours per week during the traditional school year. 2.7% 4 
16-20 hours per week during the traditional school year. 4.1% 6 
11-15 hours per week during the traditional school year. 0.7% 1 
10 hours or less per week during the traditional school 
year. 2.7% 4 
I prefer not to answer 2.0% 3 
answered question 148 
skipped question 15 
 
 Hours/Week doing job at the university off campus. As provided above, the 
campus community of the university under study is working diligently to execute their 
duties. The respondents provided that 59.5% of participants are working 15 hours per 
week or less off campus completing their obligations. However, 24 of the 163 
respondents (14.7%) chose not to answer this question (9 – I prefer not to answer, 15 – 
skipped).	  
  
 Table 10	  
Percentage of Respondents by Hours Worked Off Campus 
 
How do you describe the number of hours per week you spend OFF CAMPUS 
executing your specific job duties? An average of: 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
More than 50 hours per week during the traditional school 
year. 0.7% 1 
46-50 hours per week during the traditional school year. 0.7% 1 
41-45 hours per week during the traditional school year. 0.7% 1 
36-40 hours per week during the traditional school year. 1.4% 2 
31-35 hours per week during the traditional school year. 2.0% 3 
26-30 hours per week during the traditional school year. 3.4% 5 
21-25 hours per week during the traditional school year. 7.4% 11 
16-20 hours per week during the traditional school year. 12.2% 18 
11-15 hours per week during the traditional school year. 18.9% 28 
10 hours or less per week during the traditional school 
year. 46.6% 69 
I prefer not to answer 6.1% 9 
answered question 148 
skipped question 15 
 
  
 Descriptive statistics.	  
Table 11	  
Summation of Participants Responses Regarding Retrenchment Activities 
 
Answer 
Options 
Hardly 
at All 
Very 
Little Neutral 
Some 
what 
To a 
Very 
Large 
Extent 
N/A Rating Average 
Response 
Count 
Contracted 
[reduced]  ac
tivities and 
services 
5 27 25 71 23 10 3.53 161 
Eliminated 
particular 
services 
8 26 29 64 22 11 3.44 160 
Decreased 
service 
expen-
ditures 
3 13 28 67 34 14 3.80 159 
Partially/ 
temporarily 
exited from 
specific 
services 
10 14 33 62 24 12 3.53 155 
Liquidated 
[sold] assets 
in order to 
raise capital 
47 7 54 5 2 45 2.20 160 
Reduced/ 
suspended 
capital 
expendi-
tures 
13 10 40 58 20 19 3.44 160 
Closed down 
public 
organiza-
tions 
29 19 54 15 2 40 2.51 159 
Created 
stronger 
financial 
controls 
2 10 23 54 56 11 4.05 156 
Decreased 
financial 
support to 
other 
organiza-
tions 
7 12 51 38 14 37 3.33 159 
answered question 162 
skipped question 1 
 
  
 Table 12	  
Summation of Participants Responses Regarding Repositioning Activities 
 
Answer 
Options 
Hardly 
at All 
Very 
Little 
Neutra
l 
Som
e 
what 
To a 
Very 
Large 
Exten
t 
N/
A 
Rating 
Averag
e 
Respons
e Count 
Established 
new 
services 
28 41 21 50 6 5 2.76 151 
Entered into 
joint 
activities/ 
co-operated 
w/other 
agencies 
[or 
organiza-
tions] 
2020 
20 
 
38 25 46 6 13 2.85 148 
Extended 
activities & 
scope of 
services 
30 39 23 46 6 5 2.72 149 
Changed the 
priorities of 
traditional 
activities 
12 13 29 67 23 5 3.53 149 
Rented/sold/ 
mortgaged 
assets 
31 16 46 5 1 52 2.28 151 
Extended 
availability 
of services 
28 39 37 31 6 8 2.63 149 
Extended 
marketing 
efforts to 
new 
consumers 
7 13 11 56 61 4 4.02 152 
Increased 
service 
expenditure 
22 27 53 21 7 17 2.72 147 
 
 
 
 
Summation of Participants Responses Regarding Repositioning Activities (continued) 
 
Answer 
Options 
Hardl
y at 
All 
Very 
Littl
e 
Neutra
l 
Som
e 
what 
To a 
Very 
Large 
Exten
t 
N/
A 
Rating 
Averag
e 
Respons
e Count 
Modernized 
capacity of 
services 
with 
equipment 
utilizing 
new 
technolo-
gies 
11 19 26 64 23 5 3.48 148 
Began to 
provide 
services 
internally 
that were 
previously 
purchased 
8 13 50 48 6 24 3.25 149 
Loaned 
money/ 
asked for 
subvention 
for 
reorganiza-
tion 
purposes 
29 10 52 4 3 53 2.41 151 
Privatized 
services 25 16 54 14 3 38 2.59 150 
Increased 
average 
price of 
services/ 
levying 
money 
10 13 49 41 3 33 3.12 149 
Redefined 
core 
missions 
12 13 21 67 22 12 3.55 147 
Ensured high 
quality of 
services 
10 11 24 61 39 5 3.74 150 
 
 
Summation of Participants Responses Regarding Repositioning Activities (continued) 
 
Answer 
Options 
Hardly 
at All 
Very 
Littl
e 
Neutra
l 
Som
e 
what 
To a 
Very 
Large 
Exten
t N/A 
Rating 
Averag
e 
Respons
e Count 
Improved the 
internal & 
external 
image 
10 12 15 63 49 2 3.87 151 
Introduced 
new ways 
of 
implement
-tation 
7 9 24 78 25 7 3.73 150 
Rebuilt 
stakehold-
ers trust in 
the local 
authority 
16 13 19 65 33 5 3.59 151 
answered question 153 
skipped question 10 
 
  
Table 13 
Summation of Participants Responses Regarding Reorganization Activities 
 
Answer 
Options 
Hardl
y at 
All 
Very 
Littl
e 
Neutra
l 
Some 
what 
To a 
Very 
Large 
Extent 
N/
A 
Rating 
Averag
e 
Response 
Count 
Replaced the 
chief 
executive 
officer 
1 0 11 11 115 13 4.73 151 
Changed the 
internal 
local 
authority 
structure 
2 5 12 55 73 3 4.31 150 
Replaced 
senior and 
middle 
managers 
3 4 12 37 90 2 4.42 148 
Took 
centraliza-
tion steps 
6 8 38 47 36 10 3.73 145 
Took 
decentrali-
zation steps 
21 25 57 18 9 17 2.76 147 
Increased time 
and efforts 
in 
researching 
consumers’ 
needs 
12 19 29 62 23 4 3.45 149 
Increased time 
and efforts 
in 
becoming a 
learning 
organiza-
tion 
8 14 27 65 30 5 3.66 149 
Made changes 
in human 
resources 
manage-
ment style 
37 27 29 33 18 6 2.78 150 
 
 
Summation of Participants Responses Regarding Reorganization Activities (continued) 
Answer 
Options 
Hardl
y at 
All 
Very 
Little Neutral 
Some 
what 
To a 
Very 
Large 
Exten
t 
N/A Rating Average 
Respons
e Count 
Reshaped & 
improved 
the 
organiza-
tional 
culture 
and 
climate 
17 29 20 53 27 3 3.3 149 
         
Invested in 
staff 
skills 
training 
11 32 35 53 16 1 3.21 148 
Defined a 
common 
vision of 
the local 
authority 
12 15 29 51 40 3 3.63 150 
Diagnosed 
the local 
authority 
strengths 
and 
weak-
nesses 
15 18 20 59 36 1 3.56 149 
Formulated 
an 
organiza-
tional 
working 
plan 
14 19 19 60 31 6 3.52 149 
Fought the 
denial 
and 
resistance 
of 
employ-
ees 
12 15 50 38 21 12 3.3 148 
answered question 151 
skipped question 12 
Table 14	  
Descriptive Statistics of Turnaround Activity Responses 
 
 n Range 
Mini-
mum 
Maxi-
mum Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Contracted [reduced] activities and 
services 151 4 1 5 3.53 1.057 
Eliminated particular services 149 4 1 5 3.44 1.105 
Decreased Service Expenditures 144 4 1 5 3.80 .972 
Partially/temporarily exited from specific 
services 142 4 1 5 3.55 1.082 
Liquidated [sold] assets in order to raise 
capital 115 4 1 5 2.20 1.086 
Reduced/suspended capital expenditures 141 4 1 5 3.44 1.111 
Closed down public organizations 119 4 1 5 2.51 1.049 
Created stronger financial controls 145 4 1 5 4.05 .974 
Decreased financial support to other 
organizations 122 4 1 5 3.33 1.000 
Established new services 146 4 1 5 2.76 1.228 
Entered into joint activities/co-operated 
with other agencies [or organizations] 135 4 1 5 2.85 1.175 
Extended activities and scope of services 144 4 1 5 2.72 1.233 
Changed the priorities of traditional 
activities 144 4 1 5 3.53 1.122 
Rented/sold/mortgaged assets 99 4 1 5 2.28 1.000 
Extended availability of services 141 4 1 5 2.63 1.155 
Extended marketing efforts (reaching out) 
to new consumers 148 4 1 5 4.02 1.128 
Increased service expenditure 130 4 1 5 2.72 1.093 
Modernized capacity of services with 
equipment utilizing new technologies 143 4 1 5 3.48 1.144 
Began to provide services/internal services 
that were previously purchased 125 4 1 5 3.25 .939 
 
  
 Descriptive Statistics of Turnaround Activity Responses (continued) 
 
  n 
Rang
e 
Mini-
mum 
Maxi-
mum 
Mea
n 
Std. 
Dev. 
Loaned money/asked for 
subvention [aid or support] for 
reorganization purposes 98 4 1 5 2.41 1.054 
Privatized Services 11
2 4 1 5 2.59 1.053 
Increased average price of 
services/levying money 
11
6 4 1 5 3.12 0.952 
Redefined core missions 13
5 4 1 5 3.55 1.144 
Ensured high quality of services 14
5 4 1 5 3.74 1.141 
Improved the local authority’s 
internal and external image 
14
9 4 1 5 3.87 1.16 
Introduced new ways of 
implementation 
14
3 4 1 5 3.73 0.985 
Rebuilt stakeholders trust in the 
local authority 
14
6 4 1 5 3.59 1.241 
Replaced the chief executive 
officer 
13
8 4 1 5 4.73 0.668 
Changed the internal local authority 
structure 
14
7 4 1 5 4.31 0.865 
Replaced senior and middle 
managers 
14
6 4 1 5 4.42 0.908 
Took centralization steps 13
5 4 1 5 3.73 1.059 
Took decentralization steps 13
0 4 1 5 2.76 1.098 
Increased time and efforts in 
researching consumers’ needs 
14
5 4 1 5 3.45 1.154 
Increased time and efforts in 
becoming a learning 
organization 
14
4 4 1 5 3.66 1.085 
Made changes in human resources 
management style 
14
4 4 1 5 2.78 1.381 
Reshaped and improved the 
organizational culture and 
climate 
14
6 4 1 5 3.3 1.299 
Invested in staff skills training 14
7 4 1 5 3.21 1.13 
Defined a common vision of the 14 4 1 5 3.63 1.218 
local authority 7 
Diagnosed the local authority 
strengths and weaknesses 
14
8 4 1 5 3.56 1.263 
Formulated an organizational 
working plan 
14
3 4 1 5 3.52 1.244 
 
  
 Descriptive Statistics of Turnaround Activity Responses (continued) 
 
  n 
Rang
e 
Mini-
mum 
Maxi-
mum 
Mea
n 
Std. 
Dev. 
How major was the violation of 
trust 
14
5 4 1 5 4.59 0.862 
Rating the "success" of the 
turnaround to date 
14
8 4 1 5 4 1.1 
Valid n (listwise) 
98      
 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient.	  
 Correlation is an important type of statistical analysis that focuses upon the 
strength and/or direction of a relationship between two variables (Newton & Rudestam, 
1999). As a result, the analysis explains whether two variables are related, how strongly, 
and even how the variables are connected. The relationship is reported as a correlation 
coefficient somewhere between 0.0 and 1.0 for positive correlations and 0.0 to -1.0 for 
negative correlations (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). For the purpose of this research, the 
analysis used Dancey and Reidy’s (2004) categorization about the strength of the 
correlation. Therefore a correlation coefficient of 1.0 is considered a perfect correlation, 
therefore an exact relationship between the variables (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). Dancey 
and Reidy (2004) defined a strong correlation as a relationship of 0.7 to 0.9, which can 
also be listed as 70-99%. A moderate correlation is from 0.4 to 0.6, providing the strength 
of the relationship of 40-69% (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). A weak relationship or weak 
correlation is calculated as 0.1 to 0.3, therefore roughly 10-39% (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). 
If the correlation coefficient is roughly 0 or less then 0.1, there is no relationship between 
the variables (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). A negative relationship utilizes the same 
correlation coefficients, but has negative values (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). Therefore, if a 
negative correlation exists, when one variable increases, the other decreases – the 
relationship moves in opposite directions. The significance is determined by whether the 
population correlation coefficient is different from the calculated correlation coefficient. 
For a correlation to be considered statistically significant, it must be at least 0.05 or 
smaller (Newton & Rudestam, 1999). 
Hypothesis 1 – Accepted.	  
 Hypothesis 1 stated that a positive correlation existed between a perception of 
turnaround in reorganization activities and all faculty, staff, and administrative 
employees. This hypothesis served to test the assumption that Reorganization Activities 
had a mutual relationship and connection with the faculty, staff, and administration’s 
perception of the “success” of the turnaround to date at the university in question. These 
activities included: replaced the chief executive officer, changed the internal local 
authority structure, replaced senior and middle managers, took centralization steps, took 
decentralization steps, increased time and efforts in researching consumers’ needs, 
increased time and efforts in becoming a learning organization, made changes in human 
resources management style, reshaped and improved the organizational culture and 
climate, invested in staff skills training, defined a common vision of the local authority, 
diagnosed the local authority strengths and weaknesses, formulated an organizational 
working plan, and fought the denial and resistance of employees (Beeri, 2009). The full 
correlation matrix (See Appendix F: Additional Statistical Tables and Matrices) 
illustrates the relationships between the individual activities and the perception of the 
“success” of the turnaround. Several of the different activities showed statistically 
significant correlations to each other. Items with statistically strong correlation, therefore 
0.7-0.9 or better per Dancey and Reidy (2004) included: 
Table 15	  
Hypothesis 1: Strong Correlations 
 
 
Defined a 
common 
vision of 
the local 
authority 
Diagnosed the 
local authority 
strengths & 
weaknesses 
Formulated an 
organizational 
working plan 
Defined a common 
vision of the 
local authority 
Pearson 
Correlation  .774
** .739** 
Sig.(2-
tailed)  .000 .000 
n  146 143 
Diagnosed the local 
authority 
strengths and 
weaknesses 
Pearson 
Correlation .774
**  .799** 
Sig.(2-
tailed) .000  .000 
n 146  143 
Formulated an 
organizational 
working plan 
Pearson 
Correlation .739
** .799**  
Sig.(2-
tailed) .000 .000  
n 143 143  
Note.  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Activities with statistically significant moderate correlation with strengths of the 
correlation ranging from 0.4-0.6 per Dancey and Reidy (2004) included: 
  
 Table 16	  
Hypothesis 1: Moderate Correlations 
 
  
Replaced 
the chief 
executive 
officer 
Changed 
the internal 
local 
authority 
structure 
Replaced 
senior and 
middle 
managers 
Took 
centralization 
steps 
Replaced the 
chief 
executive 
officer 
Pearson 
Correlation  .467
** .559** .278** 
Sig. (2-
tailed)  .000 .000 .002 
n  136 136 125 
Changed the 
internal 
local 
authority 
structure 
Pearson 
Correlation .467
**  .658** .409** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .000  .000 .000 
n 136  144 134 
Replaced 
senior and 
middle 
managers 
Pearson 
Correlation .559
** .658**  .462** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .000 .000  .000 
n 136 144  133 
Took 
centraliza-
tion steps 
Pearson 
Correlation .278
** .409** .462**  
Sig. (2-
tailed) .002 .000 .000  
n 125 134 133  
Note.  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
  
 Hypothesis 1: Moderate Correlations (Continued) 
 
Increased 
time and 
efforts in 
researchin
g 
consumers
’ needs 
Increased 
time and 
efforts in 
becoming a 
learning 
organizatio
n 
Made 
changes in 
human 
resources 
managemen
t style 
Reshaped and 
improved the 
organizationa
l culture and 
climate 
Changed the 
internal local 
authority 
structure 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.333** .285** .258** .224** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .000 .001 .002 .007 
n 144 143 143 143 
Replaced 
senior and 
middle 
managers 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.308** .237** .208* .186* 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .000 .005 .013 .026 
n 142 141 141 143 
Took 
centralizatio
n steps 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.201* .220* .252**  
Sig. (2-
tailed) .020 .011 .004  
n 134 133 131  
Note.  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
  
 Hypothesis 1: Moderate Correlations (Continued) 
  
Invest
-ed in 
staff 
skills 
traini-
ng 
Defined 
a 
comm-
on 
vision 
of the 
local 
authori-
ty 
Diagnosed 
the local 
authority 
strengths 
and 
weaknesses 
Formulated 
an 
organization
-al working 
plan 
Rating 
the 
"success" 
of the 
turnarou-
nd to 
date 
Changed 
the 
internal 
local 
authority 
structure 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.274** .343** .238** .210* .252** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .001 .000 .004 .012 .002 
n 145 146 146 142 145 
Replaced 
senior 
and 
middle 
managers 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.200* .301** .243** .229** .282** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .017 .000 .003 .006 .001 
n 143 145 145 141 144 
Took 
centraliz-
ation 
steps 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.210* .243**   .221* 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .015 .005   .011 
n 134 135   133 
Note.  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
  
 Hypothesis 1: Moderate Correlations (Continued) 
  
Chang-
ed the 
intern-
al local 
authori
-ty 
structu
-re 
Replac-
ed 
senior 
and 
middle 
manage
-rs 
Took 
cen-
trali-
zatio
n 
steps 
Took 
decentra
-lization 
steps 
Increas-
ed time 
and 
efforts 
research
-ing 
consu-
mers’ 
needs 
Increased 
time and 
efforts in 
become-
ng a 
learning 
organizati
-on 
Took 
decentr-
a-
lization 
steps 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
    .364** .252** 
Sig. (2-
tailed)     .000 .004 
n     129 128 
Increased 
time and 
efforts 
in 
resear-
ching 
consum-
ers’ 
needs 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.333** .308** .201* .364**  .631** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .000 .000 .020 .000  .000 
n 
144 142 134 129  143 
Increased 
time & 
efforts 
in bec-
oming a 
learn-
ing 
organiza
-tion 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.285** .237** .220* .252** .631**  
Sig. (2-
tailed) .001 .005 .011 .004 .000  
n 
143 141 133 128 143  
Made 
changes 
in HR 
mgmt 
style 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.258** .208* .252
*
* 
.284** .422** .440** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .002 .013 .004 .001 .000 .000 
n 143 141 131 127 140 139 
Note.  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Hypothesis 1: Moderate Correlations (Continued) 
 
Made changes 
in human 
resources 
management 
style 
Resha
-ped 
& 
impro
-ved 
the 
organ
-
izatio-
nal 
cultu-
re & 
clima-
te 
Invest
-ed in 
staff 
skills 
traini-
ng 
Defin
-ed a 
comm
-on 
vision 
of the 
local 
autho-
rity 
Diagnos
-ed the 
local 
authori-
ty 
strength
-s and 
weak-
nesses 
Formula
-ted an 
organiza
-tional 
working 
plan 
Rati-
ng 
the 
"suc-
cess" 
of 
the 
turn-
arou-
nd to 
date 
Took 
decentra-
lization 
steps 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.284** .365**  .340** .255** .215* .212* 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .001 .000  .000 .003 .015 
.01
6 
n 127 129  130 130 128 128 
Increased 
time and 
efforts in 
research-
ing 
consum-
ers’ needs 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.422** .576** .516** .623** .646** .622** .554** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
.00
0 
n 140 143 143 144 145 141 143 
Increased 
time and 
efforts in 
becoming 
a learning 
organiza-
tion 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.440** .612** .554** .648** .610** .580** .452** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
.00
0 
n 139 142 142 143 144 140 142 
Made 
changes in 
human 
resources 
manage-
ment style 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
 .536** .506** .387** .314** .340** .300** 
Sig. (2-
tailed)  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
.00
0 
n  140 141 142 143 139 142 
Note. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Hypothesis 1: Moderate Correlations (Continued) 
  
Chang
-ed 
the 
intern-
al 
local 
author
-ity 
struct-
ure 
Repl-
aced 
senior 
and 
middl
e 
manag
-ers 
Took 
centr
-ali-
zatio
n 
steps 
Too-
k de-
cen-
trali-
zati-
on 
steps 
Increa
-sed 
time 
& 
effort-
ts in 
resear
-ching 
con-
sume-
rs’ 
needs 
Increas
-ed 
time 
and 
efforts 
in 
becom
-ing a 
learni-
ng 
organi-
zation 
Made 
chang-
es in 
human 
resour-
ces 
manage
-ment 
style 
Reshaped 
and 
improve-
ed the 
organi-
zational 
culture 
and 
climate 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.224** .186*  .365
*
* 
.576** .612** .536** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .007 .026  .000 .000 .000 .000 
n 
143 143  129 143 142 140 
Invested in 
staff skills 
training 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.274** .200* .210*  .516** .554** .506** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .001 .017 .015  .000 .000 .000 
n 145 143 134  143 142 141 
Defined a 
common 
vision  of 
the local 
authority 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.343** .301** .243
*
* 
.340*
* 
.623** .648** .387** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .000 .000 .005 .000 .000 .000 .000 
n 146 145 135 130 144 143 142 
Diagnosed 
the local 
authority 
strengths 
and weak-
nesses 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.238** .243**  .255
*
* 
.646** .610** .314** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .004 .003  .003 .000 .000 .000 
n 146 145  130 145 144 143 
Note. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Hypothesis 1: Moderate Correlations (Continued) 
  
Resha
-ped 
& 
impro
-ved 
org 
cultu-
re & 
clima-
te 
Invest
-ed in 
staff 
skills 
traini-
ng 
Defin-
ed a 
comm
-on 
vision 
of the 
local 
author
-ity 
Diagn
-osed 
the 
local 
author
-ity 
streng
-ths 
and 
weak-
nesses 
Formu
-lated 
an 
organ-
izatio-
nal 
work-
ing 
plan 
Fought 
the 
denial 
and 
resist-
ance of 
employ
-ees 
Rat-
ing 
the 
"suc-
cess" 
of 
the 
turn-
arou-
nd to 
date 
Reshaped 
& 
impro-
ved the 
org 
culture
/ clim-
ate 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
 .613** .607** .599** .581**  .531
*
* 
Sig. (2-
tailed)  .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 
n 
 143 144 145 141  144 
Invested 
in staff 
skills 
train-
ing 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.613**  .509** .483** .490** .181* .381
*
* 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .000  .000 .000 .000 .037 .000 
n 143  145 145 141 133 145 
Defined a 
comm 
vision 
of the 
local 
author-
ity 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.607** .509**  .774** .739**  .493
*
* 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .000 .000  .000 .000  .000 
n 144 145  146 143  145 
Diagnose
d local 
author-
ity 
streng-
ths/ 
weak-
nesses 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.599** .483** .774**  .799**  .533
*
* 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .000 .000 .000  .000  .000 
n 
145 145 146  143  146 
Note. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 Hypothesis 1: Moderate Correlations (Continued) 
 
Chan-
ged 
the 
intern
-al 
local 
author
-ity 
struct-
ure 
Replac
-ed 
senior 
and 
middle 
manag
-ers 
Too
k 
centr
-
aliz-
ation 
steps 
Took 
dece-
ntraliza
-tion 
steps 
Increas
-ed 
time 
and 
efforts 
in 
resear-
ching 
consu-
mers’ 
needs 
Increa
-sed 
time 
and 
efforts 
in 
becom
-ing a 
learni-
ng 
orga-
ni-
zation 
Made 
chang-
es in 
human 
resour-
ces 
manage
-ment 
style 
Formulat-
ed an 
organi-
zatio-
nal 
worki-
ng plan 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.210* .229**  .215* .622** .580** .340** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .012 .006  .015 .000 .000 .000 
n 142 141  128 141 140 139 
Fought 
the 
denial 
and 
resist-
ance of 
employ
-ees 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
     .237**  
Sig. (2-
tailed)      .006  
n 
     133  
Rating 
the 
"suc-
cess" 
of the 
turn-
around 
to date 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.252** .282** .221* .212* .554** .452** .300** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .002 .001 .011 .016 .000 .000 .000 
n 
145 144 133 128 143 142 142 
Note. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
  
 Hypothesis 1: Moderate Correlations (Continued) 
  
Reshaped 
and 
improved the 
organiza-
tional culture 
and climate 
Invest
-ed in 
staff 
skills 
train-
ing 
Defin-
ed a 
comm
-on 
vision 
of the 
local 
author
-ity 
Diagno
-sed the 
local 
author-
ity’s 
strength
-s and 
weak-
nesses 
Formulat
-ed and 
organiza
t-ional 
working 
plan 
Fought 
the 
denial 
and 
resist-
ance of 
employ
-ees 
Rating 
the 
"succe
-ss" of 
the 
turn-
arou-
nd to 
date 
Formulat-
ed an 
organi-
zational 
working 
plan 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.581** .490** .739** .799**   .495** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000   .000 
n 141 141 143 143   142 
Fought  the 
denial 
and 
resist-
ance of 
employ-
ees 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
       
Sig. (2-
tailed)        
n        
Rating the 
"suc-
cess" of 
the turn-
around 
to date 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.531** .381** .493** .533** .495**   
Sig. (2-
tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000   
n 144 145 145 146 142   
Note. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
The correlations between the various activities and rating the “success” of the perception 
of the turnaround to date were weakly (therefore 0.1-0.3) to moderately (therefore 0.4-
0.6) correlated with statistically significant correlations ranging from 21.2% to 55.4% 
(Dancey & Reidy, 2004). 
  
 Table 17	  
Hypothesis 1: Correlations Between Activities and Success of the Turnaround 
 
The majority of the reorganization activities were positively correlated with rating the 
perception of the “success” of the turnaround to date.  
Hypothesis 2 – Accepted.	  
 Hypothesis 2 stated that a positive correlation existed between a perception of 
stronger financial controls and faculty, staff, and administrative employees, therefore that 
the members of the university as a whole saw an increase in financial controls across the 
university. Though there was no published data before regarding how many financial 
controls existed within the university, the perception of an increase was studied. In 
examining the relationship between creating stronger financial controls and faculty, staff, 
and administration, based upon the frequency of responses (‘5’ is “to a very large extent,” 
and ‘4’ is “somewhat”), 75.8% of respondents (110 of 145 valid responses) agreed that 
the university had created stronger financial controls, indicating a strong relationship 
(Dancey & Reidy, 2004). With a mean of 4.05 and a standard deviation of .974, the effect 
size is 0.97674 (rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a “large” effect size. 
  
 Table 18	  
Created Stronger Financial Controls 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 2 1.2 1.4 1.4 
2 10 6.1 6.9 8.3 
3 23 14.0 15.9 24.1 
4 54 32.9 37.2 61.4 
5 56 34.1 38.6 100.0 
Total 145 88.4 100.0  
Missing 0 18 11.0   
System 1 .6   
Total 19 11.6   
Total 164 100.0   
 
Table 19	  
Hypothesis 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 n Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Created stronger 
financial controls 145 1 5 4.05 .974 
Describe your position 
at [the university] 149 1 5 3.06 1.170 
Valid n (listwise) 137     
 
Table 20	  
Hypothesis 2: Correlations 
 
 
Created stronger 
financial controls 
Describe your position 
at [the university] 
Created stronger 
financial controls 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.207* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .015 
n 145 137 
Describe your position 
at [the university] 
Pearson Correlation -.207* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .015  
n 137 149 
Note. 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
The frequency of responses indicates that the hypothesis is accepted. In 
examining the correlations, the statistical correlation between “Created stronger financial 
controls” and the “Describe your position at [the university]” were statistically significant 
at the 0.05 level. While there was a slight negative correlation, this is likely because of 
how the data was coded in SPSS. Individuals that identified as completely or mostly 
administrative were coded as “1,” individuals that identified as half administrative and 
half faculty were coded as “2,” individuals that identified as completely or mostly faculty 
were coded as “3,” and individuals that identified as completely or mostly staff were 
coded as “4.” This negative correlation indicates that while 75.8% of respondents (110 of 
145 valid responses) agreed that the university had created stronger financial controls, 
this was noticed more by those individuals that were either part of administration or 
closer to administration, higher on the organizational hierarchy.  
Hypothesis 3 – Accepted.	  
 Hypothesis 3 stated that a positive correlation existed between a perception of 
extending new marketing efforts to new consumers and faculty, staff, and administrative 
employees. By examining the frequency of the responses of members of university 
faculty, staff, and administration (‘5’ is “to a very large extent,” and ‘4’ is “somewhat”), 
79.0% of respondents (117 of 148 valid responses) agreed that the university had 
extended or increased marketing efforts to new consumers, indicating a strong 
relationship (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). With a mean of 4.02 and a standard deviation of 
1.128, the effect size is 0.92949 (rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a “large” 
effect size. 
Table 21	  
Extended Marketing Efforts (Reaching Out) to New Consumers 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 7 4.3 4.7 4.7 
2 13 7.9 8.8 13.5 
3 11 6.7 7.4 20.9 
4 56 34.1 37.8 58.8 
5 61 37.2 41.2 100.0 
Total 148 90.2 100.0  
Missing 0 15 9.1   
System 1 .6   
Total 16 9.8   
Total 164 100.0   
 
Table 22	  
Hypothesis 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 n Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Describe your position 
at [the university] 149 1 5 3.06 1.170 
Extended marketing 
efforts (reaching out) 
to new consumers 
148 1 5 4.02 1.128 
Valid n (listwise) 144     
 
Table 23 	  
Hypothesis 3: Correlations	  
 
Describe your 
position at [the 
university] 
Extended marketing 
efforts (reaching out) to 
new consumers 
Describe your position 
at [the university] 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 -.065 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .437 
n 149 144 
Extended marketing 
efforts (reaching out) 
to new consumers 
Pearson 
Correlation -.065 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .437  
n 144 148 
The frequency of responses indicates that the hypothesis is accepted. In 
examining the correlations, the statistical correlation between “Extended marketing 
efforts (reaching out) to new customers” and the “Describe your position at [the 
university]” was not statistically significant. While there was a slight negative correlation 
of 6.5%, due to the lack of sufficient statistical significance, this result is not considered 
valid. 
Hypothesis 4 – Accepted.	  
 Hypothesis 4 stated that a positive correlation existed between a perception of 
improving the local authority’s internal and external image and all faculty, staff, and 
administrative employees. By examining the frequency of the responses of members of 
university faculty, staff, and administration (‘5’ is “to a very large extent,” and ‘4’ is 
“somewhat”), 75.2% of respondents (112 of 149 valid responses) agreed that the 
university had improved the university’s internal and external image, indicating a strong 
relationship (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). With a mean of 3.87 and a standard deviation of 
1.160 the effect size is 0.92070 (rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a “large” 
effect size. 
 
  
 Table 24	  
Improved the Local Authority’s Internal and External Image 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 10 6.1 6.7 6.7 
2 12 7.3 8.1 14.8 
3 15 9.1 10.1 24.8 
4 63 38.4 42.3 67.1 
5 49 29.9 32.9 100.0 
Total 149 90.9 100.0  
Missing 0 14 8.5   
System 1 .6   
Total 15 9.1   
Total 164 100.0   
 
Table 25	  
Hypothesis 4: Descriptive Statistics 
 n Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Describe your position 
at [the university] 149 1 5 3.06 1.170 
Improved the local 
authority’s internal 
and external image 
149 1 5 3.87 1.160 
Valid n (listwise) 148     
 
Table 26	  
Hypothesis 4: Correlations 
 
 
Describe your 
position at [the 
university] 
Improved the local 
authority’s internal and 
external image 
Describe your position at 
[the university] 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 -.143 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .084 
n 149 148 
Improved the local 
authority’s internal and 
external image 
Pearson 
Correlation -.143 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .084  
n 148 149 
 The frequency of responses indicates that the hypothesis is accepted. In 
examining the correlations, the statistical correlation between “Improved the local 
authority’s internal and external image” and the “Describe your position at [the 
university]” was not statistically significant. While there was a slight negative correlation 
of 14.3%, due to the lack of sufficient statistical significance, this result is not considered 
valid. 
Hypothesis 5 – Accepted & Accepted.	  
 Hypothesis 5 stated that a moderate correlation between a perception of 
rebuilding stakeholder trust in the local authority and those employees considered mostly 
staff or mostly faculty existed. By examining the frequency of the responses of members 
of the university that identified their positions as completely/mostly faculty, (‘5’ is “to a 
very large extent,” and ‘4’ is “somewhat”), 75.9% of respondents (41 of 54 valid 
responses) agreed that the university had rebuilt stakeholder trust, indicating a strong 
relationship (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). With a mean of 3.59 and a standard deviation of 
1.281 the effect size is 0.89277 (rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a “large” 
effect size. 
Table 27	  
Rebuilt Stakeholders Trust in the Local Authority – Faculty 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 8 14.8 14.8 14.8 
2 3 5.6 5.6 20.4 
3 2 3.7 3.7 24.1 
4 31 57.4 57.4 81.5 
5 10 18.5 18.5 100.0 
Total 54 100.0 100.0  
 
By examining the frequency of the responses of members of the university that identified 
their positions as completely/mostly staff, (‘5’ is “to a very large extent,” and ‘4’ is 
“somewhat”), 62.2% of respondents (28 of 45 valid responses) agreed that the university 
had rebuilt stakeholder trust, indicating a moderate relationship (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). 
With a mean of 3.62 and a standard deviation of 1.284 the effect size is 0.89385 
(rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a “large” effect size. 
Table 28	  
Rebuilt Stakeholders Trust in the Local Authority – Staff 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 5 10.9 11.1 11.1 
2 3 6.5 6.7 17.8 
3 9 19.6 20.0 37.8 
4 15 32.6 33.3 71.1 
5 13 28.3 28.9 100.0 
Total 45 97.8 100.0  
Missing 0 1 2.2   
Total 46 100.0   
 
Table 29	  
Hypothesis 5: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 n Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Describe your position 
at [the university] 149 1 5 3.06 1.170 
Rebuilt stakeholders 
trust in the local 
authority 
146 1 5 3.59 1.241 
Valid n (listwise) 144     
 
  
 Table 30	  
Hypothesis 5: Correlations 
 
 
Describe 
your position 
at [the 
university] 
Rebuilt stakeholders 
trust in the local 
authority 
Describe your position 
at [the university] 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 -.181
* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .030 
n 149 144 
Rebuilt stakeholders 
trust in the local 
authority 
Pearson 
Correlation -.181
* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .030  
n 144 146 
Note. 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
The frequency of responses indicates that the hypothesis is accepted. In 
examining the correlations, the statistical correlation between “Rebuilt stakeholders trust 
in the local authority” and the “Describe your position at [the university]” were 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. While there was a slight negative correlation, this 
result is likely because of how the data was coded in SPSS. Individuals that identified as 
completely or mostly administrative were coded as “1,” individuals that identified as half 
administrative and half faculty were coded as “2,” individuals that identified as 
completely or mostly faculty were coded as “3,” and individuals that identified as 
completely or mostly staff were coded as “4.” This negative correlation indicates that 
while 69.7% of respondents (69 of 99 valid responses) agreed that the university had 
rebuilt stakeholders trust in the local authority, this was noticed more by those individuals 
that were either part of administration or closer to administration, higher on the 
organizational hierarchy. 
Hypothesis 6 – Accepted & Accepted.	  
 Hypothesis 6 stated that a moderate correlation existed between a perception of 
reshaping and improving the organizational culture and climate and faculty and staff 
employees. By examining the frequency of the responses of members of the university 
that identified their positions as completely/mostly faculty, (‘5’ is “to a very large 
extent,” and ‘4’ is “somewhat”), 51.9% of respondents (28 of 54 valid responses) agreed 
that the university had reshaped and improved the organizational culture and climate, 
indicating a moderate relationship (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). With a mean of 3.22 and a 
standard deviation of 1.327, the effect size is 0.86397 (rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this 
suggests a “large” effect size. 
Table 31	  
Reshaped and Improved the Organizational Culture and Climate – Faculty 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 6 11.1 11.1 11.1 
2 14 25.9 25.9 37.0 
3 6 11.1 11.1 48.1 
4 18 33.3 33.3 81.5 
5 10 18.5 18.5 100.0 
Total 54 100.0 100.0  
 
By examining the frequency of the responses of members of the university that identified 
their positions as completely/mostly staff, (‘5’ is “to a very large extent,” and ‘4’ is 
“somewhat”), 52.4% of respondents (22 of 42 valid responses) agreed that the university 
had reshaped and improved the organizational culture and climate, indicating a moderate 
relationship (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). With a mean of 3.26 and a standard deviation of 
1.251, the effect size is 0.87891 (rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a “large” 
effect size. 
Table 32	  
Reshaped and Improved the Organizational Culture and Climate – Staff 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 5 10.9 11.9 11.9 
2 7 15.2 16.7 28.6 
3 8 17.4 19.0 47.6 
4 16 34.8 38.1 85.7 
5 6 13.0 14.3 100.0 
Total 42 91.3 100.0  
Missing 0 4 8.7   
Total 46 100.0   
 
Table 33	  
Hypothesis 6: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 n Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Describe your position 
at [the university] 149 1 5 3.06 1.170 
Reshaped and improved 
the organizational 
culture and climate 
146 1 5 3.30 1.299 
Valid n (listwise) 145     
 
Table 34	  
Hypothesis 6: Correlations 
 
 
Describe your 
position at [the 
university] 
Reshaped & improved 
organizational culture 
& climate 
Describe your position 
at [the university] 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.216** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .009 
n 149 145 
Reshaped & improved 
the organizational 
culture & climate 
Pearson Correlation -.216** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .009  
n 145 146 
Note. 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 The frequency of responses indicates that the hypothesis is accepted. In 
examining the correlations, the statistical correlation between “Reshaped and improved 
the organizational culture and climate” and the “Describe your position at [the 
university]” were statistically significant at the 0.01 level. While there was a negative 
correlation, this is likely because of how the data was coded in SPSS. Individuals that 
identified as completely or mostly administrative were coded as “1,” individuals that 
identified as half administrative and half faculty were coded as “2,” individuals that 
identified as completely or mostly faculty were coded as “3,” and individuals that 
identified as completely or mostly staff were coded as “4.” This negative correlation 
indicates that while 52.08% of respondents (50 of 96 valid responses) agreed that the 
university had reshaped and improved the organizational culture and climate, this was 
noticed more by those individuals that were either part of administration or closer to 
administration, higher on the organizational hierarchy. 
Hypothesis 7 – Rejected.	  
 Hypothesis 7 stated that a positive correlation existed between a perception of 
rebuilding stakeholders trust in the local authority and the level of participation in 
extracurricular activities on campus.  
Table 35	  
Hypothesis 7: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 n Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Rebuilt stakeholders trust in 
the local authority 146 1 5 3.59 1.241 
Level of participation in 
extracurriculars on 
campus 
149 1 8 4.74 2.067 
Valid n (listwise) 144     
 
Table 36	  
Hypothesis 7: Correlations 
 
 
Rebuilt 
stakeholders trust 
in the local 
Level of participation 
in extracurriculars on 
campus 
authority 
Rebuilt stakeholders trust in 
the local authority 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 -.110 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .190 
n 146 144 
Level of participation in 
extracurriculars on 
campus 
Pearson 
Correlation -.110 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .190  
n 144 149 
 
The statistical calculations of correlation between “Rebuild stakeholders trust in the local 
authority” and the “Level of participation in extracurricular activities on campus” was not 
statistically significant. While there was a slight negative correlation of 11%, due to the 
lack of sufficient statistical significance, this result is not considered valid. 
In an effort to determine if appropriate statistical significance could be achieved, 
the data was again calculated by regrouping extracurricular activities to match the 
response scale (1-5) of rebuilding stakeholder trust. Using a maximum of 5 for all values 
of extracurricular activities, therefore grouping the responses of attending an average of 
2, 1, or less than 1 extracurricular activities into one set of responses, the data 
calculations were as follows. 
  
 Table 37	  
Hypothesis 7: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 n Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Rebuilt stakeholders 
trust in the local 
authority 
146 1 5 3.59 1.241 
Level of participation in 
extracurriculars on 
campus 
149 1 5 4.08 1.459 
Valid n (listwise) 144     
 
Table 38	  
Hypothesis 7: Correlations 
 
 
Rebuilt stakeholders 
trust in local 
authority 
Level of participation 
in extracurriculars on 
campus 
Rebuilt stakeholders 
trust in local authority 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 -.095 
Sig. (2-
tailed)  .255 
n 146 144 
Level of participation in 
extracurriculars on 
campus 
Pearson 
Correlation -.095 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .255  
n 144 149 
 
The statistical calculations of correlation between “Rebuild stakeholders trust in the local 
authority” and the “Level of participation in extracurricular activities on campus” 
regrouped were also not statistically significant. While there was a slight negative 
correlation of 9.5%, due to the lack of sufficient statistical significance, this result is not 
considered valid. 
Hypothesis 8 – Rejected. 
Hypothesis 8 stated that a positive correlation existed between a perception of 
rebuilding stakeholders trust in the local authority and the number of hours per week 
employees spend on campus executing their specific job duties. 
Table 39	  
Hypothesis 8: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Rebuilt stakeholders trust in the 
local authority 
Hours a week on campus 
executing job 
n Valid 146 148 
Missing 18 16 
Mean 3.59 3.65 
Median 4.00 3.00 
Std. Dev. 1.241 2.407 
Minimum 1 1 
Maximum 5 11 
Percentile
s 
10 1.00 1.00 
20 2.40 2.00 
25 3.00 2.00 
30 3.00 2.00 
40 4.00 3.00 
50 4.00 3.00 
60 4.00 3.00 
70 4.00 4.00 
75 4.00 4.00 
80 5.00 5.20 
90 5.00 7.10 
  
 
Table 40	  
Rebuilt Stakeholders Trust in the Local Authority 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 16 9.8 11.0 11.0 
2 13 7.9 8.9 19.9 
3 19 11.6 13.0 32.9 
4 65 39.6 44.5 77.4 
5 33 20.1 22.6 100.0 
Total 146 89.0 100.0  
Missing 0 17 10.4   
System 1 .6   
Total 18 11.0   
Total 164 100.0   
 
Table 41	  
Hours a Week on Campus Executing Job 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 27 16.5 18.2 18.2 
2 21 12.8 14.2 32.4 
3 44 26.8 29.7 62.2 
4 20 12.2 13.5 75.7 
5 7 4.3 4.7 80.4 
6 11 6.7 7.4 87.8 
7 4 2.4 2.7 90.5 
8 6 3.7 4.1 94.6 
9 1 .6 .7 95.3 
10 4 2.4 2.7 98.0 
11 3 1.8 2.0 100.0 
Total 148 90.2 100.0  
Missing 0 15 9.1   
System 1 .6   
Total 16 9.8   
Total 164 100.0   
  
 
Table 42	  
Hypothesis 8: Correlations 
 
 
Rebuilt stakeholders 
trust in the local 
authority 
Hours a week on 
campus executing 
job 
Rebuilt stakeholders trust 
in the local authority 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 -.092 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .277 
n 146 143 
Hours a week on campus 
executing job 
Pearson 
Correlation -.092 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .277  
n 143 148 
 
The statistical calculations of correlation between “Rebuild stakeholders trust in the local 
authority” and the “Hours worked per week on campus executing job” was not 
statistically significant. While there was a slight negative correlation of 9.2%, due to the 
lack of sufficient statistical significance, this result is not considered valid. 
Hypothesis 9 – Accepted.	  
 Hypothesis 9 stated that a positive correlation existed between a perception of 
redefining the core mission and all faculty, staff, and administrative employees. By 
examining the frequency of the responses of members of the university, (‘5’ is “to a very 
large extent,” and ‘4’ is “somewhat”), 65.9% of respondents (89 of 135 valid responses) 
agreed that the university had redefined core missions, indicating a moderate relationship 
(Dancey & Reidy, 2004). With a mean of 3.55 and a standard deviation of 1.144, the 
effect size is 0.90996 (rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a “large” effect size. 
  
 Table 43	  
Redefined Core Missions 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 12 7.3 8.9 8.9 
2 13 7.9 9.6 18.5 
3 21 12.8 15.6 34.1 
4 67 40.9 49.6 83.7 
5 22 13.4 16.3 100.0 
Total 135 82.3 100.0  
Missing 0 28 17.1   
System 1 .6   
Total 29 17.7   
Total 164 100.0   
 
Table 44	  
Hypothesis 9: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 n Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Describe your position at [the university] 149 1 5 3.06 1.170 
Redefined core missions 135 1 5 3.55 1.144 
Valid n (listwise) 134     
 
Table 45	  
Hypothesis 9: Correlations 
 
 
Describe your position 
at [the university] 
Redefined core 
missions 
Describe your position at 
[the university] 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 -.204
* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .018 
n 149 134 
Redefined core missions Pearson 
Correlation -.204
* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .018  
n 134 135 
Note. 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
  
The frequency of responses indicates that the hypothesis is accepted. In 
examining the correlations, the statistical correlation between “Redefined core missions” 
and the “Describe your position at [the university]” were statistically significant at the 
0.05 level. While there was a negative correlation, this is likely because of how the data 
was coded in SPSS. Individuals that identified as completely or mostly administrative 
were coded as “1,” individuals that identified as half administrative and half faculty were 
coded as “2,” individuals that identified as completely or mostly faculty were coded as 
“3,” and individuals that identified as completely or mostly staff were coded as “4.” This 
negative correlation indicates that while 65.9% of respondents (89 of 135 valid 
responses) agreed that the university had redefined core missions, this was noticed more 
by those individuals that were either part of administration or closer to administration, 
higher on the organizational hierarchy. 
Hypothesis 10 – Accepted, Accepted, & Accepted.	  
 Hypothesis 10 stated that a positive correlation existed between defining a 
common vision of the local authority and the levels of management. By examining the 
frequency of the responses of members of the university that defined themselves as 
upper/middle management, (‘5’ is “to a very large extent,” and ‘4’ is “somewhat”), 80% 
of respondents (8 of 10 valid responses) agreed that the university had defined a common 
vision of the local authority, indicating a strong relationship (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). 
With a mean of 4.20 and a standard deviation of .789, the effect size is 0.96647 
(rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a “large” effect size. 
  
 Table 46	  
Defined a Common Vision of the Local Authority – Upper Management 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 3 2 20.0 20.0 20.0 
4 4 40.0 40.0 60.0 
5 4 40.0 40.0 100.0 
Total 10 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 47	  
Hypothesis 10: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 n 
Mini-
mum 
Maxi-
mum Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Describe your position at [the 
university] 10 1 4 1.60 1.265 
Defined a common vision of the 
local authority 10 3 5 4.20 .789 
Valid n (listwise) 10     
 
Table 48	  
Hypothesis 10: Correlations 
 
 
Describe your position at 
[the university] 
Redefined core 
missions 
Describe your position at 
[the university] 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 .195 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .590 
n 10 10 
Redefined core missions Pearson 
Correlation .195 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .590  
n 10 10 
 
The frequency of responses indicates that the hypothesis is accepted. In 
examining the correlations, the statistical correlation between “Redefined core missions” 
and the “Describe your position at [the university] (upper management only)” was not 
statistically significant. While there was a positive correlation of 59%, due to the lack of 
sufficient statistical significance, this result is not considered valid. 
 Hypothesis 10 stated that a positive correlation existed between defining a 
common vision of the local authority and the levels of management. By examining the 
frequency of the responses of members of the university that defined themselves as junior 
management, (‘5’ is “to a very large extent,” and ‘4’ is “somewhat”), 66.6% of 
respondents (14 of 21 valid responses) agreed that the university had defined a common 
vision of the local authority, indicating a strong relationship (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). 
With a mean of 3.57 and a standard deviation of 1.469 the effect size is 0.86431 
(rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a “large” effect size. 
Table 49	  
Defined a Common Vision of the Local Authority – Junior Management 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 3 14.3 14.3 14.3 
2 3 14.3 14.3 28.6 
3 1 4.8 4.8 33.3 
4 7 33.3 33.3 66.7 
5 7 33.3 33.3 100.0 
Total 21 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 50	  
Hypothesis 10: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 n Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Describe your position at 
[the university] 21 1 4 2.67 1.197 
Defined a common vision 
of the local authority 21 1 5 3.57 1.469 
Valid n (listwise) 21     
 
Table 51	  
Hypothesis 10: Correlations 
 
 Describe your 
position at [the 
university] 
Redefined core 
missions 
Describe your position 
at [the university] 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 .152 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .548 
n 21 18 
Redefined core 
missions 
Pearson 
Correlation .152 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .548  
n 18 18 
 
The frequency of responses indicates that the hypothesis is accepted. In 
examining the correlations, the statistical correlation between “Redefined core missions” 
and the “Describe your position at [the university] (junior management only)” was not 
statistically significant. While there was a positive correlation of 54.8%, due to the lack 
of sufficient statistical significance, this result is not considered valid. 
Hypothesis 10 stated that a positive correlation existed between defining a 
common vision of the local authority and the levels of management. By examining the 
frequency of the responses of members of the university that defined themselves as 
individuals that do not manage other employees, (‘5’ is “to a very large extent,” and ‘4’ is 
“somewhat”), 60.7% of respondents (56 of 92 valid responses) agreed that the university 
had defined a common vision of the local authority, indicating a moderate relationship 
(Dancey & Reidy, 2004). With a mean of 3.64 and a standard deviation of 1.163, the 
effect size is 0.91129 (rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a “large” effect size. 
Table 52	  
Defined a Common Vision of the Local Authority  – Non-Managing 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 6 6.3 6.5 6.5 
2 9 9.5 9.8 16.3 
3 21 22.1 22.8 39.1 
4 32 33.7 34.8 73.9 
5 24 25.3 26.1 100.0 
Total 92 96.8 100.0  
Missing 0 3 3.2   
Total 95 100.0   
 
Table 53	  
Hypothesis 10: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 n Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
Describe your position at [the university] 95 1 4 3.07 .866 
Defined a common vision of the local 
authority 92 1 5 3.64 1.163 
Valid n (listwise) 92     
 
Table 54	  
Hypothesis 10: Correlations 
 
 
Describe your position at 
[the university] 
Redefined core 
missions 
Describe your position at 
[the university] 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 -.132 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .226 
n 95 86 
Redefined core missions Pearson 
Correlation -.132 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .226  
n 86 86 
 
The frequency of responses indicates that the hypothesis is accepted. In 
examining the correlations, the statistical correlation between “Redefined core missions” 
and the “Describe your position at [the university] (non-managing employees only)” was 
not statistically significant. While there was a slight negative correlation of 13.2%, due to 
the lack of sufficient statistical significance, this result is not considered valid. 
Table 55	  
Hypotheses Summary 
 
  
Hypotheses Accepted / Rejected 
1 Reorganization Activities + Perception by all employees Accepted 
2 Stronger Financial Controls + Perception by all employees Accepted 
3 New Marketing Efforts + Perception by all employees Accepted 
4 Improving Internal & External Image + Perception by all employees Accepted 
5 Rebuilding Stakeholder Trust + Mostly Faculty / Mostly Staff Accepted & Accepted 
6 Reshaping & Improving Organization Climate + Mostly Faculty / Mostly Staff Accepted & Accepted 
7 Rebuilding Stakeholder Trust + On Campus Activities Participation Rejected 
8 Rebuilding Stakeholder Trust + Hours/Week Spent on Campus Rejected 
9 Redefining Core Mission + Perception by all employees Accepted 
10 Common Vision of the Local Authority + Levels of Management 
Accepted, Accepted, 
& Accepted 
 
General analysis.	  
 In addition to the statistical results of the hypotheses provided above, there are 
some supplementary results. Overall, respondents to the survey (faculty, staff, and 
members of administration) rated the overall “success” of the turnaround to date with 
80.4% of respondents (119 of 148 valid responses) agreeing that the university either “4 – 
somewhat” or “5 – to a very large extent” had successfully begun the turnaround to date, 
indicating a strong result (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). With a mean of 4.00 and a standard 
deviation of 1.100, the effect size is 0.93199 (rounded). Per Cohen (1988), this suggests a 
“large” effect size. 
Table 56	  
Rating the "Success" of the Turnaround to Date 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 6 3.7 4.1 4.1 
2 15 9.1 10.1 14.2 
3 8 4.9 5.4 19.6 
4 63 38.4 42.6 62.2 
5 56 34.1 37.8 100.0 
Total 148 90.2 100.0  
Missing 0 15 9.1   
System 1 .6   
Total 16 9.8   
Total 164 100.0   
 
It is also possible to test the assumption that Retrenchment Activities had a 
mutual relationship and connection with the faculty, staff, and administration’s 
perception of the “success” of the turnaround to date at the university in question. These 
activities included: contracted activities and services scope, eliminated particular 
services, decreased service expenditure, partially/temporarily exited from specific 
services, liquidated assets in order to raise capital, reduced/suspended capital 
expenditures, closed down public organizations, created stronger financial controls, and 
decreased financial support to other organizations (Beeri, 2009). 
The correlations between the various activities and rating the “success” of the perception 
of the turnaround to date were weakly (therefore 0.1-0.3), negatively correlated with 
statistically significant correlations ranging from -16.6% to -26.1% (Dancey & Reidy, 
2004). 
Table 57	  
Success of the Turnaround to Date and Retrenchment Activities: Correlations 
 The reorganization activities that were statistically significant were negatively correlated 
with rating the perception of the “success” of the turnaround to date, indicating that these 
activities did not have a positive relationship with the perception of success. The data 
indicates that these activities did not support the perception of the success of the 
turnaround and possibly may even have detracted from the perception of success. 
It is also possible to test the assumption that Repositioning Activities had a 
mutual relationship and connection with the faculty, staff, and administration’s 
perception of the “success” of the turnaround to date at the university in question. These 
activities included: established new services, entered into joint activities/co-operated with 
other agencies, extended activities and scope of services, changed the priorities of 
traditional activities, rented/sold/mortgaged assets, extended availability of services, 
extended marketing efforts (reaching out) to new consumers, increased service 
expenditures, modernized capacity of services with equipment utilizing new 
technologies, began to provide services/internal services that were previously purchased, 
loaned money/asked for subvention for reorganization purposes, privatized services, 
increased average price of services/levying money, redefined core missions, ensured high 
quality of services, improved the local authority’s internal and external image, introduced 
new ways of implementation, rebuilt stakeholders trust in the local authority (Beeri, 
2009). The correlations between the various activities and rating the “success” of the 
perception of the turnaround to date were weakly (therefore 0.1-0.3) to moderately 
(therefore 0.4-0.6) correlated with statistically significant correlations ranging from 
20.6% to 61.9% (Dancey & Reidy, 2004). 
Table 58	  
Success of the Turnaround to Date and Repositioning Activities: Correlations 
 
 
The repositioning activities that were statistically significant were positively correlated 
with rating the perception of the “success” of the turnaround to date, indicating that these 
activities had a positive relationship with the perception of success. Specifically, 
establishing new services, entering into joint activities/co-operated with other agencies, 
extending activities and scope of services, extending availability of services, extending 
marketing efforts (reaching out) to new consumers, increasing service expenditures, 
modernizing capacity of services with equipment utilizing new technologies, beginning 
to provide services/internal services that were previously purchased, redefining core 
missions, ensuring high quality of services, improving the local authority’s internal and 
external image, introducing new ways of implementation, and rebuilding stakeholders 
trust in the local authority were positively correlated with the perception of success 
(Beeri, 2009). The activity with the highest correlation was “rebuilt stakeholders trust in 
the local authority.” This result is a logical extension of the fact that 93.1% of 
respondents (135 of 145 valid responses” agreed (“4 – somewhat” or “5 – to a very large 
extent”) that the events prior to the turnaround were a major violation of trust (see above 
for data table). 
  
 	  	  
Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations	  
 
In the 2011-2012 academic year, a small, regional, public university in the upper 
Midwest under study experienced an organizational trauma after an ethical breech, 
demanding change. After an external audit was completed, it was determined that the 
special, short-term international programs were granting degrees that failed appropriate 
degree standards (The Associated Press, 2012; Donovan, 2012a; Donovan, 2012b). Over 
740 degrees were awarded to students within the program and more than 500 of those 
degrees lacked sufficient documentation to prove that the students actually earned the 
degree, earning the university the moniker as a degree mill for Chinese students. In 
addition, the former president was terminated for enrollment inflation and countersued, 
and the university had a stern compliance, policy, and financial audit, all of which 
revealed a number of problems across the university (Finneman, 2012). With enrollment 
fraud, improper awarding of degrees, inappropriate handling of public funds, and 
incorrect scholarship allocations, the university’s reputation was damaged, employees left 
the organization in droves, enrollment plummeted, donors and revenue were lost, and the 
former dean took his own life. The university, its management, and the state authority 
governing it chose to execute a turnaround to change the organization’s course and save 
it. It is that turnaround that this research studied. 
As such, this research looked to apply the field of turnaround management to 
higher education in the case of a small, regional public institution in the upper Midwest 
that had experienced significant organizational upheaval and ethical issues. Overall, the 
results were mixed, demonstrating opinions and perceptions of success and failure in the 
turnaround. Members of the university, nearly unequivocally, expressed that the issues 
that the university faced were highly traumatic and were a major violation of trust. 
Faculty, staff, and members of the administration felt betrayed and abused by the former 
administration due to the unethical actions as well as their concealment. An unexpected 
result of the research was the relatively positive perception of the progress and path of the 
turnaround to date with over 80% of the respondents replying that the turnaround was 
either somewhat successful or to a very large extent successful. The university leaders 
and the state system decided that the organization was worth saving, though its operating 
and strategic health demanded change (Hofer, 1980). 
Contributions to the academe.	  
 While there has been significant research on turnarounds in the body of 
knowledge, this study also provided some interesting additions to the academe. This 
research confirmed some “common sense” thoughts regarding the opinions and 
perspectives of individuals experiencing a turnaround as well as the impact of violations 
of trust on an organization. In addition, it revealed the importance of a common vision 
within an organization in transition during a turnaround as well as the need for a strongly 
longitudinal approach. 
 In regards to turnarounds, the common, conventional wisdom would indicate that 
the more active and involved individuals were in their organization, the more likely they 
would be committed to a turnaround and trust an entity’s progress. Therefore, the 
assumption in this research was that the more involved the individual on campus, the 
more contact they would have with the university and therefore be more inclined to trust 
the organization, management, and the turnaround. However, anecdotally, the research 
has shown this convention wisdom might not to be true. The academe should take notice 
of the potentially negative impact of individuals being “too” involved in the organization 
to trust the turnaround, organization, and management. This involvement can possibly 
extend to spending too many hours at the organization above and beyond their job duties 
and being so immersed in the system that they become jaded or suspicious of the change. 
The more time respondents spent on campus, even doing their job, the less their trust in 
the local authority was rebuilt. An anecdotal supposition could be that these individuals 
trusted the organization less because of their larger amount of time spent on campus, the 
opposite result of expectations and something that should be taken into account when 
studying trust as well as executing a turnaround. If employees that are more active and 
involved in the organization are the least trusting, the academe should assess why they 
are less trusting as well as the communications processes that enabled the situation. 
The destruction of trust that can occur in an organization due to scandals is 
significant, perhaps even egregious. When a violation of trust is considered “major,” 
rebuilding trust in the organization and its management with its employees is vital. 
Because trust is so necessary for organizational function and communication, the 
destruction of it, especially when it is considered to be an intentional violation by 
individuals internal to the organization, is far more insidious (Caldwell et al., 2009; 
Denton, 2009; Hirsch, 1978; Kramer & Tyler, 1996; Wong & Cummings, 2009). A 
difference in faculty and staff opinion in higher education was an interesting compliment 
to the academe research because of the difference in relationships driven by the types of 
employees within the organization. As faculty are often traditionally more adversarial 
with college and university management than staff, the differing opinions of the faculty 
and staff are worth further study. A difference in opinion from the different areas of 
employees within the organization might indicate a shift in how management understands 
the world of academia and bears additional analysis. 
Another contribution to the body of knowledge involves how the levels of 
management perceived the common vision defined by the university. The common 
wisdom of the higher the level of management, the more likely the individuals were to 
agree with the vision from upper management was confirmed. However, the disparity in 
responses to the various levels of management and responsibility indicated that while 
upper and middle management might believe there is a common vision, that information 
and concept may not be translated across the university as a whole. Whether it was a lack 
of communication or a lack of understanding of the vision, the university as a whole did 
not share it. While a majority of respondents did perceive a common vision, there is no 
assurances that members of the university understood the same “common vision.” The 
difference in communication is another area of research and confirms the necessity for 
clear, congruent, and aligned communication across an entire organization with a concise 
message shared with both internal and external stakeholders that is consistent at every 
level of management and function. 
One of the major contributions to the academe was the demonstrated need for 
longitudinal studies regarding all facets of a turnaround. While a number of different 
facts and perspectives were found at the time of the research, much was uncertain 
regarding the longevity and “staying power” of the changes. As a result, a key factor 
demonstrated in this research as well as across the body of knowledge was the need for 
studies to take place in an organization completing a turnaround over time. For true 
assessment of a turnaround as well as the financial, strategic, and operating health of an 
entity, longitudinal evaluation and measurement are imperative. 
Contributions to the profession.	  
 This research, while providing valuable insight to the specific university under 
study, provided insights and encouragement to other institutions of higher education that 
need to execute a turnaround to survive and/or thrive. As mentioned above, turnarounds 
are not unique to the business or corporate world, but are often necessitated in every 
industry. Higher education is no different, therefore the following section provides 
broader generalizations of what was learned in the university to apply to other colleges 
and universities to complete a turnaround. 
 Supporting the findings of previous researchers, an overarching conclusion is that 
reorganization activities generally supported the success of a turnaround, perhaps in part 
because these activities are so visual and public. Changing the president (CEO), the 
internal reporting structure, replacing lower and middle managers, and 
centralizing/decentralizing decisions as well as university functions are a clear series of 
actions that send a message to stakeholders of change (Hofer, 1980; Sims, 2000). While 
these items may not provide strong correlations with the success of the turnaround, they 
provide very clear and publicized first steps even though the true turnaround cannot be 
measured merely by changing the individuals in charge. Instead, Schneider et al. (1996) 
provided that leadership must change the mindset of the organizational culture for real, 
permanent change. Therefore, the research results support the suppositions that just hiring 
and firing upper, middle, and lower management and reorganizing decision makers are 
insufficient to alter the hearts and minds of organizational stakeholders, even though the 
“old guard” is largely demoted or leaves the organization (Sims, 2000). Higher education, 
when faced with the need to execute a turnaround, should complete various 
reorganization activities to publically and clearly remove all parties and vestiges of prior 
management to pave the way for other turnaround activities as soon as possible. Because 
a turnaround is more than a single task, but is instead a series of changes and alterations 
made to change the organization’s direction, these steps are the critical beginning that 
provides the opening to trust in the transition as well as those spearheading it. 
 Higher education should then follow up the initial reorganization activities by 
formulating an organizational working plan, defining a common vision, and diagnosing 
the organization’s strengths and weaknesses, all activities designed to align the 
perspectives and focus of a population towards a common goal. As the strongest 
correlations between reorganization activities and rating the success of the turnaround in 
this research included researching the needs of consumers, becoming a learning 
organization, reshaping and improving the culture, defining a common vision, diagnosing 
organizational strengths and weaknesses, and formulating a working plan, universities 
and colleges in need of a turnaround demand a hard look at their true mission, character, 
and goals. By reevaluating the organization’s identity, these activities indicate to the 
profession at large that when a university’s management decides to turn the organization 
around and alter its trajectory, much of the university community can embrace the desire 
to change and believed in “coming together” to solve the entity’s problems. As a result, 
faculty, staff, and members of administration can open their minds to working together 
with the goal of revitalizing the entity through a common vision and direction, at least at 
the time. Institutions of higher education need to move from operating in “crisis mode” to 
create a vision of change for a better culture focusing on growing student bodies by not 
cutting corners, building strong programs, and aligning the university’s actions with its 
mission. The common vision and organizational culture improvement must become a 
permanent shift. Higher education can fully engage in turning its institutions around 
when they create a cultural change that embraces a single intention that celebrates ethics 
and integrity, both publicized and lived by the members of the organization. 
 When an organization within higher education has financial troubles, it is 
especially important that faith and confidence be restored in the university’s finances 
because the funds come not only from customers, but from the public at large either 
through tax dollars or donations. The message of honesty, integrity, and proper controls 
protecting not only the assets but the net value of a college or university must be 
understood by the faculty, staff, and members of administration within the organization. 
As Slatter and Lovett (1999) emphasized, an entity needs to stabilize from its crisis, have 
proper cash management, strong financial controls, and cut costs to go forward in a 
turnaround. As a result, the actions of tightening financial controls such as hiring a new 
Vice President of Finance/Chief Financial Officer, changing policies, and reorganizing 
the financial division can be noticed by the vast majority of employees and support the 
turnaround in process. 
In higher education as an industry, scandals and organizational strife often results 
in decreased student enrollment. To revitalize the university or college and continue 
operations, it is important that the institution recruit new customers in the form of 
increased enrollment of new students to reverse a net enrollment decrease. If the faculty, 
staff, and members of administration have the perception that the university extended its 
marketing efforts to new potential consumers throughout the community with various 
productive campaigns, the turnaround is more likely to be successful. Yet those 
additional marketing efforts will need to be analyzed over time for ongoing trends in any 
organization after a turnaround. 
 After any scandal or trouble, especially in higher education, the potential exists 
for tarnished reputation. As such, any turnaround demands that the organization improve 
its reputation and image, both internally and externally. Internally, it is important to 
restore some of the faith and character of the university with its internal stakeholders – 
faculty, staff, and administrative employees. Externally, the community, university 
system, region, potential students, and donors have likely lost faith in the college or 
university. Because of this fallout, improving the reputation of the institution of higher 
education is directly tied to its success in recruiting students as well as supporters of the 
organization throughout the university community both at the individual and 
organizational level. Therefore, the profession would be wise to look to restore the 
internal and external image of the entity, not only to restore trust, but to revitalize their 
enrollment, decrease turnover of employees, and recapture lost revenue from donors and 
students. The profession should analyze the most appropriate venues and opportunities to 
provide a clear, consistent message of change – admitting the organization’s failings as 
well as executing and completing exacting steps of correction. It is also important to 
assess whether these changes in reputation and trust are viewed as short or long-term 
changes to assess the strength of the turnaround over time. 
 Supporting the overall intention of turning the entity in a new direction after a 
series of scandals, the organizational culture must shift away from its dark past. Puffer 
and McCarthy (2008) provided that “turning around a company ethically, financially, and 
strategically [first] requires a compelling vision to motivate executives and employees” 
(p. 305). A culture shift from the previous patterns of behavior driven by the “old guard” 
and slipshod controls demands an improved culture with a higher level of trust and 
honesty embraced by leadership (Epstein, 2003; Puffer & McCarthy, 2008; Sims, 2000). 
For real change in higher education after a turnaround, there must be a reshaping and 
improving of the organizational culture and climate. When completing this turnaround, 
the college or university must stamp out the previous culture with all force and create a 
new, positive, changed culture with openness, trust, honesty, and integrity. This 
reformation is supported by removing the “old guard” in its entirety, increasing the 
marketing efforts to new consumers, changing the vision and culture, but also increasing 
transparency of organizational decisions within the college or university and the 
community at large. 
Contributions to the university under study.	  
Overall, roughly 80% of respondents indicated that the university had either 
“somewhat” or “to a very large extent” had successfully begun the turnaround to date. 
The university did undertake some of the turnaround activities provided in the literature, 
though not all. The previous CEO (university president) was removed and a new 
president installed with the intention of rooting out the previous administration’s 
management style and organizational climate (Hofer, 1980; Sims, 2000). While there 
were weak correlations regarding centralization and decentralization activities with the 
success of the turnaround, there was significant restructuring of the organization in 
regards to moving departments, authority, and function to different areas. Therefore, 
while respondents did not perceive these activities as major influences to the turnaround, 
they still supported the overall organizational change (Kavanagh, 2008). The survey 
instrument did not ask respondents about changing the reward structure or instituting a 
Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer, and there was no anecdotal evidence that the 
university undertook these steps (Ackermann, 2005; Kavanagh, 2008; Meisler, 2004; 
Sims, 2000). 
 The negative correlations of the retrenchment activities that were statistically 
significant (contracted activities and services scope, eliminated particular services, 
decreased service expenditure, partially/temporarily exited from specific services, 
liquidated assets in order to raise capital, reduced/suspended capital expenditures, closed 
down public organizations, created stronger financial controls, and decreased financial 
support to other organizations) also provided interesting results. The fact that 
retrenchment activities were negatively correlated, though weakly, to the perception of 
success indicated that respondents perceived retrenchment activities as actually hurting 
the turnaround. Perhaps respondents viewed the retrenchment activities as “pulling back” 
and hurting the university’s forward progress. 
 A number of the repositioning activities showed positive, though weak to 
moderate, correlations with the turnaround. These activities included establishing new 
services, entering into joint activities/co-operated with other agencies, extending 
activities and scope of services, extending availability of services, extending marketing 
efforts (reaching out) to new consumers, increasing service expenditures, modernizing 
capacity of services with equipment utilizing new technologies, beginning to provide 
services/internal services that were previously purchased, redefining core missions, 
ensuring high quality of services, improving the local authority’s internal and external 
image, introducing new ways of implementation, and rebuilding stakeholders trust in the 
local authority. These results indicated that growing the university’s reputation as well as 
footprint in the community positively influenced the perception of the turnaround. These 
activities generally coincided with forward progress as the organization was aligning its 
mission, vision, and operations to create a higher-quality product of education that is 
becoming a well-thought of and valued member of the community. 
 This study revealed a number of recommendations for the university and its 
management to make adjustments to continue turning around the organization. The 
mission of the organization is explicitly stated and published, but the organization needs 
an improved understanding and communication of the organization’s vision, strategic 
direction, and goals of management. While the organization as of late has initiated or 
revamped a few programs and directions as understood by the participants in this 
research, the vision and direction needs to be not only understood by the university 
community at large, but embraced. In addition, as the university moves out of operating 
as if still in a crisis, the overall culture needs to be strengthened and embraced by the 
entire university community and shared with the external community across the state and 
region. As much of the “old guard” has left the university, the current management 
should take care to distance itself from past mistakes positively by creating an overall 
aligned direction with clear strategic and operational goals that are published and 
clarified to remove all opacity. Once the university goals and direction are distributed 
within the internal university community, every department (academic and operational) 
should provide individual strategic and operational goals for their functional units as well 
as measurable outcomes. 
 To continue the process of rebuilding trust and faith in the organization, 
management should also demonstrate their competence and the competence of the 
university, ensure quality, increase procedural fairness, strengthen communication, and 
focus on disseminating information about the improved legal and financial compliance of 
the entity (Caldwell & Jeffries, 2001). Institutional stakeholders must not only perceive, 
but believe in the competence of management without questioning the integrity and 
honesty of their motives to improve trust (Caldwell & Jeffries, 2001). Denton (2009) 
provided that organizations can rebuild and improve trust by delivering truthful, accurate, 
and timely information. Because the university and its management needs to express both 
confidence and trustworthiness to its internal and external stakeholders, it is 
recommended that management increase communications across the university with as 
personal and involved focus as possible. 
 As respondents viewed a number of repositioning activities as positively 
correlated with the success of the turnaround to date, the university should increase those 
activities. Examples would include establishing new services or programs, perhaps by 
encouraging new methods of delivering courses and programs that appealed to larger 
markets of students. By increasing technology available to students and programs as well 
as encouraging new program development while reinforcing the core mission and 
refining the organization’s vision, introducing new methods of implementation of 
operations as well as programs could increase student enrollment. These new programs 
and services should be heavily marketed to new, potential customers, while capitalizing 
on the specific needs of the booming regional economy as well as the market of military 
veterans moving to the area to work in the local economy. 
 It is also important to note that at the time of this research, the university’s 
affiliated organization, the university alumni foundation, was undergoing its own 
operational, strategic, and financial crisis. While this entity was legally separated from 
the university under study, its actions influenced the opinions and trust of the internal and 
external community in the university. The university will need to use the techniques, 
communication improvements, and repositioning activities as listed above to protect the 
university from the actions of the foundation while fulfilling its mission as the public 
again loses faith in the entity.  	  
Recommendations for Future Research 	  
 Specific research might include a method or design for longitudinal research at 
this university, assessing the same factors at a later date to determine the progress of the 
turnaround over time. As the question in this research was whether the university’s 
faculty, staff, and members of administration perceived a process/path illustrative of a 
turnaround, there is no easy answer. At this point in time, members perceived a beginning 
of turnaround, but the responses indicated that more work and time are likely needed to 
determine the turnaround’s long-term success or failure. Through a longitudinal study 
after the above recommendations have been instituted, it may be possible to more fully 
understand the progress of a turnaround in a public institution of higher education.  
 Turnaround management has been applied to business organizations for several 
decades, but as previously mentioned, very little formal work has been completed in the 
area of higher education. As such, the instrument used in this research was not a perfect 
fit. A number of respondents provided anecdotal comments stating that the instrument 
had questions that were not applicable to the university’s situation, some of questions 
were more applicable to business or government, and that some of the questions were 
overly complicated. While these were anecdotal comments that could not be quantified or 
widely assessed, they did raise the issue that the specific issues in institutions of higher 
education might be best served with an instrument uniquely designed for colleges and 
universities. Future research should focus upon creating and/or adapting an instrument to 
survey retrenchment, repositioning, and reorganization activities specific to educational 
entities and their stakeholders. 	  
Limitations	  
 This dissertation’s major limitations centered upon the survey methodology, 
combined with the fact that the respondents to the survey were self-selected and may 
have been those individuals that may have been especially interested in the research 
and/or the turnaround. While the established instrument was found to be reliable and 
valid, the findings are largely generalizable, but not entirely. In addition, survey fatigue 
was suspected as the number of valid responses per question began to decrease as the 
survey progressed. 
 Another limitation was that because only currently employed individuals at the 
university were surveyed, many of the individuals that were directly influenced, engaged 
in, and/or hurt by previous management and the university’s actions had already exited 
the university and therefore were not available for research. Because the survey went out 
to every currently employed individual at the institution, no matter the length of their 
employment, the responses were skewed as the opinions and perceptions of the 
individuals studied were those that were either emotionally committed to changing the 
university or were “stuck” without the sufficient desire/ability to leave. Because the 
research questioned how current employees perceived the turnaround, no former 
employees were surveyed, resulting in a skewed data pool. In addition, the employees 
that were not with the university at the time of the ethical breach or during the early 
stages of the turnaround and were hired later may not have the information or experience 
in the entity to fully assess the turnaround because of their shorter employment. 
Ultimately, these limitations indicate potentially skewed data and responses. 
 As the risk of discomfort was possible for the respondents due to the emotional 
trauma from the experience of the breach and turnaround, this risk likely limited the 
amount and types of responses. Respondents were also operating with a concern of 
anonymity as suspected by the decreased number of responses to demographic questions. 
Though this risk was substantially mitigated by vetting and approval from both the 
George Fox Institutional Review Board as well as the university’s Institutional Review 
Board, the concern about anonymity and/or confidentiality may have also biased or 
limited the responses. In addition, because of the need to protect the anonymity and 
confidentiality of employees, the organization’s Institutional Research Board disallowed 
a number of potential demographic questions, including questions regarding whether or 
not employees were tenured, when they were hired, how long they had been at the 
university, etc. This restraint was discovered in discussions with the Chair of the 
Institutional Review Board before official submission. (A. Stark, personal 
communication, May 2, 2014). 
Given that the study focused on a single population, bounded by unique 
experiences, generalization may not be consistently appropriate. This limitation provides 
that it is up to the reader of the research to determine how much or which elements of this 
study are generalizable to other situations. The specific market and issues were unique to 
the organization at that point in time, though the potential exists for other universities and 
colleges in the future to find themselves in similar situations or circumstances with 
comparable consequences. While the existing research substantiates and supports the 
theories of ethical turnarounds and organizational course change, the concepts may not be 
applicable to all institutions of higher education. Therefore, the results may not be 
replicable in other cases or to the populations of other educational institutions. 	  
Conclusions	  
 The final interpretation of the results of this research, in light of the research 
problem, indicates partial success in the turnaround. Overall, these results demonstrate 
that the university has begun the process and path of a turnaround, at least as perceived 
by many of the employees at the university in question. However, this does not mean that 
the process of the turnaround is completed and far more work is needed, as evidenced by 
the number of respondents that did not see positive change in various areas. As this 
university has been used by others as a warning against bad behavior and held up as an 
example of what not to do, the academic community can use the results from this 
example and research to make course corrections and improvements in their own 
organizations, using this entity’s hard-earned wisdom. 
 Ultimately, the university began its turnaround in its effort to regain its honor, 
integrity, and ethics. In an attempt to reverse the trend that “he who has forfeited his 
honor can lose nothing more” (Syrus, as cited in Lyman, 1856, p. 31), turning around an 
organization to restore the broken faith in the entity is extremely challenging. Yet the 
organization “cannot be always torn in two. [It] will have to be one and whole, for many 
years. [It has] so much to enjoy, and to be, and to do” (Tolkien, 1965, p. 382). The steps 
that the university has taken have started it on the road to recovery, but can serve both the 
academy and the profession by being an example of both failure and positive change as a 
phoenix rising from the ashes of its own malaise. This research bridged the gap between 
the corporate world of turnaround management to higher education, though not without 
its challenges. More research is required both at the university in question as well as 
others to continue studying turnarounds in higher education to encourage the 
improvement and transition of colleges and universities through problems to stable 
futures.  
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 Appendix A: Respondent Solicitation	  
The following letters were sent soliciting the participation of subjects in the research 
study. 
Initial E-mail to Inform of Survey	  
 
Good afternoon, [insert name here]! 
 
As you may know, I have been diligently working on my dissertation these past months. 
The time has come for me to actually execute the research. Per approvals from the 
campus Institutional Review Board (see attached), I have been given the go-ahead to 
survey all of you for my research. Whether you have been at [the university] one day or 
thirty years – YOUR input is important! 
  
The procedure is detailed in a personal invitation in this email. Please click the following 
link: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/S8BRGLS to complete the survey and claim your 
optional thank you gift. I very much value your assistance and support in this research 
project. Also detailed in the link is all information regarding anonymity and 
confidentiality – you are completely anonymous and all information is entirely 
confidential. 
  
Thank you for your consideration and assistance in this matter. I greatly appreciate your 
support and aid in completing this research. Your contribution of roughly 15 minutes is 
most appreciated! If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to shoot me an email 
or track me down – I will be happy to answer any questions or explain the purposes of the 
research in more detail. 
  
Thank you! 
Kindest regards, 
Ashley 
 
Ashley B. Stark, Doctoral Candidate 
George Fox University 
Newberg, OR 
 
Week 1 Follow-Up E-mail (after Initial Invitation)	  
 
Good afternoon! 
 
By now, all of you should have received your personal invitation to participate in the 
research for my dissertation. I just wanted to follow up with you all and request your 
assistance in completing this research. I can personally attest from the data I have 
received so far that the strictest protocols of confidentiality and anonymity are being 
achieved. This is why I am sending ALL of you this message again! Unless I have 
received your printout about the thank you gift, I have no idea who has completed my 
survey and who has not! : ) 
 
I have not yet achieved the critical mass of respondents in this survey, so I respectfully 
request your continued patience with me to complete this survey. Also, please take note 
on at the end of the survey as to the thank you gift of $15 to the university bookstore or 
Amazon gift card – your choice! 
 
Here is the link to the survey: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/S8BRGLS just in case. If 
you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at any time. Thank you again 
for your support and willingness to participate in my dissertation research. Please feel 
free to ask any questions – I am happy to help! 
 
Thank you! 
Sincerest regards, 
Ashley 
 
Ashley B. Stark, Doctoral Candidate 
George Fox University 
Newberg, OR 
 
Week 2 Follow-Up E-mail (after Initial Invitation)	  
 
Good afternoon! 
 
I am sure that you all are getting a bit sick of my emails regarding my dissertation 
research. However, I come to beg your indulgence just a bit longer as I have not yet 
received the sufficient sample population to complete my research. I need a mere 12 
more! So if you thought you did not matter to the survey – YOU DO MATTER! Here is 
the link, just in case you need it: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/S8BRGLS 
 
If you have already done the survey, please disregard this email, with my thanks. Thank 
you all again for your willingness to support my research. Once I reach critical mass in 
my sample size, I will send everyone their thank you gifts of $15 to the university 
bookstore or Amazon.com gift certificates. 
 
Thank you! 
Sincerest regards, 
Ashley 
 
Ashley B. Stark, Doctoral Candidate 
George Fox University 
Newberg, OR 
 
Week 3 Follow-Up E-mail (after Initial Invitation)	  
 
Good evening, [the university]! 
 
I just wanted to send you all a little update regarding my survey. I have reached sufficient 
sample size and am ready to proceed on the next step towards completing my 
dissertation. This would not have been possible without all of you!!! I will be sending the 
thank you gifts requested in the survey this week and next. 
 
Thank you to everyone who participated in my research – each and every one of you are 
appreciated. 
Kindest regards, 
Ashley 
 
  
 Appendix B: Statement of Informed Consent and Communications	  
The Statement of Informed Consent	  
 
The Statement of Informed Consent was provided in the initial web page of the survey for 
respondents. Participants read the following and progressed through the survey after 
clicking the “I accept” button. 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research. Please click the following link: 
________________________ to participate. By participating in this research, you are 
engaging in a healthy exploration about understanding how a university can move 
forward after an ethical issue. At the end of the survey, you will have the option to input 
your name or fill out a paper form to receive a thank you gift of either a $15 university 
bookstore or Amazon.com gift card. 
 
Purpose of the Study: 
The purpose of this study is to examine the perspectives of university employees about 
the turnaround at the university. 
 
What will be done: 
You will complete a survey, requiring approximately 15-30 minutes to complete. The 
survey includes some demographic questions to describe the general population under 
study. 
 
Benefits of this Study: 
You will be contributing to the understanding about the changes at the university to 
determine whether the organization and its leadership demonstrated a process/path of an 
ethical turnaround. 
 
Risks or discomforts: 
There are some potential discomforts in taking part in this study. Because it brings up 
issues of trust, belief and confidence in management, and memories of the university’s 
difficulties, you may be uncomfortable answering questions. If you feel in any way 
uncomfortable with a question, you are free to skip that question or withdraw from the 
study altogether. 
 
Confidentiality: 
Your responses will be kept completely confidential and anonymous. The researcher 
will NOT know your IP address when you respond to the Internet survey. There will be 
NO WAY to identify you individually, as every potentially identifiable demographic 
question provides the opportunity to answer “I prefer not to answer.” The researcher is 
utilizing SurveyMonkey.com BECAUSE it prevents the researcher from acquiring ANY 
individually identifiable information. Only the researcher will be able to access the 
numerical survey data via a report from SurveyMonkey.com and there will be NO WAY 
to determine who provided the various responses. The data will be stored in an offsite, 
secure location with no association to the university. There is NO WAY to determine 
who responds to any questions or even identify whether a single individual responded to 
the survey as it was sent out through this paper invitation. The data will NOT be turned 
over to the university administration and no one (save the researcher) at the university 
will have access to the data. Even if you submit your name for the thank you gift, your 
name CANNOT be matched with your responses. 
 
Contact information: 
If you have concerns or questions about this study, please contact Ashley B. Stark 
(ashley.b.stark@gmail.com or astark10@georgefox.edu) or Dr. Paul Shelton 
(pshelton@georgefox.edu), Committee Chairperson. 
 
By beginning the survey, you acknowledge that you have read this information and agree 
to participate in this research, with the knowledge that you are free to withdraw your 
participation at any time without penalty. 
 
OPTION to Receive a Thank You Gift: 
As this experience will require taking some of your time, you have the OPTION to 
submit your name for a thank you gift. The researcher will be providing a thank you gift 
of a $15 university bookstore or Amazon.com gift certificate to every participant. To 
maintain the STRICTEST confidentiality and anonymity in the research, if you are 
interested in entering in receiving the gift after you have completed the electronic 
(online) survey via SurveyMonkey.com, please fill out the following information on the 
link OR on paper and return it to the researcher via campus mail, certifying that you 
completed the online survey. 
 
Please note: There is NO WAY for the researcher to connect the electronic responses to 
any paper submission. There is no personally identifiable information requested on the 
survey, and all data is submitted to the researcher via electronic reports. 
 
 
Send to: Ashley Stark, May Hall 308 
 
 
Name: 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
I completed the survey – please send me a $15 gift card: 
 
1) AMAZON.com or                  ________ 
2) University bookstore  ________ 
 
Preferred E-mail Address (to send the electronic certificate to): 
___________________________ 
 
 
  
 Appendix C: Survey Instruments	  
Demographic Questions	  
1) What is your gender?  
a. Male 
b. Female 
c. “I prefer not to answer” 
 
2) What is your age? 
a. Younger than 20 
b. 21-30 
c. 31-40 
d. 41-50 
e. 51-60 
f. older than 60 
g. “I prefer not to answer” 
 
3) What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
a. Some high school 
b. High school graduate or equivalent 
c. Some college 
d. Bachelor’s degree 
e. Master’s degree 
f. Doctoral degree 
g. “I prefer not to answer” 
 
4) Which of the following best describes your position here? 
a. Completely/Mostly Administrative 
b. Half Administrative/Half Faculty 
c. Completely/Mostly Faculty 
d. Completely/Mostly Staff 
e. “I prefer not to answer” 
 
5) Which of the following best describes your department in the organization? 
a. College of Arts and Sciences (Dean or under Dean of CAS) 
b. College of Education, Business, and Applied Sciences (Dean or under 
Dean of CEBAS) 
c. Finance and Administration (VP or under Vice President of Finance & 
Admin) 
d. Student Development (VP or under Vice President of Student 
Development) 
e. Enrollment Services and Communications (ED or under Executive 
Director of Enrollment Services and Communications) 
f. Position within Academic Affairs (VPAA or under VPAA) 
g. Athletics (Director or under Director of Intercollegiate Athletics) 
h. Other position (President or other positions that report directly to the 
President) 
i. “I prefer not to answer” 
 
6) Which of the following best describes your managerial role at the university? 
a. Upper or middle management (Ex. Dean/Director or above) 
b. Junior management (Ex. Assist Director/Department Chair, etc.) 
c. Do not manage other DSU employees (not including work study students) 
d. “I prefer not to answer” 
 
7) How do you describe your level of participation in extracurricular activities on 
campus? 
a. I attend an average of more than five on campus extracurricular activities 
(sporting events, events celebrating the arts, symposiums, etc.) per month. 
b. I attend an average of five on campus extracurricular activities (sporting 
events, events celebrating the arts, symposiums, etc.) per month. 
c. I attend an average of four on campus extracurricular activities (sporting 
events, events celebrating the arts, symposiums, etc.) per month. 
d. I attend an average of three on campus extracurricular activities (sporting 
events, events celebrating the arts, symposiums, etc.) per month. 
e. I attend an average of two on campus extracurricular activities (sporting 
events, events celebrating the arts, symposiums, etc.) per month. 
f. I attend an average of one on campus extracurricular activities (sporting 
events, events celebrating the arts, symposiums, etc.) per month. 
g. I attend an average of less than one on campus extracurricular activities 
(sporting events, events celebrating the arts, symposiums, etc.) per month. 
h. “I prefer not to answer” 
 
8) How do you describe the number of hours per week you spend on campus 
executing your specific job duties? 
a. An average of more than 50 hours per week during the traditional school 
year. 
b. An average of 46-50 hours per week during the traditional school year. 
c. An average of 41-45 hours per week during the traditional school year. 
d. An average of 36-40 hours per week during the traditional school year. 
e. An average of 31-35 hours per week during the traditional school year. 
f. An average of 26-30 hours per week during the traditional school year. 
g. An average of 21-25 hours per week during the traditional school year. 
h. An average of 16-20 hours per week during the traditional school year. 
i. An average of 11-15 hours per week during the traditional school year. 
j. An average of 10 hours or less per week during the traditional school year. 
k. “I prefer not to answer” 
 
9) How do you describe the number of hours per week you spend off campus 
executing your specific job duties? 
a. An average of more than 50 hours per week during the traditional school 
year. 
b. An average of 46-50 hours per week during the traditional school year. 
c. An average of 41-45 hours per week during the traditional school year. 
d. An average of 36-40 hours per week during the traditional school year. 
e. An average of 31-35 hours per week during the traditional school year. 
f. An average of 26-30 hours per week during the traditional school year. 
g. An average of 21-25 hours per week during the traditional school year. 
h. An average of 16-20 hours per week during the traditional school year. 
i. An average of 11-15 hours per week during the traditional school year. 
j. An average of 10 hours or less per week during the traditional school year. 
k. “I prefer not to answer” 
 
10) In terms of the problems that the university has faced, on a scale of 1-5, (1-
Hardly; 2-Very Little; 3-Neutral; 4-Somewhat; 5-To a Very Large Extent), how 
“major” would you define the violation of trust/difficulties that the university due 
to the issues brought to light in the 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 academic years?, 
also “I prefer not to answer.” 
 
11) Overall, how would you rate the “success” of the process/path of the turnaround 
to date? (1-Hardly; 2-Very Little; 3-Neutral; 4-Somewhat; 5-To a Very Large 
Extent), also “I prefer not to answer.” 
 
 
  
 Turnaround Management Strategies in Local Authorities Scale (Beeri, 2009)	  
Turnaround Management Strategies in Local Authorities Scale 
            
Retrenchment: Over the past 
four years, the local authority: 
Hardly 
at All 
Very 
Little Neutral 
Somewha
t 
To a 
Very 
Large 
Extent 
Contracted activities and services 
scope           
Eliminated particular services           
Decreased service expenditure           
Partially/temporarily exited from 
specific services           
Liquidated assets in order to raise 
capital           
Reduced/suspended capital 
expenditures           
Closed down public organizations           
Created stronger financial control           
Decreased financial support to 
other organizations           
      
Repositioning: Over the past 
four years, the local authority: 
Hardly 
at All 
Very 
Little Neutral 
Somewha
t 
To a 
Very 
Large 
Extent 
Established new services           
Entered into joint activities/co-
operated with other agencies           
Extended activities and scope of 
services           
Changed the priorities of 
traditional activities           
Rented/sold/mortgaged assets           
Extended availability of services           
Extended marketing efforts 
(reaching out) to new consumers           
Increased service expenditure           
Modernized capacity of services 
with equipment utilizing new 
technologies           
Began to provide services/internal 
services that were previously 
purchased           
Loaned money/asked for 
subvention for reorganization 
purposes           
Privatized services           
Increased average price of 
services/levying money           
Redefined core missions           
Ensured high quality of services           
Improved the local authority’s 
internal and external image           
Introduced new ways of 
implementation           
Rebuilt stakeholders trust in the 
local authority           
      
Reorganization: Over the past 
four years, the local authority: 
Hardly 
at All 
Very 
Little Neutral 
Somewha
t 
To a 
Very 
Large 
Extent 
Replaced the chief executive 
officer           
Changed the internal local 
authority structure           
Replaced senior and middle 
managers           
Took centralization steps           
Took decentralization steps           
Increased time and efforts in 
researching consumers’ needs           
Increased time and efforts in 
becoming a learning organization           
Made changes in human resources 
management style           
Reshaped and improved the 
organizational culture and climate           
Invested in staff skills training           
Defined a common vision of the 
local authority           
Diagnosed the local authority 
strengths and weaknesses           
Formulated an organizational 
working plan           
Fought the denial and resistance of 
employees           
 
  
 Permission to Use the Turnaround Management Strategies in Local Authorities Scale	  
Dear Dr. Beeri ~ 
My name is Ashley Stark and I am presently a doctoral candidate at George Fox 
University in Newberg, Oregon, in the United States. I am presently working on my 
dissertation proposal for research titled "The Management of Ethical Turnarounds in a 
Public Institution of Higher Education," under the direction of my committee chaired by 
Dr. Paul Shelton. 
As you know, the field of management has built a wealth of literature on turnaround 
management as well as the effect unethical actions have upon organizations. In addition, 
academics and practitioners have developed a substantial body of research on ethical 
leadership. However, there has been less study on the application of these topics to 
ethical turnarounds specifically in small, regional, public institutions of higher education. 
It is important that an institution of higher education that has been affected by an ethical 
failure of any sort execute a turnaround to restore trust and faith in the organization, 
internally and externally. 
That being said, I, like you, have had trouble finding an appropriate instrument to 
measure turnarounds in organizations outside of the corporate setting. Coming across 
your instrument, I was ecstatic as it is highly applicable to my population of a small, 
regional, public (state) university. Therefore I am writing you to request permission to 
utilize your Turnaround Management Strategies in Local Authorities Scale in my study.  
I would like your permission to reproduce and use your survey instrument in my research 
study, under the following conditions: 
1) I will use this survey only for my research study and will not sell it or use it with any 
compensated or curriculum development activities. 
2) I will include the copyright statement on all copies (including electronic) of the 
instrument. 
If these are acceptable terms and conditions, please indicate so by signing a copy of this 
letter and returning it to me either through postal mail, fax, or e-mail: 
Ashley B. Stark 
PO Box 1634 
Dickinson, ND 58601 USA 
Fax: (701) 483-2537 (Attn: Ashley Stark) 
Email: astark10@georgefox.edu or ashley.stark@dickinsonstate.edu 
Thank you for your consideration! 
 
Sincerest regards, 
Ashley B. Stark 
Doctoral Candidate 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dear Ashley B. Stark 
Doctoral Candidate 
These terms and conditions are acceptable. Please feel free to use any materials I 
published. For your convenience, I attached some of my relevant works. Good luck with 
your research. I'd be happy to read your dissertation and I'd be happy to consider 
cooperation in future publications. 
  
_________________________________________27.1.2014______ 
Signature                                                                     Date 
  
 Appendix D: Instrument Reliability and Validity	  
Turnaround Management Strategies in Local Authorities Scale (Beeri, 2009)	  
 
Correlation matrix for TMSLA factors (Cronbach’s alpha in parentheses). 
Factor No.  
Mea
n SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Reorganization 
at the institutional 
level 4.08  0.71  
(0.870
)        
2. Retrenchment of 
services 2.58  0.89  0.015  
(0.740
)       
3. Repositioning as 
reaching out 3.35  0.79  0.541  0.018  
(0.820
)      
4. Reorganization 
as extent of 
centralization 2.90  0.63  0.099  0.196  0.385  
(0.620
)     
5. Repositioning as 
innovative services 3.64  0.73  0.544  0.231  0.673  0.356  
(0.860
)    
6. Retrenchment of 
expenditures 2.70  0.61  0.047  0.353  0.057  0.047  0.283  (0.560)   
7. Repositioning as 
renewing 
relationship 3.22  0.58  0.626  0.210  0.685  0.257  0.599  0.157  (0.540)  
8. Reorganization 
at the personnel 
level 4.00  0.89  0.239  0.192  0.155  0.294  0.204  0.180  0.189  (0.690) 
N = 83–85.                     
p < 0.01. One item was reversed for the Cronbach’s alpha procedure. p < 0.05. 
  
 Appendix E: Institutional Review Board Approvals	  
 
 
 
HUMAN SUBJECTS REVIEW COMMITTEE  
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS INITIAL REVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
[Note: Dissertation, or other formal research proposal, need not be submitted with 
this form. However, relevant section(s) may need to be attached in some cases, in 
addition to filling out this form completely, but only when it is not possible to 
answer these questions adequately in this format. Do not submit a proposal in lieu of 
filling out this form. In addition, review carefully the full text of the Human 
Subjects Research Committee Policies and Procedures on page 4 of the Research 
Manual.]  
 
Date submitted: May 5, 2014    Date received: 
__________________ 
 
Title of Proposed Research:  
 
The Management of a Turnaround after an Ethical Breach in a Public Institution of 
Higher Education 
_________________________________________________________________  
 
Principal Researcher(s):  
 
Ashley 
Stark_______________________________________________________________  
 
Degree Program _Doctorate of Business Administration – Concentration in 
Management__ 
 
Rank/Academic Standing: Doctoral 
Candidate____________________________________  
 
Other Responsible Parties (if a student, include faculty sponsor; list other involved parties 
and their role): 
  
Paul Shelton, Ph.D., MBA, Doctoral Committee Chair 
______________________________  
(**Please include identifying information on page 6 also.)  
 
(1) Characteristics of Subjects (including age range, status, how obtained, etc): 
 
The approximately 250 subjects are faculty members, staff members, and members of 
administration at Dickinson State University. They range in age from approximately 20 
to mid-70s. Including both men and women, varying in age, department, position, job, 
and level of responsibility, these subjects all work for Dickinson State University in 
either a full-time or part-time capacity. This is a convenience sample at Dickinson State 
University accessed after the research will obtain proper permissions from DSU’s 
Institutional Review Board. 
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(2) Describe any risks to the subjects (physical, psychological, social, economic, or 
discomfort/ inconvenience): 
 
Because the issues at Dickinson State were so personal and poignant to the participants, 
there is the potential for both discomfort and inconvenience to the participants. The 
survey instrument is designed to look at the improvements at Dickinson State, but might 
bring up memories of the downturn of the university. Because the past issues resulted in 
feelings of uncertainty, it will be necessary to protect participants’ identities and 
confidentiality, as well as giving participants an ‘out’ if they do not want to complete the 
survey. In addition, this survey is estimated to require 15-30 minutes and will be sent to 
work e-mail addresses. 
 
(3) Are the risks to subjects minimized (a) by using procedures which are consistent with 
sound research design and which do not unnecessarily expose subjects to risk, and (b) 
whenever appropriate, by using procedures already being performed on the subjects for 
diagnostic or treatment purposes?  
 
Degree of risk:  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
low       high  
 
It is the express purpose of the design of this research to specifically mitigate against 
risks as much as possible. First, adequate permissions to proceed will be obtained from 
Dickinson State University’s Institutional Review Board. Second, because the research 
will be executed through an anonymous survey instrument through SurveyMonkey.com, 
the researcher will receive only numerical results with no identifying personal 
information, affirming that fact to the participants. Requesting permissions from 
Dickinson State will demonstrate institutional support. Protecting participants’ responses, 
confidentiality, and identities, even from the researcher through SurveyMonkey.com, 
while achieving management support to complete the instrument will mitigate the risks to 
subjects. 
 
(4) Briefly describe the objectives, methods and procedures used: 
 
This research will utilize a non-experimental survey designed from one instrument – 
Turnaround Management Strategies in Local Authorities (Beeri, 2009). The objectives of 
the research is to determine if Dickinson State University and its leadership demonstrated 
a process/path of an ethical turnaround after a period of serious crisis. 
 
The research site of Dickinson State University was chosen due to its period of 
substantial organizational change and potential for turnaround after its internal 
difficulties, as well as the researcher’s access to the population, records, and data related 
to the site. There have been comparatively few publicized examples of ethical 
turnarounds in higher education, therefore this research will provide an analysis of how 
participants perceive the organizational turnaround. In addition, because this site involves 
a number of complex issues that have been publicized in the local, state, and national 
media, there are a number of data sources. 
 
Because this study will be of a specific organization, adequate permission will also be 
sought from Dickinson State University via request via its Institutional Review Board. 
The identities and positions of all participants will be obscured to all users including the 
primary researcher through statistical sampling via SurveyMonkey.com to maintain 
confidentiality and anonymity. 
 
Because this research will be undertaken at the researcher’s place of employment, the 
researcher will approach Dickinson State University’s management to request permission 
to conduct the study and work with the University’s Institutional Review Board. Once the 
proper permissions are achieved, the SurveyMonkey.com platform that combines the 
demographic questions and instrument will be distributed via the researcher’s personal 
email to faculty and staff members (email addresses obtained from public record). The e-
mail will detail the purpose of the survey and its importance, as well as provide a 
statement of thanks and contact information for the researcher for debriefing. Once the 
initial emails are sent to the Dickinson State University faculty and staff, follow-up e-
mails will be sent weekly for three to four weeks to encourage additional responses. 
Participants will be offered a thank you gift of a bookstore or Amazon.com gift card. 
Once the data is collected via SurveyMonkey.com, various statistical methods will be 
used to assess the results to determine potential relationships within the data – regression 
and correlation, among others. 
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(5) Briefly describe any instruments used in the study (attach a copy of each). 
 
The survey will use a survey designed from the Turnaround Management Strategies in 
Local Authorities instrument. This instrument has been vetted by prior researchers. The 
survey uses a five-point Likert-scale to ask if organizations executed various strategies in 
retrenchment, repositioning, and reorganization, and to what extent management utilized 
these strategies as perceived by participants (employees). 
 
See Appendix for Survey Instruments. 
 
(6) How does the research plan make adequate provision for monitoring the data 
collected so as to insure the safety, privacy and confidentiality of subjects?  
 
Responses collected via SurveyMonkey.com will be kept completely confidential. Not 
only will the researcher not know the participant’s IP address, but there will be no way to 
identify subjects individually, as every potentially identifiable demographic question 
provides the opportunity to answer “I prefer not to answer.” The data will be accessed 
from SurveyMonkey.com with only the numerical responses available. In addition, only 
the researcher will be able to access the numerical survey data and will not be 
individually identifiable. The data will be stored in an offsite, secure location. 
 
(7) Briefly describe the benefits that may be reasonably expected from the proposed 
study, both to the subject and to the advancement of scientific knowledge – are the risks 
to subjects reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits? 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the perspectives of Dickinson State University 
(DSU) employees about the turnaround at DSU, leadership, and trust. Participants will be 
contributing to the understanding about the changes at Dickinson State University to 
determine whether DSU and its leadership demonstrated a process/path of an ethical 
turnaround. The results of this study will be used for scholarly purposes in education and 
business to assist other organizations in their organizational turnarounds, adding to the 
body of knowledge in the field. 
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(8) Where some or all of the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue 
influence (such as children, persons with acute or severe physical or mental illness, or 
persons who are economically or educationally disadvantaged), what appropriate 
additional safeguards are included in the study to protect the rights and welfare of these 
individuals?  
 
This issue is not applicable. None of the participants fall into the categories of vulnerable 
populations. 
 
(9) Does the research place participants "at risk"? _yes – to a minor degree________ If 
so, describe the procedures employed for obtaining informed consent (in every case, 
attach copy of informed consent form; if none, explain).  
 
As this research will be undertaken using SurveyMonkey.com at the will of participants, the methodology 
will allow willing participants to submit answers anonymously, but unwilling participants will simply not 
engage in the study. To ensure informed consent, the attached statement will be provided on the face of the 
instrument in SurveyMonkey.com as well as the original e-mail request to take the survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 Appendix F: Additional Statistical Tables, Matrices, and Graphics	  
Graph 1	  
How Major was the Violation of Trust	  
 
Graph 2	  
Gender	  
 
Graph 3	  
Age	  
 
Graph 4	  
Education	  
 
Graph 5	  
Position at the University	  
 
Graph 6	  
Department at the University	  
 
Graph 7	  
Managerial Role at the University
 
 
Graph 8	  
On Campus Events attended at the University	  
 
Graph 9	  
Hours/Week Doing Job at the University on Campus	  
 
Graph 10	  
Hours/Week Doing Job at the University Off Campus	  
 
Graph 11	  
Retrenchment Activities	  
 
Graph 12	  
Repositioning Activities	  
 
 
Graph 13	  
Reorganization Activities	  
 
 
Table 59	  
Hypotheses 1: Full Correlation Matrix	  
 
Graph 14	  
Hypothesis 2: Created Stronger Financial Controls	  
 
Graph 15	  
Hypothesis 3: Extended Marketing Efforts to New Consumers	  
 
Graph 16	  
Hypothesis 4: Improved the Local Authority’s Internal and External Image	  
 
Graph 17	  
Hypothesis 5: Rebuilt Stakeholders Trust in the Local Authority	  
 
Graph 18	  
Hypothesis 5: Rebuilt Stakeholders Trust in the Local Authority	  
 
Graph 19	  
Hypothesis 6: Reshaped and Improved the Organizational Culture and Climate - Faculty	  
 
  
 Graph 20	  
Hypothesis 6: Reshaped and Improved the Organizational Culture and Climate - Staff	  
 
Graph 21	  
Hypothesis 9: Redefined Core Missions	  
 
Graph 22	  
Hypothesis 10: Defined a Common Vision of the Local Authority – Upper Management	  
 
Graph 23	  
Hypothesis 10: Defined a Common Vision of the Local Authority – Junior Management	  
 
Graph 24	  
Hypothesis 10: Defined a Common Vision of the Local Authority – Non-Managing	  
 
